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Abstract 
This thesis proposes theoretical grounding for pictorial language that grasps attention in the field 
of homiletics. The research consists of two parts: theoretical and analytical. The theoretical 
framework integrates rhetorical, homiletical, and neuroscience theory to explain why pictorial 
language wins attention during oration. By beginning with rhetorical and homiletical theory this 
thesis suggests that a speaker may achieve attention by creating presence through the use of 
lively and active words. This suggestion is then validated and constrained by theory in 
neuroscience to state that presence, created through oration, may appear to the brain as a sensory 
impression if the presence is made to be pictorial. Furthermore, according to theory in 
neuroscience on attention, sensory impressions have a higher probability of winning the brain’s 
attention than do other kinds of impressions that words can cause in the brain. These findings 
result in an original homiletical theory called “cynosure,” which concludes: language that 
generates pictorial presence has a higher probability of winning the ongoing competition for the 
brain’s attention than do other kinds of language because pictorial presence impacts the brain as 
a sensory impression. 
The analytical portion of this thesis involves identifying, analyzing, and testing the 
efficacy of pictorial presence to win attention. The identification and analysis focus on the 
creation of pictorial presence in the Bible and sermons, which suggest positive correlation 
between the proposed theory of cynosure and Christian oration. Furthermore, the creation of 
pictorial presence in the Bible and sermons presents potential strategies for grasping attention in 
homiletics. The testing gathered data using a sermon and questionnaire to investigate whether or 
not some of these strategies win attention. Quantitative analysis of the data indicates that 
language that creates pictorial presence is better at grasping listener attention than other kinds of 
language that do not create pictorial presence.  
	 iii 
Acknowledgments 
A thesis is the result of a community that supports and inspires a person who researches and 
writes. I am the fortunate recipient of such a community. 
Jen, you have loved me, encouraged me, celebrated me, listened to me, and sacrificed 
more than any other so that I could pursue this work. I suppose most people see my effort 
throughout this journey. I see you. I see you, keeping the life that we love and have created 
together, alive and flourishing. Thank you. 
Asher, Phoebe, and Miles, for six years—the majority of your lives—you have given me 
hugs and kisses when I leave the house to work on this thesis, and you have given me hugs and 
kisses when I return tired, sometimes encouraged and sometimes discouraged. Thank you for 
asking me how my paper is coming along and for celebrating the small victories with me along 
the way. I look forward to leaving you less often and delighting in life with you more often. 
Clark and Karyl, your tangible support and generous love are beyond measure. This 
thesis is not possible without you. Thank you. 
Karl, my kindred friend, through years of reading and discussing literature together, you 
have encouraged my soul to sing. Thank you. And thank you for practically supporting my 
academic and creative dreams with your editorial craft. 
Joseph, my beloved, throughout my entire adulthood you have been a faithful, caring, and 
ever-present friend. The meals we have shared, the trips we have taken, the tears we have shed, 
and the conversations we have had anchor my life to goodness. Thank you. 
Pearl Church, I have grown-up with you, I have been undone by you, I have been 
resurrected by you, and much of who I am today is the result of your presence in my life. Thank 
you for loving me, accepting me, and animating my growth for the last seventeen years. 
Dr. Arthurs, your encouragement and support, your clear thinking and practical advice, 
your tireless response to my ideas and drafts, and the gentleness with which you have interacted 
with me all these years, are pragmatic proof of divine love. Thank you, from the deepest places 
of my heart.  
	 iv 
List of Tables and Figures 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Top Twelve Books by Total Schools      8 
Table 2. Length of Commercials        17 
Table 3. Length of Social Media        17 
Table 4. Social Media Usage         18 
Table 5. 2016 Social Medial Daily Usage        18 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Three-Stage Strategy        38 
Figure 2. Expanded Three-Stage Strategy       41 
Figure 3. Expanded Three-Stage Strategy with Vivacity     49 
Figure 4. Expanded Three-Stage Strategy with Presence     58 
Figure 5. Stimuli Competition        72 
Figure 6. Complete Likert Scale Result for Sermon, Part One    139 
Figure 7. Complete Likert Scale Result for Sermon, Part Two    140 
Figure 8. Complete Likert Scale Result for Sermon, Part Three  142 
Figure 9. Complete Likert Scale Result for Sermon, Part Four    144 
Figure 10. Complete Likert Scale Result for Sermon, Part Five    146 
  
	 v 
Contents 
 
Abstract           ii 
 
Acknowledgments          iii 
 
List of Tables and Figures         iv 
 
Introduction           viii 
 
Research Questions         viii 
Significance of the Study        ix 
Methodology          ix 
 
1. Explaining the Need for Theoretically Grounded Methodology for Attention 1 
 
The Need for Attention Is Axiomatic in the Fields of Rhetoric and Homiletics 1 
Why the Need for Attention Is Assumed in Rhetoric and Homiletics   11 
Primary Obstacles That Preachers Face in Achieving Attention   14 
Cursory Advice and Copious Strategies      21 
The Contribution of This Thesis       25 
Conclusion          29 
 
2. Tracing a Rhetorical-Theoretical Basis for Language That Wins Attention  32 
 
The Theory of Enargeia in Greek Rhetoric      32 
Enargeia as Evidentia in Roman Rhetoric      36 
Enargeia as Vivacity in Modern Rhetoric      43 
Enargeia as Presence in Modern Rhetoric      50 
A Rhetorical-Theoretical Basis for Presence That Wins Attention   59 
Conclusion          60 
 
3. Explaining Neuroscience’s Findings on Attention     62 
 
Attention in the Brain: Current Cognitive Theory on Attention   63 
Application of Biased Competition Theory to Visual Mental Imagery  67 
Connections with Enargeia, Summary, and Conclusions    72 
 
4. Identifying and Analyzing Strategies for Pictorial Presence That Grasp  
Attention: The Gospel of John       75 
 
Discourse as Carefully Presented Signs: Allusion and Illustration   77 
“I Am” Conjuring Concrete Objects: Metaphor     85 
Word as Figure: Allusion        91 
Conclusion          95 
 
	 vi 
5. Identifying and Analyzing Strategies for Pictorial Presence That Grasp  
Attention: Case Studies        96 
 
Jonathan Edwards’ “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God”   97 
Charles Spurgeon’s “Compel Them to Come In”     110 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream”      118 
Fred Craddock’s “Doxology”        125 
Conclusion          129 
 
6. Research Design, Methods, and Results       131 
 
The Experience Sampling Method       131 
Justifying the Experience Sampling Method      132 
Applying the Experience Sampling Method to This Thesis    134 
Results          136 
Conclusion          149 
 
7. Conclusion           150 
 
Learning from the Study        151 
Methodological Critique        157 
Areas for Further Research        158 
 
Appendix A: Jonathan Edward’s Sermon “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” 160 
 
Appendix B: Charles Haddon Spurgeon’s Sermon “Compel Them to Come In” 171 
 
Appendix C: Martin Luther King Jr.’s Sermon “I Have a Dream”   180 
 
Appendix D: Fred Craddock’s Sermon “Doxology”     183 
 
Appendix E: Explanatory Page        186 
 
Appendix F: An Ode to Care        188  
 
Appendix G: Demographic Form        194 
 
Appendix H: Questionnaire Form        195 
  
Appendix I: Demographic Results        196 
 
Appendix J: Complete Likert Scale Results      199 
 
Appendix K: Full Analysis of the Likert Scale Results     202 
 
Appendix L: Complete Open-Ended Question Results     210 
	 vii 
 
Appendix M: Full Analysis of the Open-Ended Question Results   225 
 
Bibliography           229  
	 viii 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide theoretical grounding for pictorial language that grasps 
attention in the field of homiletics. This occurs in two parts. In the first part, by integrating 
rhetorical, homiletical, and neuroscience theory on attention, this thesis postulates a hypothesis: 
ideas, created through oration, have the best chance at winning the ongoing competition for the 
brain’s attention if they are made to be pictorially present. The term that I coin for this 
hypothesis is “cynosure.” Originally, Cynosure denoted the constellation Ursa Minor, and 
sometimes simply referred to the “North Star” that Ursa Minor contains. For thousands of years 
the North Star has been used to guide travelers. What is interesting about the North Star is that, 
although it is not the brightest star in the sky, something about the arrangement of the Ursa 
Minor constellation—the spacing and positioning of other stars—functions to cause the North 
Star to stand out and catch the eye. Because of this, over the years the word “cynosure” has 
evolved in meaning. Today, cynosure is both an actual star and an abstract noun referring to any 
person or thing that is a center of attention or interest.1  
In the second part of this study, by identifying, analyzing, and testing the efficacy of 
pictorial presence to win attention, this thesis authenticates the theory of cynosure. Arranging 
and employing words that stand out “visually” in the brain is verifiably better at grasping listener 
attention than the use of prosaic language. 
 
Research Questions 
The central issue that I examine in this thesis is: does pictorial language win attention better than 
prosaic language, and if so, why? The examination is aided by three questions: (1) What theories 
explain how language, aurally received, wins attention? (2) How does Christian rhetoric—
biblical and sermonic—coalesce with and contribute to theory on attention? (3) Based on a 
theoretical grounding for pictorial language, what strategies for attention can be elucidated for 
the field of homiletics? 
 
 
 
																																																						
1 Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 3rd ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), s.v. “cynosure.” 
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Significance of the Study 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the field of homiletics by proposing theoretical grounding that 
explains why pictorial language grasps attention. This contribution is necessary for three reasons. 
First, with nearly universal affirmation, homileticians agree on the importance of attention in 
preaching and many advocate for the use of employing pictorial language to grasp attention. 
However, as chapter 1 demonstrates, the field of homiletics lacks substantive theory to explain 
why such language gains attention. Second, the absence of theory that explains why pictorial 
language grasps attention makes this thesis a meaningful contribution to the field of homiletics. 
By integrating what the fields of rhetoric, homiletics, and neuroscience have to say about why 
pictorial language grasps attention, this thesis provides homiletics with theoretical grounding that 
does not currently exist. Third, this thesis provides the field of homiletics a theoretical 
foundation to explain, support, and guide the creation of strategies for attention-winning pictorial 
presence. This thesis concludes by offering a handful of strategies for pictorial presence. 
 
Methodology 
The methodology employed in this research is two-fold: theoretical and analytical. Chapters 1 to 
3 establish a theoretical basis that explains why pictorial presence wins attention. These chapters 
include an overview of attention in homiletics, the tracing of a rhetorical theory called 
“enargeia,” the neuroscience perspective on attention, and the proposal of a theory called 
“cynosure,” which explains: opportunity to win the ongoing competition for the brain’s attention 
increases if language is made to be pictorially present in the mind’s eyes. Chapters 4 to 7 analyze 
the theory established in chapters 1 to 3. These chapters include analysis of pictorial presence in 
the Bible and sermons, and the quantitative analysis of data from a test administered to see if 
pictorial language affects attention.   
Chapter 1 contextualizes what has been written about the issue of attention in the fields of 
rhetoric and homiletics and then narrows its focus to this thesis’ unique interest: to provide 
theoretical grounding for pictorial language that grasps attention. This chapter begins with an 
overview of attention in the fields of rhetoric and homiletics, explains the primary obstacles that 
preachers face in achieving attention, and then narrows its focus to strategies that use pictorial 
language to win attention. This chapter concludes that contemporary homiletics is deficient in 
providing theoretical grounding for one of its most highly lauded strategies for attention: 
	 x 
pictorial language. This conclusion is the impetus for this thesis, which is to provide an original 
contribution to homiletical theory. 
Chapter 2 explores a rhetorical-theoretical basis for pictorial language by tracing a 
rhetorical theory called “enargeia.” Spanning Greek rhetoric from 400 BCE to modern rhetoric 
in the twentieth century, this chapter identifies enargeia as a rhetoric of display, and follows it 
through its evolution in rhetorical theory to the theory of presence. The chapter concludes by 
explaining that language wins attention when it causes an impression from sensation in the mind. 
Chapter 3 continues to explore the theoretical basis for pictorial language by assessing 
chapter 2’s conclusion in light of neuroscience. This chapter begins by defining attention. It then 
explains how attention occurs in the brain. Finally, this chapter concludes by validating and 
constraining a rhetoric of presence as identified in chapter 2. According to neuroscience, sensory 
impressions do have a higher probability of winning the brain’s attention than do other kinds of 
impressions that words can cause in the brain. However, those words must function to create 
images in the mind’s eyes. This conclusion results in this chapter’s original contribution, 
“cynosure,” which explains: language that generates pictorial presence has a higher probability 
of winning the ongoing competition for the brain’s attention than do other kinds of language 
because pictorial presence impacts the brain as a sensory impression. 
Chapters 4 and 5 identify and analyze strategies for pictorial presence in Christian 
rhetoric. Chapter 4 provides a literary analysis of pictorial presence in the Gospel of John. 
Chapter 5 provides sermonic analysis of four sermons affirmed for their ability to win attention. 
Not only do these chapters support the theory of cynosure as an efficacious means of gaining 
attention, but they also begin to illuminate possible methodology for achieving attention, in 
homiletics. 
Chapter 6 tests the theory of cynosure with an experiment. It begins by explaining the 
research design and methods of the experiment. I used the Experience Sampling Method to test 
listener attention. Fifty participants listened to a sermon containing pictorial language and 
prosaic language, and I measured their attention in both. Analysis of the data indicates that 
language that creates pictorial presence is better at grasping listener attention than other kinds of 
language that do not create pictorial presence. 
	 xi 
Chapter 7 is the conclusion of the thesis. It begins by summarizing the thesis and then 
proceeds to offer learning from the study. It then provides methodological critique and proposes 
areas for further research.
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Chapter 1 
Explaining the Need for Theoretically Grounded 
Methodology for Attention 
 
This chapter contextualizes what has been written about the issue of attention in the fields of 
rhetoric and homiletics and then narrows its focus to this thesis’ unique interest: to provide 
theoretical grounding for pictorial language that grasps attention. This chapter begins with an 
overview of rhetoric and homiletics to demonstrate that the need for attention in oral 
communication is so axiomatic that the majority of rhetoricians and homileticians forgo 
explaining why it is necessary. After explaining why this is so, this chapter describes the primary 
obstacles that preachers face when attempting to achieve attention. Next, this chapter 
demonstrates that the field of homiletics has responded to the necessity of attention and the 
difficulties of gaining attention by providing strategies to win attention. However, as it will be 
explained, the copious strategies for attention and the cursory manner with which the strategies 
are suggested illuminate a gap in knowledge in homiletics today, which is theory to explain how 
language grasps attention. Finally, this chapter narrows its focus to strategies that recommend 
using pictorial language, which is a highly regarded strategy for attention and yet contemporary 
homiletics is deficient in providing theory to explain how it works. This conclusion is the 
impetus for this thesis, which is to provide the field of homiletics a theoretical grounding for how 
pictorial language grasps attention. 
 
The Need for Attention Is Axiomatic in the Fields of Rhetoric and Homiletics 
The fields of rhetoric and homiletics agree that attention is necessary in oral communication. In 
fact, the need for attention in oral communication is so axiomatic that the majority of rhetoricians 
and homileticians forgo explaining why it is necessary. Instead, when attention is mentioned, the 
focus in these fields is often two-fold. First, they offer a unanimous exhortation to speakers, “Be 
sure to grasp attention!” Second, they offer numerous methodologies for doing so: “Grasp it by 
telling a story, or by making the audience laugh, or by providing startling facts!” I describe the 
copious suggestions for gaining attention in the fourth section below, but first, I curate a brief 
history of attention in the fields of rhetoric and homiletics in three parts. The first part surveys 
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rhetoric. The second part surveys homiletics in general. The third part surveys the works being 
used most frequently by homileticians to teach preaching today. The surveys demonstrate a 
representative perspective on attention: attention is necessary and axiomatic.  
 
Surveying Attention in Rhetoric 
Authors in the field of rhetoric consistently explain that a speech’s introduction must function to 
gain attention.2 For example, according to Aristotle, a towering figure in the field who continues 
to deeply shape the study and practice of rhetoric today, a primary function of a speech’s 
introduction is to gain audience attention. To make this point, Aristotle likened the purpose of an 
introduction to the preliminary flourishes that flute players play before their performance.3 In this 
comparison he explains that the flute players display what they can best play to gain the favor 
and attention of the audience prior to the main performance.4 Other than this comparison, 
Aristotle spends little time trying to convince his students that attention is necessary. He simply 
assumes its necessity. 
Key figures from Roman rhetorical theory treat attention similarly. When expounding on 
the unique functions of an introduction, the anonymous author of Rhetorica ad Herennium 
makes it clear that a primary purpose is attention. The author writes, “The introduction is the 
beginning of the discourse, and by it the hearer's mind is prepared for attention.”5 Quintilian 
wholeheartedly agrees, noting that an introduction’s primary purpose is to secure good will and 
attention.6 
																																																						
2 Writings on an introduction often explain two other functions. The first is to introduce the speech’s theme or telos. 
The second is to make the audience favorable toward the speaker. While these are necessary facets to a speech’s 
introduction, they are beyond the scope of this thesis, which is explaining that attention is a primary task in the 
introduction of a sermon. 
3 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, translated by George A. Kennedy, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
260. 
4 Aristotle did not clarify why the flute players displayed the best of their musical ability prior to the main 
performance but it is assumed to mean that this occurred in order to gain the favor and attention of the audience. 
(Edward P. J. Corbett, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, 3rd ed. [New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990], 282.) Based on this understanding, Golden et al. explain that Aristotle believed that a speech’s introduction 
should capture the attention of the audience and create good will with one’s listeners (James Golden, Goodwin 
Berquist, William Coleman, and Michael Sproule, The Rhetoric of Western Thought, 8th ed. [Dubuque: 
Kendall/Hunt, 2003], 73). Similarly, Kennedy explains that Aristotle regarded the remedial functions of the 
introduction as having two primary purposes: to make the audience well-disposed and attentive (Aristotle, On 
Rhetoric, trans. Kennedy, 260). 
5 Cicero, Rhetorica ad Herennium (n.p., n.d.), Kindle edition, 24–26. 
6 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, ed. Lee Honeycutt (n.p., n.d.), Kindle edition, 3718–22. 
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The writings of Aristotle and Roman rhetoricians established a foundation for rhetorical 
theory that lasted throughout the Byzantine period (330–1453).7 In fact, very little development 
of the art of rhetoric occurred throughout this period because the leaders of society did not 
perceive the need for rhetoric’s functions and forms to change.8 For this reason, the Byzantine 
period is like a rhetorical time capsule that sealed the writings of the past, including works by 
Aristotle.9 Rhetoric throughout the Byzantine period was primarily an imitation of that which the 
Greeks and Romans had produced, and this includes their advice concerning the necessity of 
gaining attention in a speech’s introduction. Trebizond offers standard advice from that era. In 
Rhetoric in Five Books, in the fifteenth century, he writes that the introduction of a speech must 
quicken the interest of the audience.10 Later in the century, Rhetoric in Five Books, and other 
similar handbooks on rhetoric, enjoyed wide distribution due to the new technology of printing.11 
Due to this, the functions and forms of rhetoric that began in Greece and Rome extended into the 
Byzantine period and well beyond. 
In the eighteenth century, Scottish rhetorician George Campbell continued the apparently 
unanimous exhortation that oratory demands the attention of the audience. Campbell explains 
that touching the heart, winning cooperation, and exciting passion are necessary to command 
attention in a speech’s introduction.12 Richard Whately, in the nineteenth century, explains that 
an introduction should show that the subject of a speech is important, curious, or otherwise 
interesting and worthy of attention.13 Accomplishing attention was so important to Whately that 
he coined several terms to designate various kinds of introductions specifically designed to gain 
attention.14  
																																																						
7 The Byzantine period is often cited as beginning when Constantine I dedicated the “New Rome” in 330 CE and 
ending when an Ottoman army sacked Constantinople during the reign of Constantine XI in 1453 CE. (Earle E. 
Cairns, Christianity throughout the Centuries [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996], 119; Diarmaid MacCulloch, 
Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years [New York: Viking, 2009], 4). 
8 According to Kennedy, knowledge of correct language and forms was needed for a career in church and state in 
Byzantium, and the functions and forms passed on from the Greek and Roman rhetoricians were deemed sufficient 
in the Byzantine period. (George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition, 2nd ed. 
[Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999], 193). 
9 Ibid., 195. 
10 John Monfasani, George of Trebizoni: A Biography and a Study of His Rhetoric and Logic (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 
263. 
11 Ibid., 195. 
12 George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, ed. Lloyd F. Bitzer (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1988), 5–6. 
13 Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, 2nd ed. (London: Mawman, 1827), 124. 
14 Whately named these introductions “Introduction Inquisitive,” “Introduction Paradoxical,” “Introduction 
Corrective,” “Introduction Preparatory,” and “Introduction Narrative.” Ibid., 124–27. 
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Chaim Perelman and Lucie Obrechts-Tyteca write in the twentieth century that 
argumentation cannot even begin until the audience’s attention is gained.15 The chorus of 
rhetorical theorists still sings in unison in the early twenty-first century. Today’s books on 
rhetoric are replete with the same advice: an introduction must command attention. Edward 
Corbett is typical: “What we have been saying about the content and strategy of the introduction 
adds up to this: the introduction seeks to render the audience attentive.”16 
This survey has primarily focused on the consistent message from the field of rhetoric 
about grasping attention in the introduction of speeches and sermons. At this point however, it 
must be noted that in oral communication, attention is not simply gained once and never lost 
again. Attention must be sustained. I will explain the reason for this later in this chapter. For 
now, this survey observes a what a few of the great classical rhetoricians write about sustained 
attention. 
Aristotle implies that attention must be sustained when he asserts that making the 
audience attentive is necessary in all parts of a speech: “As a result, whenever there is an 
opportunity, one should say things like . . . ‘give me your attention, for nothing pertains more to 
me than to you’ and ‘I shall tell you something strange, the like of which you have never heard’ 
or ‘something so marvelous.’”17 
The Roman rhetoricians agreed with Aristotle about the importance of sustaining 
attention, and they built on Aristotle with two unique insights. First, in writing about speeches 
that last more than a few minutes, Quintilian explains that the need for attention increases. He 
writes, “But a speech of greater length requires attention to a greater number of particulars.”18 
Second, in writing about the ability to sustain attention, Cicero explains that it is a necessary skill 
in oration. In De Oratore, Cicero fabricates dialogue between Crassus and Antonius on the topic 
of attention, during which Antonius praises Crassus’ ability to maintain audience attention. He 
writes, “All the same, you see how inattentive we are, when you are able to induce us . . . to 
follow [italics added] your discourse to the exclusion of everything else; so successful is your 
eloquence in giving charm to subjects that are unattractive, fullness to what is dry, and some 
																																																						
15 Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, translated by John Wilkenson and Purcell 
Weaver (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 18. 
16 Corbett, Classical Rhetoric, 290. 
17 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, trans. Kennedy, 263–64. 
18 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, ed. Honeycutt, 2584–85. 
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degree of novelty to what is hackneyed.”19 According to Antonius, the ability to induce an 
audience to attentively follow oral discourse, is a difficult but necessary feat. 
 
Surveying Attention in Homiletics 
Homileticians sing in the same chorus with the rhetoricians: a sermon’s introduction must gain 
attention. The identical advice is understandable because homiletics has its antecedents in 
rhetoric. The ancient homileticians were schooled in rhetoric. Stephen Oberhelman writes, 
“Rhetoric was never far from the mind and pen of the Christian fathers. Tertullian, Minucius, 
Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius, and Hilary, all either professors of rhetoric or former students of 
the schools, were unwilling to surrender that rhetorical learning, even for the Christian cause.”20 
Lactantius is representative of this group of rhetorical-homileticians in their advice about the 
introduction of the oration: “If the attention of the audience is once secured, the truth can be 
demonstrated, and good will prevail.”21 
In the fourth and fifth centuries, the importance of gaining attention in the sermon’s 
introduction continued. In On Christian Doctrine, Augustine addresses the topic of attention 
several times, but his strongest statement is found in Book IV where he turns from interpreting 
Scripture to communicating Scripture: “But once that his hearers are friendly, attentive, and 
ready to learn, whether he has found them so, or has himself made them so, the remaining 
objects are to be carried out in whatever way the case requires.”22 In this statement Augustine 
implies that attention must be secured in an introduction. Further stating the importance of 
attention, Augustine asks a rhetorical question, “Who will listen to the preacher if he does not 
arrest attention by some beauty of style?”23 Like the other authors surveyed in this chapter, 
Augustine agreed that attention must be arrested but like the other authors spends little time 
explaining or defending what seems axiomatic to him. 
																																																						
19 Cicero, On the Orator: Book 3, On Fate, Stoic Paradoxes, Divisions of Oratory, vol. 4 of On the Orator, trans. H. 
Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), 41. 
20 Stephen M. Oberhelman, Rhetoric and Homiletics in Fourth-Century Christian Literature, American Classical 
Studies 26 (Atlanta: Scholars, 1991), 121. 
21 Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 170. 
22 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, trans. J. F. Shaw, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson, 1994), 576. 
23 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, trans. J. F. Shaw (Overland Park, KS: Digireads.com, 2010), Kindle edition, 
102. 
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Just as little development of rhetoric occurred throughout the Byzantine period, the same 
is true with homiletics. As it has already been explained, this is the result of homiletics’ 
dependence on rhetorical theory and strategies. David Larsen adds another reason: during the rise 
of the Byzantine Empire preaching was virtually nonexistent.24 However, Larsen’s statement is 
an exaggeration. Gregory the Great (540–604), Saint Patrick (389–461), the Venerable Bede 
(673–735), and St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1091–1153) conducted vigorous preaching ministries 
during the Byzantine period. It is more accurate to say that this period did not further develop 
homiletics beyond the received wisdom of the ancient rhetoricians and homileticians, and this 
applies to the insistence on gaining attention in the introduction. 
Homileticians throughout the Renaissance and into the modern era continued to write 
about the necessity of gaining attention in the introduction of a sermon. In the fifteenth century, 
Erasmus insisted that the reception of a sermon’s doctrines and precepts is dependent on 
attention, which in turn is possible only if the audience is convinced that the subject is 
interesting, important, and connected to their present and future happiness.25 In the nineteenth 
century, Charles Spurgeon offered this blunt exhortation, “Their attention must be gained, or 
nothing can be done with them.”26 In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, 
homiletics continues its assertion about gaining attention in the introduction. John Stott writes 
that an introduction serves two purposes, one of which is attention: “First, it [an introduction] 
arouses interest, stimulates curiosity, and whets the appetite for more.27 Theorists of the “New 
Homiletic” also insist on gaining attention in the introduction as in this statement from	David 
Buttrick who laconically offers, “Introductions command attention.”28  
Similar to the survey on rhetoric, this survey has begun by focusing on the consistent 
message from the field of homiletics about grasping attention in the introduction. It now turns to 
																																																						
24 David L. Larsen, The Company of Preachers: A History of Biblical Preaching from the Old Testament to the 
Modern Era (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1998), 1:97. 
25 Erasmus, Ecclesiastes or the Preacher: An Essay on the Duties of a Public Religious Instructor (London: 
Kessinger, 1797), 99. 
26 C. H. Spurgeon, Lectures to My Students (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1954), 127. 
27 John R. W. Stott, Between Two Worlds (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 244. 
28 David Buttrick, Homiletic, Moves and Structures (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 83. The new homiletic 
emphasizes induction and narration that invite listeners into an experience as opposed to passive listening. David 
James Randolph coined the term “New Homiletic” and he defines it as follows: “Preaching is the event in which the 
biblical text is interpreted in order that its meaning will come to expression in the concrete situation of the hearers.” 
(Randolph, The Renewal of Preaching [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967], 1). Furthermore, “The sermon is becoming 
understood as event, and event means encounter, engagement, and dialogue: the end of ‘monologue’ in the pulpit.” 
(Ibid., 14.) Key figures in the New Homiletic include David James Randolph, Fred Craddock, David Buttrick, 
Eugene Lowry, Charles Rice, Edmund Steimle, and Henry Mitchell. 
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what representative homileticians––Jerome, Augustine, Spurgeon, Craddock, and Stott––write 
about sustaining attention.   
Oberhelman highlights rhetorical strategies employed by Jerome and Augustine to 
“engage” audiences throughout their sermons.29 According to Oberhelman, one of the primary 
purposes of a style that includes spontaneity, improvisation, tone, vocabulary, and clarity is 
engagement between the speaker and the audience. Clearly, when Oberhelman uses the word 
“engage,” he is not referring to an actual verbal dialogue between speaker and audience, but 
rather, he is referring to an audience’s sustained interest in that which the speaker is 
communicating.30 
The “Prince of Preachers,” Charles Spurgeon, also admonishes the preacher to maintain 
attention. He writes, “Over the head of military announcements our English officers always place 
the word ‘ATTENTION!’31 in large capitals, and we need some such word over all our sermons. 
We need the earnest, candid, wakeful, continued [italics added] attention of all those who are in 
the congregation.”32 
Stott introduces the importance of sustained attention throughout the sermon when he 
writes, “But his fact leads to a further aspect of the subject, namely that earnestness of manner is 
one of the surest ways of arousing and holding people’s attention.”33 However, rather than 
offering his own thoughts on sustained attention, he chooses to summarize from Spurgeon’s 
thoughts. He writes, “The ninth address in Spurgeon’s first series of Lectures to my Students has 
the arresting title Attention! It concerns ‘how to obtain and retain the attention of our hearers’, 
and contains that combination of common sense and good humour which we have come to 
associate with this giant of a man.”34 
Finally, Fred Craddock, a key voice in the New Homiletic, which breaks the mold of the 
didactic sermonic form by advocating an inductive form embodied in concrete images, explains 
that one of the benefits of such form is sustained attention. He writes, “Particular concrete 
experiences are ingredient to the sermon, not just in the introduction to solicit interest as some 
																																																						
29 Oberhelman, Rhetoric and Homiletics, 102. 
30 Ibid., 102–20. 
31 All-caps belong to author. 
32 Spurgeon, Lectures to My Students, 127. 
33 Stott, Between Two Worlds, 279. 
34 Ibid.	
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older theories held but throughout the sermon.”35 In making this statement, Craddock reveals his 
conviction that sustaining attention is valuable, if not indispensable, in preaching. 
Attention in the introduction and sustained attention throughout the sermon is assumed in 
the field of homiletics. I have curated past masters of homiletics, now I turn to surveying the 
works being used most frequently by homileticians teaching preaching today.   
 
Surveying the Top Works Being Used by Homileticians to Teach Preaching Today 
The following survey is based on a study of the top books used to teach preaching among the 
institutions belonging to the Association of Theological Schools:36 
 
Table 1. Top Twelve Books by Total ATS Schools 
 
																																																						
35 Fred B. Craddock, As One Without Authority, 3rd ed. (Nashville: Parthenon, 1979), 61. 
36 The Association of Theological Schools in the United States and Canada (ATS) is a membership organization of 
graduate schools that conduct post-baccalaureate professional and academic degree programs to educate persons for 
the practice of ministry and for teaching and research in the theological disciplines. The findings for this survey are 
found in Alex Kato’s essay, “The Theology behind the Books We Choose,” in Evangelical Homiletics Society 
Papers for the 2017 Annual Conference, presented October 19–21, 2017, 77–79. According to Kato: “I counted how 
often each book is assigned. . . . In total, the 123 schools assign 318 different books. Of these books, 277 (87%) are 
assigned two or less times; 234 (74%) appear at only one institution. I then ranked them by the number of schools 
that assign them [and] the total full-time equivalent enrollment (FTE) of the schools that assign them.” 
Author, Book Schools FTE Primary 
Theological 
Tradition 
Thomas Long, The Witness of Preaching 30 6245 Mainline 
Haddon Robinson, Biblical Preaching 18 6169 Evangelical 
Barbara Brown Taylor, The Preaching Life 15 3846 Mainline 
Bryan Chapell, Christ-Centered Preaching 10 2564 Evangelical 
Teresa Fry Brown, Delivering the Sermon 10 1556 Mainline 
Eugene Lowry, The Homiletical Plot 8 3760 Evangelical 
O. Wesley Allen, Determining the Form 8 1678 Mainline 
Ron Allen, Patterns of Preaching 8 1201 Mainline 
Frank Thomas, They Like to Never Quit Praisin’ 
God 
7 1183 Mainline 
Andy Stanley and Lane Jones, Communicating 
for a Change  
7 1064 Evangelical 
Preaching the Mystery of Faith 6 877 Roman Catholic 
Fred Craddock, Preaching 6 508 Mainline 
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How do the top works being used to teach preaching today compare to the previous two surveys? 
This survey reveals accordance: attention is axiomatic. Furthermore, these works point out that 
while the need for attention is axiomatic, it is not axiomatically attained.  
Haddon Robinson contextualizes the insistence on and difficulty of grasping attention by 
offering a Russian proverb: “It is the same with men as with donkeys: whoever would hold them 
fast must get a very good grip on their ears!”37 This proverb makes clear Robinson’s view that 
the preacher is responsible for gaining and holding the audience’s attention. However, it also 
makes clear that this task is not easy because donkeys are stubborn and difficult to control. 
Similarly, Barbara Brown Taylor explains that the importance of grasping attention is made 
difficult by modern culture’s inundation from technology. She writes, “All the preacher has is 
words. Climbing into the pulpit without props or sound effect, the preacher speaks—for ten or 
twenty or thirty minutes—to people who are used to being communicated with in very different 
ways.”38 O. Wesley Allen agrees: “It is difficult to keep a congregation’s attention in our 
contemporary, media-soaked world. We have become an attention deficit society.”39 Bryan 
Chapell cites an abundance of issues that make the important task of winning attention difficult: 
 
The tiresomeness of so many sermons; the weekly assaults on the realities of faith 
from family, friend, and foe; the weariness prompted by work stress; the overdone 
Saturday-night fun; the competing influences of the entertainment media; the 
seeming irrelevance of prophets and apostles dead for at least two millennia; and 
the mere redundancy of a lifetime of Sunday-morning rituals combine to make 
congregational interest in any message a minor miracle that no minister should 
ever take for granted.40 
 
Continuing the steady drumming from homileticians about the importance of attention and the 
difficulty of holding it, Eugene Lowry explains that some people are eager to engage, others are 
reluctant, some enter church after a bad day, some enter already bored, some enter happy, while 
others are sad.41 Frank Thomas agrees that audience attention is paramount but has his own 
perspective on why contemporary sermons struggle to maintain attention: sermonic form. He 
																																																						
37 Robinson, Biblical Preaching, 166. 
38 Barbara Brown Taylor, The Preaching Life (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), 81. 
39 O. Wesley Allen Jr., Determining Form (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2008), 8. 
40 Bryan Chapell, Christ-Centered Preaching (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1994), 228. 
41 Lowry, Homiletical Plot, 28. 
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explains that Western preaching has ignored emotional context and preaching by focusing on 
cerebral process and words that do not connect with audiences today.42 
The preceding homileticians are Protestants, but the importance of attention and the 
difficulty in winning it also surfaces in the primary text used to teach preaching in Catholic 
seminaries, Preaching the Mystery of Faith. However, according to this text, the problem of 
attention is not due to media-saturation or individual psychological states. Instead, the problem is 
due to societal issues such as individualism in the United States, the church’s sexual abuse crisis, 
political animosity, cultural relativism and consumerism, social disparity, sin, and the idealism of 
young adults.43 
Andy Stanley and Lane Jones comment on how the task of winning attention frustrates 
preachers in a story called “No One’s Listening.” Pastor Ray Martin is unable to appreciate the 
ministry of preaching in his church because his parishioners are too distracted to pay attention to 
his sermons. Ray is nettled, therefore, during his sermon, He felt a sudden, wild impulse to 
simply pick up his notes and walk off the platform. Had anyone ever done that? Just stopped 
preaching and walked out the back door? Would anyone even notice?44 This brief story captures 
the frustration that plagues many preachers today who know the importance of grasping 
attention, but struggle to attain it. 
The twelve primary sources being used to teach preaching throughout North America 
agree: grasping attention is important but difficult.  
 
Qualification  
The cursory nature of the overview makes a qualification necessary: dissenting voices. Are there 
rhetoricians or homileticians who feel that attention is not necessary? One statement from 
Aristotle may seem to be at odds with the argument this chapter is presenting and even at odds 
with his own advice about attention. He writes, “Remarks aimed at the audience derive from an 
effort to make them well-disposed and sometimes to make them attentive or the opposite; for it is 
not always useful to make them attentive, which is why many speakers try to induce laughter.”45 
Here Aristotle appears to be explaining that it is not always useful to make an audience attentive. 
																																																						
42 Frank A. Thomas, They Like to Never Quit Praisin’ God (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2013), 19–20. 
43 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Preaching the Mystery of Faith: The Sunday Homily (Washington, 
DC: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2012), 3–5. 
44 Andy Stanley and Lane Jones, Communicating for a Change (Sisters, OR: Multnomah, 2006), 17–26. 
45 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, trans. Kennedy, 263. 
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However, careful examination of Aristotle’s statement actually adds support to this chapter’s 
claim. Aristotle’s advice is written within his section on making an audience favorable toward 
the speaker.46 He is explaining that inducing laughter and appearing reasonable are strategies for 
accomplishing an audience’s favor in the introduction. After concluding that an audience tends to 
be receptive of a humorous or reasonable person, he writes, “They pay more attention to these 
people. And they are attentive to great things, things that concern themselves, marvels, and 
pleasures. As a result, one should imply that the speech is concerned with such things. If they are 
not attentive, it is because the subject is unimportant, means nothing to them personally, or is 
distressing.”47 Attention then, is a “side benefit” of making an audience favorable toward the 
speaker. In fact, it is the telos of winning the favor of the audience. Furthermore, it could be 
argued that a speaker cannot even appear reasonable or funny to an audience if the audience is 
not paying attention to the speaker. 
 
Summary 
This section has provided a brief overview spanning the centuries and citing some of rhetoric and 
homiletics’ most prominent figures to support its claim that the need for attention is 
axiomatically assumed and recommended. According to the twelve primary sources being used 
to teach preaching throughout North America today, grasping attention is also difficult. I 
describe some of that difficulty in the third section below, but first, I explain why the need for 
attention is assumed in the fields of rhetoric and homiletics.  
 
Why the Need for Attention Is Assumed in Rhetoric and Homiletics  
What lies behind the uniform instance that attention must be secured in the introduction of a 
speech or sermon and then maintained throughout? The answer to that question lies in the fact 
that public speaking is an oral event. The ancient rhetorical theorists simply assumed this 
because their worlds were highly oral/aural. While some writing occurred in the pre-typographic 
world, it was expensive and rare. Only the educated could read and write, and manuscripts and 
letters were expensive to produce requiring trained scribes. Information was generated, 
transmitted, and preserved orally. Walter Ong characterizes this older noetic world as a world 
																																																						
46 Ibid., 263–64. 
47 Ibid., 263. 
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dominated by hearing rather than sight. He explains that oration was the basic paradigm for all 
discourse.48  
In that oral world, all communication occurred through the ear, even communication that 
was written down. Reading was done aloud, even private reading, at least as late as the twelfth 
century.49 Illustrative of this phenomenon is the oft-quoted passage from Augustine who 
described watching his mentor, Ambrose, who had developed the uncanny ability to read 
silently. He explained, “When [Ambrose] was reading, his eyes ran over the page and his heart 
perceived the sense, but his voice and tongue were silent. Very often . . . we saw him silently 
reading and never otherwise.”50 The habit of silent reading struck Augustine as so strange that he 
was compelled to speculate on why Ambrose would do something so outlandish. Augustine 
supposed that Ambrose read silently to limit the possibility of debate as people heard him read 
aloud, which would take away his time to read more books; or perhaps he read silently to 
preserve his voice.51 In Augustine’s mind, to read silently, which is part of our common 
experience today, was far from normative. 
The significance of attention in rhetorical theory originating in an oral world can be seen 
when oral rhetoric is compared to written rhetoric. In the first, the loss of attention cripples 
persuasion; while in the second the loss of attention is certainly not something to be desired, but 
neither does it automatically make persuasion impossible. For example, in written 
communication, the reader can repeat what she has previously read, ponder it, and interact with it 
mentally. The flow of information is under the control of the receiver (reader). But in oral 
communication, the flow of information is under the control of the speaker. Ong understands oral 
communication to be “evanescent.” He explains: 
 
All sensation takes place in time, but sound has a special relationship to time unlike that 
of the other fields that register in human sensation. Sound exists only when it is going out 
of existence. It is not simply perishable but essentially evanescent, and it is sensed as 
evanescent. When I pronounce the word “permanence,” by the time I get to the “-nence,” 
the “perma-” is gone, and has to be gone.52 
 
																																																						
48 Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy (London: Routledge, 1982), 117. 
49 Ong claims proof that financial accountants in England checked written financial accounts aurally, by having 
them read, as late as the twelfth century. (Ibid., 117.) 
50 Augustine, Confessions, translated by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 93. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ong, Orality and Literacy, 32. 
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Oral persuasion therefore, cannot occur when attention fades because lost elements in the 
discourse can never be repeated. Thus, attention must be sustained. Rhetorical theorists and 
homileticians, working from the assumption that their arts are oral/aural, therefore assert the 
necessity of gaining and sustaining attention. It should be noted that even after typography 
became normative, preaching continues to be an oral/aural event. For this reason, it is no surprise 
that the survey of the top homiletical textbooks revealed that modern homileticians continue to 
treat the need for attention axiomatically.  
Furthermore, oral communication is communal, whereas written communication assumes 
and promotes an individualistic experience. This is due to the fact that an author is absent when 
communicating through the medium of print whereas a speaker is present and his words are in 
direct relationship with those who are listening. This dynamic evokes a highly relational 
experience between speaker and hearer that exists only in shadow between author and reader. 
Eric Havelock refers to this oral relationship as “alliance,” because each party—speaker and 
listener—commits oneself to ally with the other in meaning-making.53 Yet, meaning-making is 
only possible if the alliance is maintained by sustained attention, and according to Carroll 
Arnold, the burden of sustaining the alliance falls squarely on the speaker. He writes, “What we 
casually call ‘loss of attention’ is, from the speaker’s viewpoint, a public destruction of a 
relationship he was publicly committed to sustain.”54 Because of this, oral communication 
demands the management of relationship in a way that written communication does not. If 
listeners choose to provide their attention, it is likely because the speaker is sustaining alliance. 
Once again, the chorus of rhetoricians and homileticians may not have spelled out these 
relational dynamics, but they seem to have assumed them. This helps explain the lacuna of 
theory behind the axiomatic belief that attention is crucial in oral communication. 
Finally, oral communication is embodied, whereas written communication is 
disembodied. The distinction is important when trying to understand why oral rhetoric assumes 
the necessity of attention. Arnold calls this dynamic in oral communication, “confrontations.” He 
writes, “Most risks and special opportunities peculiar to rhetoric under conditions of orality 
derive from the fact that rhetorical speech acts are confrontations of active beings; they are not 
																																																						
53 Eric A. Havelock, The Muse Learns to Write (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 77–78. 
54 Carroll C. Arnold, “Oral Rhetoric, Rhetoric, and Literature,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 1, no. 4 (1968): 201. 
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confrontations of impersonally symbolized concepts and vaguely specifiable human beings.”55 
Because of this confrontation in oral communication, Arnold points out that the speaker must 
literally “stand with his symbolic acts.”56 By this, Arnold means that a speaker’s verbal and 
physical behaviors must merge to form a flow of symbolic activity that accords with the 
message. The physical body authorizes the oratorical message.57 Therefore, if accordance 
between the message and the person giving the message fails, then a noticeable loss of attention 
occurs. This dynamic does not occur in written rhetoric. 
Through a comparison of oral and written rhetoric, this section of the chapter observed 
three differences that contribute to an explanation of why attention is assumed in oral 
communication: oral communication is evanescent, communal, and embodied. These factors 
help explain why rhetoricians and homileticians assert nearly unanimously that attention is 
necessary for their arts. Simply put, without attention, communication fails. That is true in a 
profound sense when the communication is oral rather than written, as was assumed in most of 
the history of rhetoric and of homiletics. However, just because attention is assumed in oral 
communication does not mean that it is automatically achieved. Many obstacles stand in the way, 
which the next section describes. 
 
Primary Obstacles That Preachers Face in Achieving Attention 
Although gaining and sustaining attention is necessary for oral communication, obstacles hinder 
these objectives. Some of those obstacles surfaced in the survey on the top works being used to 
teach preaching today. However, the characterization of the obstacles lacked coherence and 
depth of explanation. This section identifies and explains two major obstacles that hinder 
preachers in the important task of grasping audience attention. Those obstacles arise from the 
functions of the human brain and the results of exposure to modern media. 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
55 Ibid., 199. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 200. 
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Obstacle: The Brain’s Limited Processing Capacity 
The human brain must restrict and filter an enormous array of information that is continuously 
available from sensory sources.58 The primary reason that filtering is necessary is pragmatic: the 
brain’s processing capacity is limited. The brain cannot process every piece of information that 
enters it through the five senses.59 Due to limited processing capacity, the brain must choose 
which information to process and which information to discard. So, neural competition of stimuli 
is constantly present in the brain.60 This point is further explained in chapter 3, which delves into 
neuroscience theory on how attention occurs in the brain. For the purpose of this section, it is 
helpful to know that the brain chooses to attend to the array of information based on its bias.61 
Sabine Kastner and Leslie Ungerleider refer to this preference as “biasing signals,”62 also known 
as “relevance,”63 or cognitive “incentive.”64 
Martin Sarter, William Gehring, and Rouba Kozak link “attentional effort” with 
“cognitive incentive” and conclude, “Increases in attentional effort serve to optimize goal-
directed behavioral and cognitive processes. Such a definition [for cognitive incentive] integrates 
explicit and implicit motivational forces with attentional performance and implies that attentional 
effort is a function of such motivations.”65 Simply put, the stimulus that ultimately wins the 
ongoing competition for the brain’s attention is that which the brain perceives as being worth the 
cognitive effort. Expounding “cognitive incentive” and “cognitive effort” is addressed in more 
																																																						
58 Some attempt to quantify the amount of information that the brain receives and filters. (Benjamin Martin Bly and 
David E. Rumelhart, eds., Cognitive Science, 2nd ed. [New York: Academic Press, 1999], 48.) For example, Boyd 
and Larson explain that the human brain receives about one hundred million bits of information per second and the 
reticular activating system filters more than 99 percent of the sensory data that it receives. (Greg Boyd and Al 
Larson, Escaping the Matrix: Setting Your Mind Free to Experience Real Life in Christ [Grand Rapids: Baker, 
2005].) Such statistics, however, oversimplify the complex nature of stimuli and filtration in the brain. Marslen-
Wilson explains some of the complexity by referencing studies that make clear that the brain receives, processes, 
and filters visual stimuli and aural stimuli in different amounts and timeframes. (William Marslen-Wilson, 
“Activation, Competition, and Frequency in Lexical Access,” in Cognitive Models of Speech: Psycholinguistic and 
Computational Perspectives, ed. Gerry Altman [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990], 48–155.) Therefore, rather than 
trying to quantify the amount of information that the brain receives and filters, it is more accurate to explain simply, 
as Bly and Rumerlhart do, that the brain must restrict and filter an enormous array of information. 
59 Sabine Kastner and Leslie G. Ungerleider, “Mechanisms of Visual Attention in the Human Cortex,” Annual 
Review of Neuroscience 23, no. 1 (2000): 315. 
60 Edward E. Smith and Stephen U. Kosslyn, Cognitive Psychology: Mind and Brain (New Jersey: Pearson / 
Prentice Hall, 2007), 140. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Kastner and Ungerleider, “Mechanisms of Visual Attention,” 315. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Martin Sarter, William J. Gehring, and Rouba Kozak, “More Attention Must Be Paid: The Neurobiology of 
Attentional Effort,” Brain Research Reviews 51, no. 2 (2006): 148. 
65 Ibid., 147. 
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detail in chapter 3. What this section intends to make clear is that gaining attention is not 
automatic in oral communication. There is an ongoing battle between stimuli for the brain’s 
attention, and if oral communication does not appear to the brain as relevant it will be easily 
discarded with the other information that the brain is filtering. Gaining and holding attention is 
no small feat for preachers to accomplish. 
Preachers face another obstacle in the battle for attention: the brain is able to process 
ideas at a faster pace than speakers speak.66 This means that the brain is able to attend to 
thoughts and ideas during oral communication other than the ones the speaker is offering, and 
that is precisely what happens often when a speaker speaks. When this happens, the listener has 
two options. First, he can try to attend to multiple ideas at the same time. However, as Edward 
Smith and Stephen Kosslyn demonstrate, divided attention results in overall diminished 
attention.67 They write, “The ability to attend to two sources is impaired compared to the ability 
to process information from one source alone: there is a cost associated with doing both tasks 
together.”68 As an illustration, consider a person watching television while also reading a 
magazine. When he or she attempts to do both things at once, the most likely result is that either 
the television plot is followed while the magazine article is ignored (or the other way around), or 
the person will lose parts of both plot and article. 
A second option is for the listener to choose to focus solely on the oral communication, 
pushing aside the crowd of thoughts and stimuli that clamor for attention while the preacher 
speaks, but this takes discipline and ongoing commitment. More so, as it has already been 
explained, the onus to achieve the attention of a listener is primarily upon the speaker. He or she 
must demonstrate that the words being spoken are relevant and therefore worth cognitive effort. 
Certainly, procuring an audience’s single-minded focus on the oral communication is the 
preferable option, but it is not easily attained. The speaker must carefully and intentionally win 
listener attention. That is what this thesis addresses. 
 
Obstacle: Contemporary Media Implications 
Another obstacle preachers face in gaining and sustaining audience attention is created by 
contemporary media. Studies are beginning to show that the way in which media is consumed is 
																																																						
66 Marslen-Wilson, “Activation, Competition, and Frequency,” 152–54. 
67 Smith and Kosslyn, Cognitive Psychology, 107. 
68 Ibid. 
	 17 
having an impact on the brain’s bias, which in turn impacts that which the brain pays attention 
to. The tables below demonstrate the evolution of commercials and social media.69 Following the 
tables I explain three negative consequences that this evolution has on attention. 
 
1950s and 1960s 1970s and 1980s By 2005 
The standard length of a 
broadcast network television 
ad was 60 seconds. 
The standard length of a 
broadcast network television 
ad was 30 seconds. 
One-third of all television ads 
were only 15 seconds long. 
 
Table 2. Length of Commercials70 
 
Text 
Messages 
(SMS began 
in 1992) 
Facebook 
(2004) 
 
YouTube 
(2005) 
Twitter 
(2006) 
Vine 
(2012) 
Instagram 
(2012) 
The average 
length is 160 
characters. 
Posts of 70 
characters or 
less receive 
more “likes” 
and 
comments 
than longer 
posts. 
29% of its 
most popular 
videos are 
less than one 
minute in 
length. 
 
Limited posts 
to 140 
characters. 
Limits videos 
to six 
seconds. 
Single 
images. 
 
Table 3. Length of Social Media71 
 
These statistics reveal that the duration of required attention, when it comes to commercials and 
social media, seems to be decreasing. Meanwhile, consumer consumption of these media 
continues to increase. Consider these statistics:72 
																																																						
69 These statistics are primarily based on contemporary media within the United States and it is assumed that 
statistics are similar for other Western countries. 
70 Nielsen Company, “Global Trust in Advertising and Brand Messages,” report, 2013, 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/reports/2013/global-trust-in-advertising-and-brand-messages.html, accessed May 
2018. See also Stuart Elliott, “TV Commercials Adjust to a Shorter Attention Span,” New York Times, April 8, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/08/business/media/08adco.html?_r=0, accessed June 2017. 
71 Jody Ordioni, “Social Media and Short Attention Spans,” February 5, 2013, http://www.ere.net/social-media-and-
short-attention-spans; Aaron Smith, “Americans and Text Messaging,” September 19, 2011, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/09/19/americans-and-text-messaging; Aaron Smith, “How Americans Use Text 
Messaging,” September 19, 2011, http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/09/19/how-americans-use-text-messaging, 
accessed July 2017. 
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2005 2011 2016 
When Pew Research Center 
began tracking social media, 
just 5% of American adults 
used a social media platform. 
50% of American adults used 
a social media platform. 
69% of Americans were 
using some type of social 
media. 
 
Table 4. Social Media Usage 
 
Facebook Pinterest Instagram LinkedIn Twitter 
76% 25% 51% 18% 42% 
 
Table 5. 2016 Social Media Daily Usage 
 
The changing landscape of commercials and social media has three adverse effects on 
attention during sermons. The first is that the usage of digital technology may be decreasing 
attention spans. While the results of the new, electronic age are still being explored, Susan 
Greenfield is typical of the consensus that is forming. She describes how our brains change based 
on experience:  
 
[The brain is] “substantially shaped by what we do to it and by the experience of daily 
life. When I say ‘shaped,’ I'm not talking figuratively or metaphorically; I'm talking 
literally. At a microcellular level, the infinitely complex network of nerve cells that make 
up the constituent parts of the brain actually change in response to certain experiences 
and stimuli.”73  
 
Accordingly, it is reasonable to suppose that the decreasing length of media consumed by the 
majority of Americans is training the brain to be attentive for shorter periods of time. While the 
kinds of media described above are still relatively new and conclusions should be offered 
tentatively, an array of researchers are beginning to speculate that social networking usage 
																																																																																																																																																																														
72 Pew Research Center, Social Media Fact Sheet, February 5, 2018, http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-
media/, accessed July 2018. 
73 Susan Greenfield, “Modern Technology Is Changing the Way Our Brains Work, Says Neuroscientist,” 
DailyMail.com, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-565207/Modern-technology-changing-way-brains-
work-says-neuroscientist.html#ixzz2fPKO3yyl, accessed July 2017. 
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negatively impacts attention span.74 Greenfield however, is not tentative. She claims that today’s 
research is proving that digital technology usage is shrinking attention spans and deeper 
thinking.75 Greenfield is supported by contemporary research on the impact that digital 
technology is having on the brain. Doreen Dodgen-Magee explains that constant, changing 
stimulation caused by digital technology is training the brain to expect something novel to attend 
to, which results in diminished neurological skills of waiting and focus.76 Based on these 
findings it would be naïve to ignore the likely influence of digital technology on the attention 
spans of those who occupy the pews on Sunday mornings. 
A second adverse effect that media has on attention during sermons is the result of 
“media multitasking,” which is changing the way that people consume information. Eyal Ophir, 
Clifford Nass, and Anthony Wagner define “media multitasking” as a person’s consumption of 
more than one item or stream of content at the same time.77 According to Janssen, Gould, Li, 
Brumby, and Cox, engaging in multitasking behavior incurs cost because switching between 
tasks requires people to make changes to physical and mental states, which takes time and 
resources thereby affecting performance.78 Such multitasking is common with most technology 
involving screens. For example, when a person is watching a television show, breaking news 
often scrolls at the bottom of the screen, and that news has nothing to do with the show that is 
being watched. Smart phones can be used simultaneously for giving directions, listening to 
music, and sending text messages. Similarly, social media platforms encourage multitasking. For 
example, Facebook is designed so that many things may occur at the same time such as live chat, 
making updates on the home screen, notating personal status, and making picture updates. 
Furthermore, many users of digital technology use multiple devices simultaneously. We can 
easily imagine a person watching television, while talking on the phone, while multitasking on 
Facebook on a tablet. Media multitasking is unlikely to decrease in the foreseeable future, and 
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based on the statistics previously cited, it is becoming a normal way to function on a daily basis. 
How then can a preacher gain and maintain audience attention within this context? This question 
becomes more pressing as media multitasking increases, and forms part of the impetus for this 
thesis. 
A third adverse effect that media has on attention during sermons is the result of “instant 
gratification,” which is now a normative consumer expectation caused by digital media usage. 
Greenfield warns that “if the young brain is exposed from the outset to a world of fast action and 
reaction, of instant new screen images flashing up with the press of a key, such rapid interchange 
might accustom the brain to operate over such timescales.”79 A study by the Harvard Business 
School concluded something similar. Thales Teixeira explains how the burgeoning of the 
internet afforded immediate information that television did not, and this resulted in consequences 
for marketing industries. According to Teixeira, the rise of commercial websites that viewers can 
click through as quickly as they can press the mouse or tablet has led to intentional avoidance of 
other kinds of advertisement media that take longer to consume.80 Ying-Yao Cheng, Paichi Pat 
Shein, and Wen-Bin Chiou who write about the effects of a digital culture accord with 
Greenfield and Teixeira.81 They explain that instant access through hyper-connectivity reduces a 
skill called “delay discounting,” which is “the willingness to postpone receiving an immediate 
reward in order to gain additional benefits in the future.”82 The implications of the rise of instant 
gratification due to digital technology are far reaching, but in relation to audience attention 
during a sermon, an important question must be asked: how can a preacher achieve and maintain 
attention when the worshipers arrive at church with an expectation for instant gratification? That 
expectation may be unspoken, and worshipers may be unaware of it; nevertheless, a wise 
preacher should assume it is present. 
It should be noted that while these statistics reveal that modern media is trending toward 
making smaller and smaller demands on attention, some forms of modern media actually make 
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large demands. Some movies are three to four hours long, and TED talks, which are typically 
seventeen minutes, are phenomenally successful. However, since the medium of film employs 
color, music, special effects, and intense emotion, it provides a multisensory and engrossing 
medium that holds attention. Additionally, filmmakers tell stories, and narrative tends to hold 
attention. Similarly, but with a different set of techniques, TED talks are engaging. They deal 
with topics audiences find interesting and regularly employ humor and visual aids. These aspects 
of cinema and TED help to shape the biasing signals that win attention. In fact, the next chapter 
identifies some of these aspects employed by film and TED in a rhetorical theory called 
“enargeia.” 
 
Cursory Advice and Copious Strategies 
This section demonstrates that the fields of rhetoric and homiletics have responded to the 
necessity of attention and the difficulties of gaining attention by providing strategies to win 
attention. In other words, these fields have primarily responded to the necessity of attention with 
praxis. This is a reasonable and helpful response. However, as it will be observed, the strategies 
are copious and often dealt with in a cursory manner. These observations highlight a gap in 
knowledge in the field of homiletics, which is theory to explain how language grasps attention.  
We have already noticed the copious strategies tangentially above, but to be explicit, 
consider the following catalog of suggestions on how to gain attention in the introduction: 
Aristotle states that speaking about “great things” that are personally relevant to the audience is 
essential to gaining attention.83 Cicero suggests a different strategy: eloquence that gives charm 
to subjects that are unattractive.84 Quintilian offers other strategies: touch the feelings.85 
Likewise, Augustine has his own set of strategies for gaining attention at the beginning of a 
sermon: make the listeners friendly by conciliating the hostile, rousing the careless, and telling 
the ignorant both what is occurring at present and what is probable in the future.86  
Proceeding to modern homileticians, strategies for winning attention in the introduction 
of a sermon are just as plentiful. Taylor’s strategy is succinct: the preacher’s topic must be 
																																																						
83 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, trans. Kennedy, 263. 
84 Cicero, On the Orator: Book 3, trans. Rackham, 41. 
85 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, ed. Honeycutt, 3787. 
86 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1994), 576. 
	 22 
appealing and the listener must patiently and attentively listen.87 Long provides a similar strategy 
by explaining that the introduction of the sermon should begin by making a promise to hearers 
that they are interested in having kept.88 Robinson explains, “If you do not capture attention in 
the first thirty seconds, you may never gain it at all.”89 He therefore encourages the use of 
paradox, a familiar thought, a rhetorical question, a startling fact, humor, story, or a confrontive 
statement.90 Stanley and Jones also believe that attention must be captured in the beginning 
moments of the sermon.91 They therefore exhort preachers to answer six questions before writing 
the introduction in order to have the best chance at winning attention: “What is the question I am 
answering? What can I do to get my audience to want to know the answer to that question? What 
is the tension this message will resolve? What can I do to make my audience feel that tension? 
What mystery does this message solve? What can I do to make my audience want a solution?”92 
Chapell agrees with Robinson and Stanley and Jones on the importance of the sermon’s 
beginning seconds: “Today’s communication researchers say that audiences generally decide 
within the first thirty seconds of a presentation whether they are interested in what a speaker will 
say.”93 Because of this, Chapell encourages preachers to use one of six keys to grasp attention in 
the introduction: involve their imagination; involve their sense of wonder; involve their 
appreciation of the past; involve their fear of the future; involve their outrage; involve their 
compassion.94 
The long list of strategies continues as rhetoricians and homileticians describe how to 
sustain attention throughout a speech and sermon. Aristotle suggests inserting verbal clauses 
throughout the speech such as, “And give me your attention,” and “For nothing pertains more to 
me than to you,” and “I shall tell you something strange, the like of which you have never 
heard,” and “Something so marvelous.”95 Quintilian explains that arrangement and delivery are 
able to achieve sustained attention throughout a speech.96 Gregory the Great proposes his own 
strategy related not to content or eloquence but to the speaker’s relationship to the audience: the 
																																																						
87 Taylor, Preaching Life, 81–82. 
88 Thomas G. Long, The Witness of Preaching, 2nd ed. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005), 177–84. 
89 Robinson, Biblical Preaching, 166. 
90 Ibid., 166–68. 
91 Stanley and Jones, Communicating for a Change, 154. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Chapell, Christ-Centered Preaching, 229. 
94 Ibid., 230. 
95 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, trans. Kennedy, 264. 
96 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, ed. Honeycutt, 2584. 
	 23 
preacher must be loved by the listeners. He writes, “For it is indeed difficult for a preacher who 
is not loved, however well he may preach, to be willingly listened to. He, then, ought to study to 
be loved to the end that he may be listened to.”97 Spurgeon’s fulsome list includes: say 
something worth hearing; give them something clearly arranged; speak plainly; attend to your 
matter of address; do not extemporize in the emphatic sense; do not make the introduction too 
long; do not repeat yourselves; avoid being too long; be interested yourself; have a good number 
of illustrations; include an element of surprise.98  
Proceeding once again to modern homileticians, strategies for sustaining attention 
throughout a sermon are just as diverse and profuse. For example, according to Long, the 
promise made to win attention at the beginning of the sermon must dictate the sermon’s progress, 
unity, and order throughout the remainder of the sermon. Long therefore explains, if the promise 
made is that an important question will be answered, then the sermon must consistently move 
toward that answer to maintain the alliance that keeps the audience attentive; if the promise made 
is an experience related to a particular issue, then the sermon must consistently produce an 
experience connected to that issue to maintain the alliance that keeps the audience attentive.99 In 
The Homiletical Plot, Lowry argues for employing a homiletical plot that begins by upsetting the 
audience’s equilibrium. According to Lowry, upsetting the equilibrium creates an ambiguity that 
the audience longs to have resolved, and this in turn keeps the audience attentive.100 In Patterns 
of Preaching, Ronald Allen explains that an inductive movement creates tension that helps the 
congregation want to remain involved in the sermon, thus holding their attention.101 In 
Determining Form, Allen approaches the issue of attention with pragmatic pessimism. He 
assumes that hearers will “mentally pop in and out of the message” no matter what the preacher 
does, and so, he explains that the sermon should progress by saying one thing, saying it slowly, 
saying it well, saying it from beginning to end, and staying focused on a single topic so that no 
matter when the hearers become attentive, they are able to hear the main idea of the sermon.102 In 
They Like to Never Quit Praisin’ God, Thomas admonishes that sermons must consist of five key 
elements in order to achieve attention: dialogical language, appeal to core beliefs, emotive 
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movement, unity of form and substance, and creative use of reversals.103 In Biblical Preaching, 
Robinson explains that attention is maintained through gesture, voice, language, arrangement, 
and thought.104 Finally, in Communicating for a Change, Stanley and Jones offer five “rules of 
engagement” that help to maintain attention. They ground the first rule in communication 
research that explains faster speakers—190 words per minute as opposed to 150 words per 
minute—tend to be more highly rated. Based on this research their first rule of engagement is 
“check your speed.” The other four rules include: slowdown in the curves; navigate through the 
text; add something unexpected to the trip; take the most direct route.105 
Not only are the strategies for attention within the field of homiletics copious, but when 
strategies are suggested, it is often secondary to other foci in works on rhetoric and homiletics. 
The result is minimal guidance on how and when to apply one strategy over another. Here are a 
few examples. Aristotle spends six pages on the introduction of a speech. Within this section he 
offers three sentences on attention: its importance, how to achieve it, and why some orators fail 
to achieve it.106 When Quintilian explains that the importance of sustained attention increases as 
a speech becomes longer, his explanation falls within a broader discussion on speech 
arrangement. Arrangement, not attention, is his emphasis.107 Robinson spends ten pages on the 
introduction of a sermon and two of those pages suggest strategies for gaining attention.108 In 
contrast, Robinson devotes twenty-four pages to form—unity, order, and progress––and twenty-
four pages to style.109 Similarly, when Craddock lauds the narrative arc as the preeminent 
sermonic form, he states that sustained attention is a benefit of creating concrete experiences in 
the sermon.110 Sustained attention appears to be a side benefit of a new form. Craddock quickly 
moves on to expound on other benefits such as listener identification, conclusions reached, new 
perspectives gained, and decisions made.111  
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Summary 
This section demonstrated that the fields of rhetoric and homiletics have primarily responded to 
the necessity of attention with praxis. This is a reasonable and helpful response because praxis is 
quite often the practical solution to consequential problems. And yet, the copious strategies for 
attention and the cursory manner with which the strategies are suggested illuminate a gap in 
knowledge in homiletics today, which is theory to explain how language grasps attention. 
Attempting to provide theory to explain every strategy for attention that is proposed by 
rhetoricians and homileticians is beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, the next section 
necessarily narrows its focus to one highly lauded strategy for attention that the field of 
homiletics is deficient in providing theoretical grounding for: pictorial language. 
 
The Contribution of This Thesis 
The problem that this thesis seeks to solve is narrow: the field of homiletics lacks theoretical 
grounding for strategies that encourage the use of pictorial language to win listener attention. 
The contribution that this thesis makes, therefore, is to fill this gap in knowledge by providing 
theoretical grounding for pictorial language. The following section substantiates this gap in 
knowledge and this thesis’ claim of original contribution by returning to the study that resulted in 
listing the top books being used to teach preaching among the institutions belonging to the 
Association of Theological Schools. An examination of these works results in two conclusions. 
First, contemporary homiletics regularly lauds the use of pictorial language to win attention. 
Second, contemporary homiletics lacks substantive theory to explain why pictorial language 
grasps attention. Additionally, this section explains that neuroscience is a rich field of inquiry 
when theorizing about attention, but neuroscience is nearly untouched by the field of homiletics 
in relation to attention. 
 
Conclusion 1: Lauding the Use of Pictorial Language 
Contemporary homiletics regularly suggests using pictorial language to win attention. For 
example, Craddock champions generative language that creates an image, which serves as a 
magnet drawing a cluster of reflections and emotions.112 In Patterns of Preaching, one of the 
contributors, Barbara K. Lundblad, explains in “Sermon as Movement of Images” that today’s 
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culture processes the world and its meaning through images. She therefore proposes using word-
pictures to communicate the meaning of the message, which engages the audience on multiple 
levels.113 Taylor describes the preaching task as an imaginative one. She writes, “By that I do not 
mean a fanciful or fictional task, but one in which the human capacity to imagine—to form 
mental pictures of the self, the neighbor, the world, the future, to envision new realities—is both 
engaged and transformed.114 Long writes that an image in a sermon is much more than oratorical 
decoration. Accordingly, he lauds illustrations that tell stories and create images because they 
have more communicative power and energy than other kinds of illustrations.115 Thomas writes 
that effective preaching develops language and images because they appeal to one or more of the 
five senses, which in turn stirs the listener who then becomes more interested.116 In a final 
example, Robinson writes that listeners are stimulated when their senses are appealed to, he 
therefore explains, use words to help people see and remember past experiences or to imagine 
new experiences.117 The admonition to make language pictorial to win attention is good advice 
for praxis and this thesis has no argument against it. However, as the next part demonstrates, 
homiletics lacks substantive theoretical grounding for pictorial language. 
 
Conclusion 2: Strategies for Pictorial Language Lack Robust Theory 
Contemporary homileticians regularly propose using pictorial language to win attention, but 
rarely do they theoretically ground their strategies. When they do attempt to ground their 
proposed strategies, it is often laconic and lacks coherence with other homileticians. For 
example, some works such as Allen’s Determining the Form, Brown’s Delivering the Sermon, 
and the anonymous Catholic work, Preaching the Mystery of Faith, do not explain theory for 
attention whatsoever. Others, such as Long’s The Witness of Preaching and Robinson’s Biblical 
Preaching do briefly cite theorists. However, Robinson does so in just one sentence by referring 
to rhetorician Wayne Minnick, and Long does so generically by briefly overviewing why 
rhetoricians and homileticians have admonished preachers to use illustrations. Still others, such 
as Thomas’ They Like to Never Quit Preaching, Taylor’s The Preaching Life, and Lundblad’s 
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chapter titled “Sermon as Movement of Images,” explain why pictorial language wins attention 
but they do not cite theorists to support their explanations. 
Of all the books on the list, Long gives the most space to explaining why images win 
attention. However, his explanation is part of a larger section on illustrations, not just pictorial 
language. According to Long, rhetoricians and homileticians have always proposed the use of 
illustrations because they can illumine, clarify, persuade, break down resistance, make truth 
concrete, clear, and understandable.118 In an attempt to persuade preachers who may question the 
validity of pictorial language in Christian rhetoric, Long explains that Christian preachers who 
choose to communicate the gospel through narratives, images, metaphors, and similes drawn 
from everyday life follow Jesus’ example.119 Taylor is next in the amount of space that she gives 
to explain why images win attention. However, similar to Long, her explanation is part of a 
larger section. In her case, it is part of a section on imagination. According to Taylor, 
imagination works for a number of reasons: every person is able to imagine ideas in their minds; 
human beings are driven by images; Christian tradition is filled with images; theologians explain 
that faith is the enduring ability to imagine life in a certain way; mental images can blur the 
distinction between inner and outer reality and evoke physical response.120 Robinson refers to 
rhetorician Wayne Minnick before advancing his strategy for pictorial language. According to 
Robinson, Minnick explains that pictorial language can help to facilitate an experience, which 
appeals to both mind and feelings.121 This reasoning is similar to Thomas, who also explains that 
pictorial language facilitates an experience. However, rather than winning attention by appealing 
to the mind and feelings, as Robinson explains, Thomas writes that appealing to the senses 
begets identification: “When preaching effectively develops language and images that appeal to 
one or more of the five senses—sense appeal—the language and images beget identification. 
Once identification occurs, emotion is stirred and the listener becomes interested.”122 Finally, 
Lundblad explains that pictorial language engages the congregation because the congregation is 
steeped in images from electronic media. 123 
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This survey of the top twelve works being used to teach preaching in contemporary 
homiletics reveals that these books do not consistently nor comprehensively explain theory for 
pictorial language. These twelve works are representative of the field of homiletics today. In a 
past era, the nineteenth century for example, homileticians such as John Broadus and Robert 
Dabney offered more theory to explain their strategies for attention. However, even their 
explanations are brief and similar to works on homiletics today. Today’s most widely used books 
ground their strategies in praxis more than theory.124 
 
Neuroscience and Homiletics 
Although neuroscience is a rich field of inquiry when theorizing about attention, it is nearly 
untouched by the field of homiletics in relation to attention. The top twelve books used by 
seminaries to teach preaching in North America do not engage neuroscience. A word search of 
terms related to neuroscience and preaching reveals that other homiletical works do engage that 
field. However, these works are not widely used, and some are out of print; nevertheless, they do 
draw from neuroscience. For example, Ralph Lewis and Gregg Lewis’ Inductive Preaching: 
Helping People Listen, cites brain research to state that modern society discriminates against the 
visual/right hemisphere of the brain.125 Their conclusion is that this discrimination also occurs in 
preaching so that preaching impacts only half of the brain. Yet, their interest is not on how 
neuroscience elucidates important connections between language (the left side of the brain) and 
vision (the right side of the brain), which is the focus of this thesis. Instead, Lewis and Lewis use 
educational theory to explain that an inductive approach to preaching creates an experiential 
moment that engages both hemispheres of the brain.126 Thus Lewis and Lewis provide a helpful 
contribution to homiletics, but this thesis is particularly interested in how words, received 
aurally, win attention.  
Jeffrey Arthurs’ Preaching as Reminding engages scripture, rhetoric, and neuroscience to 
explain how reminding occurs in the brain and how preaching can leverage neuroscience’s 
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findings to awaken latent ideas and feelings that already reside in an audience’s consciousness.127 
However, Arthurs’ focus is the unique work of evoking memory, not attention, and the tasks, 
although similar, are different in emphasis. The former concerns how to draw out ideas that exist 
within the listener; the latter concerns how to win audience attention. 
Richard Cox’s Rewiring Your Preaching also puts preaching into conversation with 
neuroscience.128 However, its primary focus is not on attention, but on how the brain makes 
meaning. When Cox does address attention, he uses the term “brain gates,” and explains that the 
more the senses are engaged, the more likely the brain is to pay attention.129 Cox’ analysis of 
“brain gates” is laconic but it does take a meaningful step toward substantiating “multisensory” 
preaching as a possible means to attention. This is good news for advocates of multisensory 
preaching who recommend the use of sight, sound, taste, touch, and scent during the worship 
experience, and during the sermon in particular.130 However, even the turn toward multisensory 
preaching is beyond the interest of this thesis, which explores theoretical underpinnings for the 
ways language gains attention during oration. Finally, a survey of Cox’s bibliography further 
substantiates this section’s point that the field of homiletics lacks engagement about attention 
from neuroscience. Cox lists only two sources that connect neuroscience to Christianity (not 
specifically to preaching): How God Changes Your Brain by Andrew Newberg and Mark 
Waldman, and Why We Believe What We Believe by Andrew Newberg. Yet, neither of these 
works contribute to conversation between neuroscience and homiletics in relation to the issue of 
attention.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explained that the need for attention is axiomatic in rhetorical and homiletical 
literature. The primary reason for this assumption, according to this chapter, is because of the 
differences between oral rhetoric and written rhetoric: oral communication is evanescent, 
communal, and embodied. Thus, the need for attention is so obvious to rhetoricians and 
homileticians that it is often assumed in their writings. However, the audience’s attention is 
difficult for the preacher to grasp because of two primary obstacles: the brain has a limited 
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capacity for processing information and an increase in media consumption is having adverse 
effect on consumer attention. A primary response to the difficulty of winning attention by the 
field of homiletics has been to provide strategies for attention. However, the copious strategies 
for attention and the cursory manner with which the strategies are suggested illuminate a gap in 
knowledge in homiletics today, which is theory to explain how language grasps attention. 
Finally, by examining the top twelve books used to teach preaching at institutions belonging to 
the Association of Theological Schools, this chapter arrives at two conclusions: First, 
contemporary homiletics regularly lauds the use of pictorial language to win attention. Second, 
contemporary homiletics lacks substantive theory to explain why pictorial language grasps 
attention. These two points, along with a final point about the lack of engagement between the 
field of homiletics and the field of neuroscience, substantiate the claim made at the beginning of 
this chapter and are the impetus for this thesis, which is to provide theoretical grounding for 
pictorial language that grasps attention. 
The contribution that this thesis makes is important because the advance of homiletical 
theory is hindered if our discipline deals primarily with praxis. Furthermore, praxis is improved 
when preachers understand why a certain technique works. They are equipped to craft 
homiletical strategies on their own rather than simply following lock step what others have said. 
Therefore, this thesis contributes to knowledge for the field of homiletics by providing 
theoretical grounding for pictorial language that grasps attention. 
In order to accomplish this goal, this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 provide 
a theoretical basis for attention. Chapter 2 offers a rhetorical-theoretical basis for attention called 
enargeia, which suggests that an idea is able to gain and sustain attention by creating “presence” 
in oration. Chapter 3 explores current theory on attention in neuroscience to contribute to the 
rhetorical-theoretical basis that chapter 2 begins. As will be seen, theory on attention in 
neuroscience validates and limits the theory of enargeia. With this theoretical basis in place, 
chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate the practice of pictorial language in Christian rhetoric. Chapter 4 
provides a literary analysis of pictorial presence in the Gospel of John. Chapter 5 provides 
sermonic analysis of four sermons affirmed for their ability to win attention. Not only do these 
chapters support the theory explained in chapters 2 and 3, but they also begin to illuminate 
possible methodology for achieving attention in homiletics. Chapter 6 employs a quantitative 
study that results in further support of this thesis’ theory and chapter 7 concludes by articulating 
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theoretically grounded homiletical methodology for attention that is being given the name 
“cynosure.” 
Originally, Cynosure denoted the constellation Ursa Minor, and sometimes simply 
referred to the “North Star” that Ursa Minor contains. For thousands of years the North Star has 
been used to guide travelers. What is interesting about the North Star is that, although it is not the 
brightest star in the sky, something about the arrangement of the Ursa Minor constellation—the 
spacing and positioning of other stars—functions to cause the North Star to stand out and catch 
the eye. Because of this, over the years the word “cynosure” has evolved in meaning. Today, 
cynosure is both an actual star and an abstract noun referring to any person or thing that is a 
center of attention or interest.131 With this in mind, “cynosure” is a theoretically supported 
homiletical methodology for arranging and employing words that stand out and catch the mind’s 
eyes. 
  
																																																						
131 Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 3rd ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), s.v. “cynosure.” 
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Chapter 2 
Tracing a Rhetorical-Theoretical Basis for Language That 
Wins Attention 
The previous chapter sought to demonstrate that the field of homiletics needs theory to ground 
strategies for pictorial language that win attention. This chapter explores the theoretical basis for 
that task in terms of rhetoric. This chapter is not a general survey of rhetoric—such works are 
readily available—but rather traces a particular theory from ancient times to modern in order to 
elucidate why pictorial language wins attention. That theory is enargeia, which this chapter 
identifies as a rhetoric of presence and display that begins to explain why pictorial language wins 
attention. Enargeia has its origins in Greek rhetoric, develops as evidentia in Roman rhetoric, 
and comes to its culmination in modern rhetoric with the benefits and insights of the 
Enlightenment. 
This chapter begins by explaining how the rhetorical theory of enargeia contributes to 
this thesis and then it traces its development through Greek rhetoric, Roman rhetoric, and 
modern rhetoric. In Roman and modern rhetoric, the concept of enargeia is labeled differently. 
In Roman rhetoric enargeia is developed as evidentia; in modern rhetoric enargeia is referred to 
as “vivacity” and then, finally, “presence.” This chapter ends by summarizing the development 
of enargeia, synthesizing the theory of enargeia into a rhetorical-theoretical basis that will be 
applied to forthcoming chapters in order to identify and analyze strategies for grasping attention, 
and providing concluding observations. 
 
The Theory of Enargeia in Greek Rhetoric 
Aristotle spoke for many of the ancient rhetoricians when he admonished orators to bring an idea 
“before the eyes” of the listener [pro ommaton poiein, “visualization”].132 He writes, “Things 
should be seen as being done rather than as going to be done.”133 Just after this admonishment, 
he elaborates, “But it is necessary to say what we mean by ‘bringing-before-the-eyes’ and what 
makes this occur. I call those things ‘before-the-eyes’ that signify things engaged in activity.”134 
																																																						
132 Brackets supplied by Kennedy. 
133 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, trans. Kennedy, 219. 
134 Ibid., 222. 
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This kind of pictorial vividness with concrete images and active scenes is important to 
persuasion. 
In classical Greek, three primary words refer to an idea entering the mind’s eyes: ecfrasis, 
fantasia, and enargeia. According to Graham Zanker, a leading scholar on pictorial vividness as 
a rhetorical concept, ecfrasis appeals to the sense of sight, fantasia refers to mental visualization, 
and enargeia describes something that is clearly visible in the mind’s eyes.135 About these three 
words as rhetorical concepts, Zanker explains, “It may be concluded that the concept of enargeia 
is central to all ancient theory on pictorial vividness in literature and that it was felt to have a 
special relevance to poetry.”136 Zanker arrives at this conclusion for two reasons. First, enargeia 
is usually the consequence of ecfrasis and fantasia.137 Second, enargeia predates ecfrasis, 
fantasia, and any other equivalents in Greek literature.138 
Consensus exists among scholars of classical rhetoric about the eminence of enargeia as 
the central concept to ancient theory on pictorial vividness. In Classical Rhetoric for the Modern 
Student, Edward P. J. Corbett leaves out other devices and emphasizes enargeia when he writes, 
“Aid to lucidity is the device that the Greeks called enargeia and that we may translate as 
palpability or vividness.”139 Similarly, Ann Vasaly assumes the eminence of enargeia when she 
summarizes visual presentation, “One aspect of ‘Vivid description’ (in Greek, usually termed 
enargeia, in Latin, often illustratio or evidentia) was generally treated by the rhetorical 
handbooks under the heading of Style. Vivid description refers to a technique by which an orator 
created the illusion of sight through the use of concrete details of description.”140 
 
Antecedent Uses of Enargeia as a Rhetorical Concept 
Before enargeia became a rhetorical concept, it was an often-used adjective, enargeis, in the 
writings of the Greek poets. Zanker notes, “The adjective enargeis is . . . very common in the 
poets from Homer to the end of the classical period. There it means visible, palpable, in bodily 
shape especially of the gods appearing in their own forms, manifest to the mind’s eye, and, of 
																																																						
135 Graham Zanker, “Enargeia in the Ancient Criticism of Poetry,” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, Neue Folge, 
124 (1981): 301–4. 
136 Ibid., 304. 
137 Ibid., 302–4. 
138 Ibid., 304. 
139 Corbett, Classical Rhetoric, 298. 
140 Ann Vasaly, Representations: Images of the World in Ciceronian Oratory (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993), 19–20. 
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words etc., clear, distinct.”141 The standard Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and 
other Early Christian Literature translates the adjective as “readily perceived, clear, evident, and 
visible.”142 Thus, enargeis as an adjective describes something that is clear, visible, and ably 
seen in the mind’s eyes. 
The adjective, enargeis, became a noun, enargeia, in fourth-century BCE prose and 
during this time it gained increasing importance.143 Zanker writes that Plato’s use of enargeia, 
although employing it only once, is a classic example, “In the Politicus the Stranger refers to the 
enargeia that comes from pigments and the blending of colors in a painting. Here the word 
denotes visual clarity.”144 The development of enargeis the adjective, used as enargeia the noun, 
is an important advance in the use of the word. Rather than simply describing something else that 
is clear and visible, it refers to the thing itself: clear, visible, and ably seen in the mind’s eyes. 
While still not a rhetorical concept in Plato’s time, enargeia was a commonly used word that the 
fourth and third centuries Greek rhetoricians picked up. 
 
The Development of Enargeia in Greek Rhetoric 
In On the Sublime, Longinus captures the momentum and development of enargeia among 
Greek rhetoricians and may have been the first to conceptualize enargeia as a rhetorical theory: 
 
The term image145 [refers] to those cases when he who is speaking, by reason of 
the rapt and excited state of his feelings, imagines himself to see what he is 
talking about, and produces a similar illusion in his hearers. Poets and orators 
both employ images, but with a very different object, as you are well aware. The 
poetical image is designed to astound; the oratorical image to give perspicuity 
[enargeia]. Both, however, seek to work on the emotions.146 
 
With these words, the theory of enargeia was inaugurated. For Longinus it is the process of 
transferring an idea from speaker to listener through a lively image that centers attention and 
works on emotions. However, while the theory was born, it did not develop with him. 
																																																						
141 Zanker, “Enargeia,” 307. 
142 Frederick William Danker and Walter Bauer, eds., A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Early 
Christian Literature, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), s.v. “enargeis.” 
143 Zanker, “Enargeia,” 307. 
144 Ibid. 
145 The word image is not italicized in the translation but is done so here to make clear that Longinus is referring to 
image as a word. 
146 Longinus, On the Sublime, trans. Benjamin Jowett (n.p., n.d.), 18. Longinus is now generally considered not to be 
the author of On the Sublime, although it remains conventional to use his name as author. 
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Demetrius of Phalerum wrote extensively on rhetoric and he built on Longinus’ budding 
theory of enargeia by explaining two ways to transfer ideas from speaker to listener through 
lively images that grasp attention and work on emotions. First, Demetrius emphasizes the 
importance of “exact narration.” He writes, “We shall treat first of vividness [enargeia], which 
arises from an exact narration overlooking no detail and cutting out nothing.”147 To demonstrate 
the effectiveness of exact narration he offers an example from Homer’s description of a 
racehorse, “For ever they seemed as though they would mount the chariot-floor. Of Eumêlus, 
and hot on his back did the breath of their nostrils pour. And his shoulders broad, for their heads 
overhung him as onward they flew.”148 Demetrius then concludes, “The entire description is 
vivid owing to the fact that no detail which usually occurs and then occurred is omitted.”149 
Thus, according to Demetrius, exact narration is a means to producing enargeia. 
Demetrius explains that “attendant circumstances” is a second way to transfer ideas from 
speaker to listener. He writes, “Vividness [enargeia] may also be produced by mentioning the 
accompanying circumstances of any action. It was, for instance, once said of a countryman's 
walk that ‘the noise of his feet had been heard from afar as he approached,’ the suggestion being 
that he was not walking at all, but stamping the ground, so to say.”150 In this example the 
attendant circumstances—the noise from approaching feet—is a means to producing enargeia. 
 
Summary of Enargeia’s Development 
This offering by Longinus and Demetrius is the beginning of the theory of enargeia presented by 
Greek rhetoricians and it begins to answer the question that this chapter seeks to answer: What 
theoretical basis undergirds pictorial language that captures attention? To summarize the 
development of enargeia thus far, the adjective, enargeis, develops into a noun, enargeia, which 
Greek rhetoricians such as Plato and Aristotle use in their writings. However, not until Longinus 
and Demetrius does enargeia become a rhetorical concept. Longinus gives birth to the theory of 
enargeia and Demetrius contributes to it by offering “exact narration,” and “attendant 
circumstances” as means to producing enargeia. At this point, enargeia is unsophisticated in its 
development. Longinus offers a basic definition for the theory of enargeia; Demetrius provides 
																																																						
147 Demetrius, On Style, trans. W. Rhys Robert (London: Forgotten Books, 2018), ch. 4, 209. 
148 Ibid., 210. 
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initial strategy to produce enargeia. However, expanding on the means to produce enargeia 
(strategy) and explaining why enargeia works to gain attention (theory) does not develop with 
the Greek rhetoricians. 
 
Enargeia as Evidentia in Roman Rhetoric 
Greek rhetoricians’ fledgling theory of enargeia remained fairly dormant until Cicero and 
Quintilian began to develop it as a primary technique for centering attention. Although a handful 
of other rhetorical concepts also emphasized vivid description, enargeia’s accentuation of 
visualization, is what ultimately distinguished enargeia among Rome’s greatest rhetoricians as 
an explanation for pictorial vividness. As Vasaly writes, “No clear theoretical understanding of 
vivid description is to be found in the progymnasmata151 of the later Empire, and only 
[enargeia’s] emphasis on ‘visualization’ separated it from other, closely related, rhetorical 
techniques, such as narration or characterization.”152 Thus, the Roman rhetoricians, Cicero and 
Quintilian, take enargeia, commonly referred to as evidentia153 in Latin, and develop it for use in 
rhetoric as the primary theory of making ideas visible. Throughout the remainder of this section 
enargeia will be referred to as evidentia. 
 
The Development of Evidentia in Roman Rhetoric 
Cicero and Quintilian expand on the theory of enargeia by conflating Demetrius’ “exact 
narration” and “attendant circumstances” into a sophisticated three-stage process. In On the 
Orator, Cicero begins where the Greeks end. He explains, “A great impression is made by 
dwelling on a single point, and also by clear explanation and almost visual presentation of events 
as if practically going on—which are very effective both in stating a case and in explaining and 
amplifying the statement, with the object of making the fact we amplify appear to the audience 
as important as eloquence is able to make it.”154 In this explanation Cicero conflates Demetrius’ 
“exact narration” and “attendant circumstances” into the theory of evidentia, which, visually 
																																																						
151 Rhetorical exercises used by Greek and Roman students of rhetoric. 
152 Vasaly, Representations, 91. 
153 “The successful employment of evidentia caused the listener to picture what was described with ‘the eyes of the 
mind.’” (Vasaly, Representations, 90.) 
154 Cicero, On the Orator: Book 3, trans. Rackham, 161. 
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presents events as if they are actually going on. Quintilian builds on Cicero by describing a 
three-stage process in his Institutes of Oratory: 
 
When, for example, while the mind is unoccupied and we are indulging in 
chimerical hopes and dreams, as of men awake, the images of which I am 
speaking beset us so closely that we seem to be on a journey, on a voyage, in a 
battle, to be haranguing assemblies of people, to dispose of wealth which we do 
not possess, and not to be thinking but acting, shall we not turn this lawless power 
of our minds to our advantage? I make a complaint that a man has been murdered; 
shall I not bring before my eyes everything that is likely to have happened when 
the murder occurred? Shall not the assassin suddenly sally forth? Shall not the 
other tremble, cry out, supplicate or flee? Shall I not behold the one striking, the 
other falling? Shall not the blood, and paleness, and last gasp of the expiring 
victim present itself fully to my mental view? Hence will result that enargeia, 
which is called by Cicero "illustration" and "evidentness," which seems not so 
much to narrate as to exhibit, and our feelings will be moved not less strongly 
than if we were actually present at the affairs of which we are speaking.155 
 
According to Quintilian, this three-stage process requires the speaker to first, imagine and feel 
his images as if they are actually happening. Next, he needs to describe what he is imagining and 
feeling as if they are actually happening. These first two stages result in a third stage, which 
turns the audience into “eyewitnesses.” Vasaly concisely summarizes this three-stage strategy: 
 
The speaker first summons images from his memory, where they are stored; if the 
orator is skillful and imaginative, these stimulate the particular emotional 
response that he had hoped to create in himself; the orator then, through vivid 
description, stimulates corresponding visiones in the minds of his audience; and 
these, in turn, produce a seemingly inevitable emotional reaction in the listeners. 
The process by which the mind of the orator is moved and that by which his 
audience is moved is, in essence, the same. A particular image (visio), summoned 
to mind, sets in motion a predictable emotional response (pathos).156 
 
Describing evidentia as a three-stage process is a helpful advancement on Demetrius’ admonition 
to employ “exact narration” and “attendant circumstances” as a means to making ideas 
pictorially present. The figure below displays evidentia as a three-stage strategy: 
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Figures of Speech 
Following this description of evidentia Quintilian offers figures of speech as literary devices that 
are capable of exhibiting the rhetorician’s idea vividly, passionately, and stimulatingly in the 
second stage. Cicero also writes about figures of speech, but for him, they are little more than 
ornamental. After contributing a list of twenty-three figures157 Cicero writes, “For these more or 
less are the figures—and possibly there may be even more also like them—that embellish oratory 
with the thoughts and with arrangements of words.”158 Quintilian views figures159 as something 
more than simply ornamental and he elevates their status. He writes, “For they add force to our 
thoughts, and confer a grace upon them.”160 He then goes on to define figures and to demonstrate 
their unique function in oratory. There are two figures that Quintilian discusses that are of 
particular interest to this chapter because of their unique ability to facilitate the second stage of 
evidentia. Those two figures are metaphor and hypotyposis. 
																																																						
157 Cicero, On the Orator: Book 3, trans. Rackham, 159–68. 
158 Ibid., 167. 
159 Quintilian spends some time differentiating between tropes and figures but ultimately concludes, “The nature of 
things is not changed by a change in their appellations; and as men, if they take a name different from that which 
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(Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, trans. John Selby Watson [London: Covent Garden, 1856], 145.) 
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Quintilian connects the function of metaphor to the theory of enargeia when he writes, 
“Metaphor has been invented for the purpose of exciting the mind, giving a character to things, 
and setting them before the eye.”161 He defines metaphor as when, “a noun or a verb is 
accordingly transferred, fixed as it were, from that place in the language to which it properly 
belongs, to one in which there is either no proper word, or in which the metaphorical word is 
preferable to the proper.”162 According to Quintilian there are four ways that a metaphor may be 
used to bring an idea before the mind’s eyes. The first is, “When one sort of living thing is put 
for another; as, in speaking of a driver of horses, ‘the steersman turn’d his horse with mighty 
force.”163 The second is, “When one inanimate thing is put for another; as, ‘He gives his fleet the 
reins’.”164 The third is, “When inanimate things are put for things having life, as, ‘By steel, not 
fate, the wall of Greece fell down.’”165 The fourth is, “When things having life are put for things 
inanimate, ‘The shepherd sits amaz’d, listening to the sound from the high mountain’s head.’”166 
Following his delineation of these four kinds of metaphor Quintilian explains that these four 
could probably be distinguished into more species but that it is unnecessary.167 For example, the 
fourth, “When things having life are put for things inanimate,” is clearly personification. 
However, Quintilian is content to keep personification under the general classification of 
metaphor. 
A second figure of speech that Quintilian offers that may be applied to facilitating 
evidentia is hypotyposis. About this figure he writes, “But as to the figure which, as Cicero says, 
sets things before the eyes, it is used, when a thing is not simply mentioned as having been done, 
but is mentioned with a representation how it was done, not merely in a general way, but in all its 
attendant circumstances.”168 In referencing Cicero, Quintilian is referring to Rhetorica Ad 
Herennium.169 Found within that work is a description of a hypotyposis: “It is Ocular 
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Demonstration170 [hypotyposis] when an event is so described in words that the business seems 
to be enacted and the subject to pass vividly before our eyes.”171 Rhetorica Ad Herennium then 
offers an example of hypotyposis in which a story about the murder of Gracchus is depicted in 
vivid detail. Describing an assassin the author writes, “In a sweat, with eyes blazing, hair 
bristling, toga awry, he begins to quicken his pace, several other men joining him.”172 The author 
then describes the murder, “But this fellow, frothing crime from his mouth, breathing forth 
cruelty from the depth of his lungs, swings his arm, and, while Gracchus wonders what it means, 
but still does not move from the place where he stood, strikes him on the temple.”173 A depiction 
of the assassin and crowd following the murder concludes the hypotyposis, “The assassin, 
bespattered with the pitiable blood of the bravest of heroes, looks about him as if he had done a 
most admirable deed, gaily extends his murderous hand to his followers as they congratulate 
him, and betakes himself to the temple of Jupiter.”174 
Metaphor and hypotyposis are unique figures of speech that may be applied to the theory 
of evidentia because of their ability to visually exhibit ideas in the second stage. As Quintilian 
writes, “Metaphor has been invented for the purpose of exciting the mind, giving a character to 
things, and setting them before the eye.”175 And hypotyposis, “Sets things before the eyes, it is 
used, when a thing is not simply mentioned as having been done, but is mentioned with a 
representation how it was done, not merely in a general way, but in all its attendant 
circumstances.”176 In the second stage of enargeia, the task of the rhetorician is to describe what 
he is imagining and feeling as if it is actually happening for the distinct purpose of visually 
exhibiting ideas. Metaphor and hypotyposis are unique in their ability to accomplish this task. 
The figure below displays the addition of these figures to the second stage: 
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Summary of Evidentia’s Development 
In summary, the Roman rhetoricians refine theory for enargeia and they begin to prescribe 
strategy for making language pictorial. They do this by developing Demetrius’ “exact narration” 
and “attendant circumstances” into an integrated, three-stage process. They then offer figures of 
speech, specifically metaphor and hypotyposis, as literary devices that are capable of visually 
exhibiting ideas in the second stage. These contributions help to answer the question that this 
chapter seeks to answer: What rhetorical theoretical basis undergirds why pictorial presence 
grasps attention. 
 
Critiquing Evidentia 
Because the Greek and Roman rhetoricians’ discussion of evidentia primarily prescribes strategy, 
the theory at this point in its development raises two significant questions for the modern reader. 
First, how do images of real objects and experiences actually impact the mind? Second, what 
exactly is the connection in the brain between words and images? Vasaly’s critique of evidentia 
touches on the first question: 
 
Much of this appears fairly peculiar to the modern reader, and yet those aspects of 
the theoretical discussion of evidentia that appear most strange to us are perhaps 
most revealing of differences between Cicero’s audience and ourselves. Implicit 
in these discussions of the images derived from experience of real objects is the 
idea that such images were able to produce a cohering and lasting physical impact 
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on the mind by means of the eyes. . . . No explicit attempt was made, however, to 
explain the perceptual mechanics of evidentia, by which the orator, through 
words, produced images.177 
 
Thus far in the theory of evidentia an assumption is being made about the impact that pictorial 
images of real objects and real experiences have on the brain. However, as Vasaly’s critique 
makes clear, the Roman rhetoricians do not explain how this happens or why they think it works. 
This is because rhetoric, and specifically the theory of evidentia, is primarily pragmatic at this 
stage in its development. Cicero and Quintilian, and their predecessors Longinus and Demetrius, 
were observing what works and they codified rules about that. 
There is a second question that evidentia raises: What exactly is the connection in the 
mind between words and images? Vasaly explains: 
 
It is also to be observed that the accounts of evidentia or enargeia found in 
ancient sources assume an extraordinary degree of correspondence between words 
and images. The effect in such descriptions of words as words, each freighted 
with emotional resonance for the listener, is scarcely acknowledged by ancient 
rhetorical theorists.178 
 
In other words, the classical rhetoricians assume a strong correlation between the words that they 
speak and the images that their words produce in the brains of their listeners. An assumed one-
for-one correlation between symbol and thing symbolized is a weakness at this point in the 
theory of enargeia. Going beyond the correlation of symbol and thing symbolized, the Greeks 
and Romans also assume the emotional impact that their images produce in their listeners. 
Dennis R. Bormann wrote extensively on the theory of enargeia. In his article “Enargeia: A 
Concept For All Seasons,” Bormann posits a response to this critique at the end of his section on 
the Roman rhetoricians by writing, “Lively and vividly descriptive language can raise the ideas 
of the imagination to almost the same vividness of sense impressions. Enargeia can ‘almost 
compel the audience to see what the author imagined.’”179 By mentioning “sense impressions” 
Bormann begins to address this critique. However, sense impressions are not something that the 
Greek and Roman rhetoricians connect to the theory of evidentia. Sense impressions, in relation 
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to this rhetorical theory, are only discussed in the modern era and not until the modern 
rhetoricians does the theory of evidentia receive treatment that explains the inner workings of 
this rhetorical theory. 
 
Enargeia as Vivacity in Modern Rhetoric 
The next stage of development in the theory of enargeia arrives with the modern rhetoricians. 
Eminent among the modern rhetoricians who understood and expanded the rhetorical concept of 
enargeia are eighteenth-century clergyman George Campbell and twentieth-century 
philosophers, Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. 
Campbell’s explanation of the theory of enargeia is located in his concept of vivacity. 
Arthur E. Walzer supports the connection that this section makes between enargeia and vivacity 
by briefly tracing the development of pictorial vividness in rhetoric. He begins by connecting 
enargeia to evidentia writing that, “Enargeia (in Latin, evidentia) is the term for detailed verbal 
description that is intended to create a picture of a place, person, or action in the mind of the 
listener.”180 He then connects evidentia to Campbell’s vivacity by noting that, “Enargeia is 
certainly one effective way in which an orator engages the listener’s imagination. Campbell will 
bring Hume’s theory of vivacity to explain what Quintilian observed.”181 Throughout the 
remainder of this section enargeia will be referred to as vivacity. 
 
The Development of Vivacity in George Campbell’s Rhetoric 
Campbell made an indelible mark on the development of the concept of enargeia in his work The 
Philosophy of Rhetoric by approaching rhetoric as a philosophical rather than a practical 
rhetorician.182 As Lloyd Bitzer writes, “The book’s distinctive contributions result from the 
encounter of a philosophical mind with concepts and problems of rhetoric. Campbell permitted 
fundamentalist issues of metaphysics and epistemology to enter and influence his theory of 
rhetoric.”183 As a philosopher, Campbell’s concern was to explain why techniques of rhetoric 
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work. Thus, Campbell applied eighteenth-century theory of philosophy and science of the human 
mind to explain why the theory of enargeia works. 
Campbell’s explanation for why the theory of vivacity works was based on David 
Hume’s science of the mind. Walzer writes, “Indeed, Hume casts himself as the Newton of the 
science of the mind, who would identify the ‘laws and forces’ that influence mental 
operations.”184 Therefore, the following sections begin by articulating Hume’s writings on 
impressions and vivacity and conclude by explaining how Campbell appropriates Hume to 
explain his theory of vivacity. The final section then ends with a summary of Campbell’s 
vivacity followed by a critique before discussing more current rhetoricians. 
 
A Theory of Impressions 
According to David Hume, chief among the “laws and forces” that influence mental operations 
are impressions. However, impressions are not all alike. Hume claims that three kinds of 
impressions occur in cognition: 
 
We find by experience that when an impression has been present to the mind, it 
re-appears there later as an idea; and it can do this in either of two ways: when in 
its new appearance it retains a good deal of its first liveliness and is intermediate 
between an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that liveliness and is 
a perfect idea. The faculty by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner 
is called the “memory,” and the other the “imagination.”185 
 
According to Hume, one kind of impression that the mind receives is an impression from actual 
experience. This can also be called an impression from sensation. A second kind of impression 
that the mind receives is an impression from memory. This results from the mind remembering 
an impression from sensation. Finally, a third kind of impression that the mind receives is an 
impression from imagination. An impression from imagination is the result of the mind having 
no actual experience and no memory of actual experience so that the only impression available is 
one that is created through the imagination. 
Hume differentiates between the impact that impressions from memory have on the mind 
and the impact that impressions from imagination have on the mind: 
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You can see at a glance that the ideas of the memory are much livelier and 
stronger than those of the imagination, and that the memory paints its objects in 
sharper colours than the imagination uses. When we remember a past event, the 
idea of it flows in on the mind in a forcible manner; whereas in the imagination 
the perception is faint and languid, and the mind can’t easily keep it steady and 
uniform for any considerable time. Here, then, is a noticeable difference between 
one species of ideas and another.186 
 
For Hume, an impression from memory is superior to an impression from imagination because 
the ideas that an impression from memory creates in the mind are livelier, stronger, and sharper 
in color. 
Campbell applied Hume’s theory of impressions by explaining a three-tiered hierarchy 
for impressions that occur in the mind. First in Campbell’s hierarchy is an impression from 
sensation. Campbell writes, “A passion is most strongly excited by sensation.”187 He then offers 
an example of an impression from sensation and its ability to grab attention and stir emotion, 
“The sight of danger, immediate or near, instantly rouseth fear; the feeling of an injury, and the 
presence of the injurer, in a moment kindle anger.”188 An impression from sensation is the actual 
experience of something happening. For example, experiencing an army attacking the city 
creates a deep impression in the mind that is the direct result of sensation; one sees the army 
attacking, hears the clash of arms, smells the fires burning, and so forth. Second in the hierarchy 
is an impression from memory. Campbell explains, “Next to the influence of sense is that of 
memory, the effect of which upon passion, if the fact be recent, and remembered distinctly and 
circumstantially, is almost equal.”189 An impression from memory is the recollection of an actual 
experience. For example, remembering an army attacking the city creates an impression in the 
mind that is very near, but not quite as powerful, as an impression from sensation. Last in the 
hierarchy is an impression from imagination. Campbell explains, “Next to the influence of 
memory is that of imagination by which is here solely meant the faculty of apprehending what is 
neither perceived by the sense, nor remembered.”190 An impression from imagination is the 
creation of an idea ex nihilo. For example, hearing about an army attacking the city creates an 
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impression in cognition, although it is possesses less vivacity than impressions from sensation or 
memory. Thus, according to Campbell, the mind experiences one of three kinds of impressions: 
sensation, memory, and imagination. Impressions from sensation have the greatest impact on 
attention and emotion whereas impressions from imagination have the least impact on attention 
and emotion. 
A theory of impressions offers lucid insight into the inner workings of vivacity. Up to this 
point the Greek and Roman rhetoricians argued that ideas need to be lively and visual so that 
they enter into the mind’s eyes thereby centering attention on an idea. To accomplish this they 
prescribed a three-stage strategy that employs figures of speech to create pictorial images of real 
objects and real experiences in the mind. However, they did not delve into the theory of why real 
objects and real experiences were effective rhetorically. This led to critique that asked, “How do 
images of real objects and experiences actually impact the mind?” Campbell’s application of 
Hume’s theory of impressions answers this critique: impressions from sensation have the greatest 
impact on attention and emotion whereas impressions from imagination have the least impact on 
attention and emotion. This of course leads to a second question that the previous section asked, 
“What exactly is the connection in the mind between words and images?” Using the language 
afforded by Campbell, the question may be put, “How is impression from sensation achieved 
through mere words?” Or, “Is it possible to create an impression from sensation in the mind 
through impression from imagination?” The next section, A Theory of Vivacity, will explore that 
question. 
 
A Theory of Vivacity 
Orators rarely have the means to regale the audience with an actual army attacking their city. At 
times they may be able to evoke memories of such an attack. However, most often, orators deal 
with imagination. Is it possible to transform an idea that causes an impression from imagination 
into an impression from sensation so as to have the greatest impact in the mind? According to 
Hume, the answer is “yes” if impressions from imagination are imbued with vivacity. 
Vivacity makes the transformation of impression from imagination to sensation possible 
by causing an idea to be more present in consciousness. Hume writes, “I would willingly 
establish it as a general maxim in the science of human nature, that when any impression 
becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but 
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likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity.191 Although Hume does not 
define vivacity, he offers the following terms to help explain it: 
 
And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or 
vivacity, or solidity, or FIRMNESS, or steadiness. This variety of terms, which 
may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, 
which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh 
more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and 
imagination.192 
 
Superior force, solidity, firmness and steadiness are words that Hume uses to help explain 
vivacity. He also explains vivacity in terms of resemblance and liveliness by writing about 
closing his eyes, imagining his study, and seeing in his mind’s eyes exact representations of the 
impressions from sensation that his mind experiences when he is in his study.193 By this 
example, Hume demonstrates how the idea of his study is able to transform from an impression 
from imagination into an impression from sensation through vivacity—a lively resemblance of 
his study in his mind’s eyes. Bitzer helpfully articulates Hume’s concept of vivacity: 
 
Is our perception of a pencil on the desk a sensation, an idea of memory, or an 
idea of imagination? How do we know that we are sensing the pencil rather than 
imagining or remembering it? Hume answered that the mind distinguishes among 
kinds of perceptions by their relative degree of vivacity. Thus, the perception of 
the pencil will be identified as a sensation, if such it is, because we feel the 
compelling degree of vivacity, or liveliness, which accompanies perceptions of 
sense.194 
 
In summary, Hume believed that an idea that forms in the mind as an impression from 
imagination has the possibility to become an impression from sensation if the idea is imbued 
with enough vivacity—resemblance, liveliness, superior force, solidity, firmness, and steadiness. 
This is possible because vivacity functions to make an idea more present in the mind’s eyes. 
Walzer supports this summary of Hume’s concept of vivacity when he writes, “If an idea is 
presented in a lively way, that is with vivacity, we not only experience pleasure from it; we are 
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more likely to believe it, because its impact on the mind would resemble a sense impression.”195	
Campbell applied Hume’s theory of vivacity to his own in order to explain what the 
Greek and Roman rhetoricians intuited: ideas imbued with vivacity can be so lively that they 
actually evoke impressions from sensation in cognition. This is Campbell’s response to the 
second critique leveled at evidentia in the previous section. He explains, “By a judicious yet 
natural arrangement of the most affecting circumstances, by a proper selection of the most 
suitable tropes and figures, it enlivens the ideas raised in the imagination to such a pitch as 
makes them strongly resemble the perceptions of the senses, or the transcripts of the memory.”196 
Bitzer explains Campbell’s perspective further when he writes, “The orator must find ways to 
make ideas of imagination as strong and lively as sensations or ideas of memory because ideas of 
imagination, when given the power or vivacity of sensible impressions or memories, will tend to 
compel attention, win belief, and arouse passion.”197 Thus, the task of the rhetorician who desires 
to elevate an idea in consciousness must make that idea more present to the brain by imbuing it 
with vivacity because vivacity makes an idea lively enough and forceful enough to resemble 
actual impression from sensation in the mind. 
Since vivacity is central to creating an impression from sensation it is interesting to note 
that Campbell, like Hume, did not define vivacity. Instead, Campbell offered a list of terms much 
like Hume’s list of terms. Hume uses the terms superior force, solidity, firmness, steadiness, 
resemblance, and liveliness, 198 and Campbell offers force, steadiness, energy, brightness, 
brilliancy, luster, and liveliness.199 By offering terms that signify vivacity, both Hume and 
Campbell conceptualize the kind of language that achieves an impression from sensation in the 
mind but they do not go further in explaining why this kind of language achieves an impression 
from sensation in the mind. 
 
Summary of Vivacity’s Development 
Campbell undergirds previously existing strategy for vivacity with theory by applying Hume’s 
theories on the science of the mind to explain what is happening in cognition when an idea 
captures attention by enters into the mind’s eyes. Using Hume’s theory of impressions, Campbell 
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articulates a three-tiered hierarchy of impressions to explain that not all ideas are the same in 
their impact on the mind. Then, using Hume’s theory of vivacity, Campbell explains that an idea 
imbued with vivacity is capable of transcending from an impression from imagination to an 
impression from sensation. Following his theoretical explanations for impressions and vivacity 
Campbell begins to implement strategy but it does little to advance that which was offered by the 
Greek and Roman rhetoricians. Campbell exhorts the orator to strategically employ language that 
imbues ideas with vivacity. Walzer explains, “The orator or poet chooses words, tropes and 
figures, and syntactic structures that exploit the incredible resources that language has for the 
sensitive reader or speaker.”200 
The figure below incorporates Campbell’s theory into the developing theory of vivacity: 
 
 
 
Critiquing Vivacity 
Campbell used current theory of the mind to explain how ideas capture attention but he didn't 
delve deeper into the relationship of how vivacious language causes the mind to respond. This is 
certainly an improvement, but weaknesses remain, primarily related to Campbell’s lack of 
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definition for vivacity. Campbell’s entire theory is dependent on vivacity. Ideas lacking it fail to 
achieve impression from sensation status in the mind; ideas imbued with it ascend to impression 
from sensation status in the mind. Yet Campbell did not offer more than a list of terms to signify 
vivacity. Walzer explains that this is an improvement on what the Greeks and Romans offered, 
writing, “This [Enlightenment’s science of the mind] psychological perspective not only 
provides Campbell with a lens that focuses on effects, but it also provides him with a list of 
technical terms more discretely related to effects than terms used such as ‘weightiness’ or 
‘impressiveness’ of Roman rhetoric.”201 However, technical terms that conceptualize vivacity are 
not enough. Because vivacity is paramount to the ascension of an idea in the mind, vivacity 
needs to be clearly articulated. How does vivacious language cause the mind to respond? 
Having laid a partial foundation for vivacity in the theories of the mind from Hume and 
Campbell, the next section looks to Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca who furthered 
Campbell’s contribution by refining, articulating, and explaining vivacity through their theory of 
presence. 
 
Enargeia as Presence in Modern Rhetoric 
Following George Campbell’s eighteenth-century advancement on enargeia through his theory 
of vivacity is twentieth-century theory of presence from rhetoricians Chaim Perelman and Lucie 
Olbrechts-Tyteca. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca make a direct connection between their theory 
and Campbell’s theory when they write, “In an appendix to his work on rhetoric, Whately 
reproduces a lengthy note by Campbell dealing with the conditions of time, place, relation, and 
personal interest by means of which an event affects us: these conditions are also those which 
determine presence.”202 Alan Gross and Ray Dearin appreciate the connection between Campbell 
and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. They write, “Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca freely 
acknowledge that this view [presence] has been anticipated by the eighteenth-century rhetorical 
theorist, George Campbell. Campbell calls his anticipations of presence ‘circumstances in the 
object presented by the speaker which serve to awaken and inflame the passions of the hearers,’ 
for him an essential ingredient in persuasion.”203 Thus, there is a connection between Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s presence and Campbell’s vivacity that, ultimately, connects presence to 
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the developing theory of enargeia. Throughout the remainder of this section enargeia will be 
referred to as presence. 
This section breaks into five parts. The first part explains that Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s presence is the aim of Campbell’s vivacity. The second part describes how presence 
works in the mind. The third part articulates the ways that strategies for presence function to 
achieve impression from sensation status in the mind. The fourth part summarizes Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’ theory of presence. The fifth part offers a critique on the theory of presence. 
 
Presence: The Aim of Vivacity 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explained that “presence” is, “The displaying of certain elements 
on which the speaker wishes to center attention in order that they may occupy the foreground of 
the hearer’s consciousness.”204 Enargeia, evidentia, and vivacity sought to accomplish the same 
thing. However, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have the advantage of developing their theory 
of presence in light of those rhetoricians who went before them who sought to explain a theory 
of pictorial vividness that wins attention. Standing on their shoulders, Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s presence refines previous theory into a theory that focalizes ideas in the brain. Foss, 
Foss, and Trapp describe Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s notion of presence by using the 
metaphor of figure and ground, “A person standing on a mountain top looking into a valley may 
see trees, a lake, and a stream, along with other objects. When that person focuses on, for 
instance, a tree, the tree becomes the figure and the rest of the objects become the ground. 
Perelman might say that, in this case, the tree has achieved presence in that person’s 
perception.”205 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca summarize this concept when they write, “The 
thing on which the eye dwells, that which is best or most often seen is, by that very 
circumstance, overestimated.”206 In summary, presence occupies the foreground of the hearer’s 
consciousness by distinguishing a “figure” from the “ground,” and by overestimating a thing or 
idea the “figure” becomes the primary focus of the mind. 
Presence is a helpful response to the critique directed at Campbell’s vivacity. Whereas 
Campbell conceptualized vivacity with a list of technical terms such as force, energy, lustre, and 
																																																						
204 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, New Rhetoric, 142. 
205 Sonja K. Foss, Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp, Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric, 3rd ed. (Long Grove, 
IL: Waveland, 2002), 95. 
206 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, New Rhetoric, 116–17. 
	 52 
liveliness, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca went further by delineating what causes vivacious 
language to capture the mind’s attention. Rather than focusing on vivacious language, Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca focused on what it is that causes language to be vivacious—presence. For 
them, endowing ideas with presence is what makes ideas vivacious. In other words, presence is 
the intended outcome of vivacity. 
 
How Presence Works in the Mind 
Ideas achieve presence by becoming the primary focus in consciousness. This happens by 
directing the mind’s eyes toward a specific thing or idea. To support this point Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca reference Piaget. They write: 
 
As Piaget shows, it is a psychological datum operative already at the level of 
perception: when two things are set side by side, say a fixed standard and things 
of variable dimensions with which it is compared, the thing on which the eye 
dwells, that which is best or most often seen, is, by that very circumstance, 
overestimated.207 
 
Based on Piaget, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that whatever idea or thing is made 
present to consciousness is that which becomes most important in consciousness.208 
Theory on attention appears to verify this point. In Louise Karon’s article titled, 
“Presence in The New Rhetoric,” she explores theory on attention and affirms Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s rhetorical theory of presence. Karon explains: 
 
Wundt concludes that “Attention means a redistribution of clearness in 
consciousness, the rise of some elements and the fall of others, with an 
accompanying total feeling of a characteristic kind.” Similarly, Dewey holds that 
“In attending, we fixate the mental content in the center of the mind’s activity, 
and allow all else to become dim and indistinct. So the mind, instead of diffusing 
consciousness over all the elements presented to it, brings it all to bear upon some 
one selected point, which stands out with unusual brilliancy and distinctness.”209 
 
Karon then concludes, “By definition, presence accomplishes the same thing as attention.”210 
And, “It is quite probably that the feeling of vivacity or liveliness inhering to presence accounts 
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for this urgency: that impelling idea, which draws and fixes our attention, is the consequence of 
the feeling or sensation imparted by the impression of presentness.”211 “The impression of 
presentness” is a phrase that captures much of what enargeia, evidentia, and vivacity 
championed but were unable to articulate. When the impression of presentness is created, it 
centers attention on an idea in the mind’s eyes and makes that idea so present to the mind that it 
ascends from an impression from imagination to an impression from sensation. 
 
Strategies for Creating the Impression of Presentness 
How is the impression of presentness created? Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca offer three 
primary strategies: objects, presentation of data, and figures of speech. 
 
Creating Presence through Objects 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca believed that presence is created through objects, which form 
impressions from sensation in the mind. Furthermore, they believed that presence created 
through objects can make that which is distant, in either time or space, more present. To support 
this claim Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca drew from Clarence Lewis, an American philosopher 
and logician, who explained that presence is able to make things that are distant appear closer.212 
To demonstrate the validity of this notion they referred to Richard Crossman’s book, The God 
That Failed. Crossman explains that the primary reason for the atrocities committed during the 
civil war in Spain was the loss of the enemy’s presence. He writes, “Your friends are allies and 
therefore real human beings. Your opponents are just tiresome, unreasonable, unnecessary 
theses, whose lives are so many false statements which you would like to strike out with a lead 
bullet.”213 Thus, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca write, “The individual whom one is ready to 
sacrifice is not only unreal de jure because he has lost his ontological status, but also de facto 
because he is not present.”214 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca offer two examples to demonstrate how things that are 
absent can become more present through the use of physical objects. First, Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca explain how Marc Antony waved Caesar’s bloody tunic in front of the Roman 
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populace. They then make the point that by waving a tunic that had blood on it from a murder 
that the populace was being told about, a past event became more present in the populace’s 
consciousness.215 A second example that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca offer is that of a lawyer 
bringing the children of the accused before a judge prior to the judge’s judgment. By doing this, 
they write that the accused’s children increases their presence in the judge’s mind, which ideally, 
affects the judge’s judgment.216 
Creating presence is not limited to physical objects. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
write, “It should also be observed that the effort to make something present to the consciousness 
can relate not only to real objects, but also to a judgment or an entire argumentative 
development.”217 According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, selection and presentation of 
certain elements elevate their pertinence to the discussion thereby endowing them with 
presence.218 The following sections describe how the selection and presentation of certain 
elements are able to increase presence in oration. 
 
Creating Presence through Presentation of Data 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain the important role that the presentation of data has in 
creating presence when they write, “In examining the form of discourse, insofar as we find it 
possible to distinguish the form from the content, we shall direct attention to the means whereby 
a particular presentation of the data establishes agreement at a certain level, impresses it on the 
consciousness with a certain intensity, and emphasizes certain of its aspects.”219 Following this 
statement Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca delineate four kinds of data that can be presented to 
increase presence in oration: dwelling, common cultural heritage, concrete terms, and 
illustration. 
Dwelling on an idea is one way to increase presence in oration. Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca write, “A speaker will do well sometimes to expatiate at length on the significance and 
importance of certain unquestionable elements, instead of implying or merely mentioning them. 
By dwelling on them longer, the speaker increases their presence in the minds of his hearers.”220 
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By way of example they quote Quintilian who admonished dwelling on a point and drawing out 
an idea.221 While time spent on an idea is one way to dwell on a point, there are other ways to 
increase dwelling in oration. Repetition, accentuation, even accumulating stories, are means to 
dwelling. About these, repetition repeats something that has already been said in exact or almost 
exact words. Accentuation, either by tone of voice, pause, or pace is an aspect of dwelling. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca also mention accumulating stories as a kind of dwelling. They 
write, “accumulating stories, even contradictory ones, on a given subject may create the 
impression that it is an important one.”222 
Common cultural heritage is another way to increase presence in oration. Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca write, “Collective myths, legendary tales, which are part of a common cultural 
heritage, have this advantage over hypotheses and utopias that they can much more readily take 
advantage of presence.”223 To support this point Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca refer to Plato 
who employed Greek mythology to make his point before his Greek audience. They believe that 
the shared mythology between Plato and his audience functions to increase presence by making 
Plato’s words less arbitrary and less abstract.224 
Concrete terms are another way to increase presence in oration. Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca write, “General notions and abstract schemes have hardly any effect on the 
imagination.”225 In place of abstract schemes, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca propose the use of 
concrete terms. A concrete term refers to specifying things such as time and place, but it also 
refers to describing things in concrete actions. As an example of this they use Antony’s speech in 
Julias Caesar to show how the conspirators are not referred to as those who “killed Caesar” but 
as those “whose daggers have stabbed Caesar.” Thus, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca conclude, 
“The concrete term increases the sense of actuality.”226 
Illustration is another way to create presence in oration. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
explain that illustrating a standard can be used as a starting point for a line of argument.227 In this 
way, an illustration is able to make a discourse visually accessible to the mind’s eyes. They 
explain, “Because an illustration seeks to increase presence by making an abstract rule concrete 
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by means of a particular case, there is a tendency to see an illustration as ‘a vivid picture of an 
abstract matter.’”228 To exemplify this, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca quote Aristotle who 
lauded periodic style over free-running style because, according to him, free-running style had 
the disadvantage of having no definite end point. To endow this “rule” with presence, Aristotle 
illustrates, “One always likes to sight a stopping-place in front of one: it is only at the goal that 
men in a race faint and collapse; while they see the end of the course before them, they can keep 
on going.”229 
 
Creating Presence through Figures of Speech 
In Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of presence, figures of speech play an integral role. 
Their list is not intended to be exhaustive. Instead it serves as an example of the kind of figures 
that foster presence. About these figures they write, “The effect of figures relating to presence is 
to make the object of discourse present to the mind.”230 They follow this statement by offering 
eight figures. Of the eight, three of those figures stand out. 
The first figure of speech that stands out in its ability to create presence is onomatopoeia. 
Onomatopoeia is the creation of a word or the unusual use of words that evoke the actual noises 
of people, animals, and things.231 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that the word, used to 
imitate the sound of something else, helps to increase the presence of that which is being 
imitated.232 
A second figure of speech that stands out in its ability to create presence is hypotyposis, 
which is the same figure that the Roman rhetoricians applied to evidentia.233 Hypotyposis 
describes the attendant circumstances of something in such a way that the matter seems to unfold 
before the audience’s eyes. The specific details are what make the thing being described more 
present to the mind. Hume wrote about this when he compared being in his study to thinking 
about being in his study.234 The similarity between the real and the imagined is what makes that 
which is absent more present in consciousness. 
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A third figure of speech that stands out in its ability to create presence is imaginary direct 
speech. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca write, “Imaginary direct speech increases the feeling of 
presence by the fictitious attribution of words to a person (sermocinatio) or to a group of persons 
involved in conversation (dialogism).”235 
 
A Summary of the Modern Theory of Enargeia 
Two significant questions were asked at the end of the section on evidentia in Roman rhetoric. 
First, how do images of real objects and experiences actually impact the mind? Second, what 
exactly is the connection in the mind between words and images? As a philosopher, Campbell’s 
primary contribution to rhetorical theory was an explanation of why techniques of rhetoric work. 
Campbell applied eighteenth-century theory from philosophy and science of the human mind to 
explain. Campbell responded to the first question with his theory of impressions, which explains 
that ideas can make one of three different kinds of impressions in the mind. To the second 
question, Campbell responded with his theory of vivacity, which explains that an idea imbued 
with force, steadiness, energy, brightness, brilliancy, lustre, and liveliness are what cause an idea 
to ascend from an impression from imagination to an impression from sensation in the mind. The 
primary critique of Campbell’s theory of vivacity is the lack of definition for and explanation of 
vivacity, which is limited to a list of terms. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of presence offers a theoretical explanation for 
what is happening when language reaches the height of vivacity that Campbell’s technical terms 
describe: an idea has been endowed with presence. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of 
presence is the culmination not only of Campbell’s vivacity, but also of the theory of enargeia as 
a whole. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that when an idea is endowed with presence in 
the mind, that idea becomes the forceful, steady, energetic, bright, brilliant, lustrous, and lively 
idea that Campbell claimed results in ideas ascending from impressions from imagination to 
impressions from sensation in the mind. Following this theory, they connect similar strategies to 
what the Greek and Roman rhetoricians promoted in their theories, to explain how some 
rhetorical strategies function to create presence in the mind. 
The figure below depicts the theory of presence in its attempt to achieve impression from 
sensation in oration: 
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Critiquing Presence 
Although Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca significantly improve on the theory of enargeia 
through presence, there remains critique. Karon articulates a primary critique of presence when 
she writes: 
 
We are told that “presence, and efforts to increase the feeling of presence, must 
. . . not be confused with fidelity to reality.” This implies that its suasory force 
comes not from any verisimilitude of nature; instead it comes from the elements 
of the discourse. However, are these connections not based on processes of 
association and dissociation, and are these not psychological processes? And are 
not the conditions producing these associations allied with, if not the same as, 
those conditions for creating presence?236 
 
Karon’s critique is grounded in one sentence in which Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca laud the 
ability of presence to cause an impression from sensation without resembling reality. However, 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do not say that presence is altogether absent from reality. 
Instead, the statement that they make is part of their larger argument. They believe that presence 
is able to cause an impression from sensation in the mind without resembling reality within the 
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framework of enargeia that the Roman rhetoricians establish. Within that framework, resembling 
reality is limited to displaying actual events that happened in the past by making them happen in 
the present through oration. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argue that there are other ways to 
cause impression from sensation—specifically through the creation of presence. Clearly, 
presence is a psychological process based on association and dissociation. That reality is just not 
limited to resembling a past event in present terms. 
A better critique for the theory of presence is that it lacks empirical proof. The modern 
rhetoricians understood this. That is why Campbell drew on Hume’s science of the mind, while 
Perelman, and Olbrechts-Tyteca drew on Piaget and attention theorists. They understood that 
more proof was necessary to validate and explain their theories on pictorial vividness. Of course 
it is possible that no one fully understands how language affects the mind. Yet, other disciplines 
may help to illuminate that which the Greeks, Romans, and modern rhetoricians offer in regards 
to the creation of presence that captures the brain’s attention. 
 
A Rhetorical-Theoretical Basis for Presence That Wins Attention 
This chapter began with the question: What rhetorical-theoretical basis explains language that 
grasps attention? One answer to this question is found in the theory of enargeia as a rhetorical 
concept. Now that this chapter has surveyed, summarized, and critiqued enargeia (evidentia, 
vivacity, and presence), it offers the following rhetorical-theoretical basis for how language 
grasps the brain’s attention. 
A theory of impressions explains two things about how ideas function in cognition. First, 
it explains that an idea is able to cause one of three kinds of impressions in the mind: an 
impression from imagination, an impression from memory, and an impression from sensation. 
Second, a theory of impressions explains that there is a hierarchy to the three kinds of 
impressions that occur in the mind. An impression from imagination is the weakest kind of 
impression whereas an impression from sensation is the strongest kind of impression. 
A theory of vivacity explains that ideas are dynamic when it comes to the kind of 
impressions that they are able to cause in the mind. A languid idea causes little more than an 
impression from imagination whereas an energetic idea is able to ascend the hierarchy of 
impressions so that it becomes an actual impression from sensation in the mind. Terms used to 
	 60 
signify an energetic idea that ascends the hierarchy of impressions are force, steadiness, energy, 
brightness, brilliance, luster, and liveliness. 
A theory of presence articulates what happens in the mind when an idea is imbued with 
the terms used to signify an energetic idea: that idea is endowed with presence. Presence makes 
one idea more present to the mind than any other idea. This focalization of an idea in the mind is 
what makes an idea energetic enough so that it forms an impression from sensation in the mind. 
A theory of presence employs the arsenal of Greek, Roman, and modern rhetoric’s 
strategies for making language vivid. Strategies are selected based on their ability to endow an 
idea with presence in the mind. Concrete objects, presentation of data, and figures of speech are 
a few of the categories offered for strategies that create presence but these are not exhaustive. 
There is opportunity to explore other strategies that may function to endow ideas with presence 
in the mind. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored a theoretical basis for grasping attention in terms of rhetoric. Beginning 
with Aristotle who admonished orators to bring an idea “before the eyes” of the listener [pro 
ommaton poiein, ‘visualization’],237 Longinus and Demetrius of Phalerum delineated the 
beginning of a theory of presence and display called enargeia. They prescribed two strategies—
“exact narration” and “attendant circumstances”—as means to producing enargeia. The Roman 
rhetoricians developed enargeia as evidentia and they extended the Greeks’ strategies into a 
three-stage process. They then offered figures of speech, specifically metaphor and hypotyposis, 
as literary devices that are capable of recreating reality in the second stage. At this point in the 
development of enargeia, strategy is strong but theory is weak. George Campbell followed the 
Roman rhetoricians and applied Enlightenment theory on the human mind to explain how 
recreating ideas in oration work in cognition. He argued that an idea makes a sensory impression 
in the mind if it is imbued with enough energy and he calls this process “vivacity.” Although his 
explanation is helpful, vivacity is limited because it is not defined or explained beyond a list of 
terms used to describe vivacity. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca followed Campbell by 
explaining that presence is the aim of vivacity. Presence is “The displaying of certain elements 
on which the speaker wishes to center attention in order that they may occupy the foreground of 
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the hearer’s consciousness.”238 According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, presence may be 
created by any means that makes an idea more present in the mind. This advancement is the 
culmination of theory that began as “enargeia” and grew into “presence.” The theory of presence 
may effectually guide the rhetorician who is looking to understand why certain language grasps 
attention and what possible strategies best win attention by causing an impression from sensation 
in the mind. The next chapter explores neuroscience’s findings on attention, which support and 
constrain a theory of enargeia/evidentia/vivacity/presence. 
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Chapter 3 
Explaining Neuroscience’s Findings on Attention 
 
Chapter 2 traced a rhetorical theory called enargeia from Greek and Roman rhetoric to the 
eighteenth and twentieth centuries with Campbell’s theory of vivacity and Perelman’s theory of 
presence. The chapter suggests why discourse is able to make an impression in the mind similar 
to actual sensory experience. According to this theory, sensory impression arises from actual 
experience, and oration that utilizes presence—created through the use of concrete language, 
presentation of data, and figures of speech—imbues an idea with enough vivacity that it causes a 
sensory impression in the mind. This theory is the basis for my thesis. 
Campbell drew on Hume’s science of the mind and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca drew 
on Piaget’s science of the mind to support their claims; however, modern cognitive science has 
much to contribute to the central question that the previous chapter explored: What theoretical 
basis explains language that grasps attention? 
This chapter explores neuroscience’s theory on attention to contribute to the rhetorical-
theoretical basis that the previous chapter began.239 As will be seen, current theory both validates 
and limits the theory of presence. This chapter proceeds through three sections. The first explains 
how attention works in the brain according to modern cognitive theory. The second section 
explains how visual mental imagery created through discourse functions to win the ongoing 
competition for attention. The third section compares this chapter’s findings with the previous 
chapter’s conclusions and then offers its own conclusions. The result is a theoretical basis for 
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cynosure, which draws from classical and contemporary rhetoric, and neuroscience’s theory on 
attention. 
 
Attention in the Brain: Current Cognitive Theory on Attention 
Broad consensus exists in the field of attention on the definition of attention. Smith and Kosslyn 
describe this consensus, “Attention involves selecting some information for further processing 
and inhibiting other information from receiving further processing.”240 Thus, attention is the 
mental operation in the brain choosing what to focus on. To be clear, attention is not the star 
being looked at; instead, attention is the telescope being used to look at the star. Scientific theory 
on attention, therefore, seeks to understand why certain stimuli (stars) achieve the brain’s 
attention over other stimuli, and it attempts to explain how stimuli are processed in the brain. 
Over the last fifty years, two prominent theories on attention have culminated in a third 
theory that has gained wide-ranging support among theorists on attention. The first theory, 
known as the “filter model,” began with E. Colin Cherry’s experiments on the recognition of 
speech with one and with two ears.241 In this experiment, one audio clip played into one ear, and 
a second, different audio clip played into the other ear. Cherry instructed participants to follow 
one of the audio clips and when evaluated it was found that the participants could detail what 
was happening in the audio clip that they were attending to but that they could only explain that 
undefined sounds were occurring in the other audio clip.242 Building on these findings, British 
psychologist Donald Broadbent introduced the “filter model,” which explains that the brain 
cannot process all incoming stimuli at once and so it selectively filters information.243 This 
theory initially gained support among theorists on attention. However, this conclusion was 
challenged by an important finding known as “the cocktail party effect,” which made it clear that 
unattended but high priority information is able to interrupt early selection and gain a person’s 
attention. Smith and Kosslyn write, “Hearing your name at a loud party is such a good example 
of this phenomenon that it’s known as the cocktail party effect. By early-selection views, the 
cocktail party effect should not be possible; but there it is. Because it now seemed that 
unattended inputs were able to intrude and capture attention, Broadbent’s ideas had to be 
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modified.”244 
The necessary modification came in the form of “spotlight theory.” Spotlight theory 
argues that, like a spotlight, the brain attends to information within its beam or range of 
awareness, and it ignores, or is incapable of attending to, any information outside of its range.245 
That is to say, everything within the spotlight has the potential to gain the brain’s attention. This 
theory resolves the problem that the cocktail effect finding caused for the filter model by 
broadening attention’s range to include unattended inputs of stimuli. However, spotlight theory 
creates a new problem, which is explaining how the brain selectively brings information within a 
circumscribed region of space—the spotlight—to awareness. About this, Smith and Kosslyn 
write, “Rather than thinking about attention as a spotlight where information outside the selected 
region is simply ignored, more recent studies have begun to characterize attention as a dynamic 
process in which information selection is automatically accompanied by active inhibition of 
other information.”246 In other words, attention is less about selective information being 
processed—the filter model—and less about a range of awareness—spotlight theory—and more 
about an ongoing dynamic competition for attention in the brain that these theories do not 
account for. 
A further development in theory on attention arrived in the form of “biased competition 
theory.” This theory has gained wide-ranging support among theorists on attention. Biased 
competition theory was developed by Desimone and Duncan, and remains the eminent theory on 
attention to this day, and is now the basis from which theorists build. These conclusions are well 
supported by today’s most prominent theorists on attention. After surveying the previously 
mentioned theories, Smith and Kosslyn ask, “Is there a general theory of attention that embraces 
the findings from neural studies and observed behavior?”247 They write, “The answer is yes. This 
is the theory of biased competition, or integrated competition.”248 Graziano and Kastner go as far 
as to assume that biased competition is axiomatic when they write that it is now possible to detail 
an account of attention, through a process in which one stimulus representation wins a neuronal 
competition among other representations.”249 Kastner and Ungerleider also assume the theory of 
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biased competition as the unassailable explanation of how a multitude of stimuli function in the 
brain to gain attention. They write, “Hence, because of limited processing resources, multiple 
objects present at the same time . . . compete for neural representation.”250 Because biased 
competition theory is the state of the art in attention theory, and thus the paradigm this chapter 
explores, a more detailed explanation is offered. 
 
An Explanation of the Dominant Paradigm: Biased Competition 
In the biased competition model, stimuli compete for processing capacity.251 This competition 
occurs because the brain cannot process all the sensory input it receives. As Smith and Kosslyn 
explain, “Competition occurs because it is impossible to process everything at once; attention 
acts as a bias that helps resolve competition between inputs.”252 The term “bias” is virtually 
synonymous with “attention.” While the brain can attend to more than one piece of information 
at a time, the more the information increases, the less the brain can give attention to any one 
piece of information. Smith and Kosslyn illustrate: 
 
If you are presented with only two sources of information simultaneously (say, a 
drama on television and a story in the newspaper) and are required to process 
both, you will not be able to do them both full justice. The ability to attend to two 
sources is impaired compared to the ability to process information from one 
source alone: there is a cost associated with doing both tasks together. When you 
try to do both things at once, there are two possibilities: either you will follow the 
television plot perfectly and lose the news story altogether (or the other way 
around), or you will lose parts of both show and story.253 
 
This conclusion appears to confirm Perelman’s theory of “presence.” The brain cannot attend to 
all stimuli—just as you are now paying attention to the words before you and are not paying 
attention (presumably) to your left ankle even though the nerves there are sending signals to the 
brain—so the brain selects a very small range of stimuli to focus on. 
The biased competition model goes on to explain that there are two kinds of stimuli that 
compete for attention in the brain. “Bottom-up” stimuli, also called “exogenous” stimuli, refer to 
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sensory input that are perceived by sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch. “Top-down” stimuli, 
also called “endogenous” stimuli, refer to value and affect. That is, bottom-up stimuli come from 
without and affect physical senses, and top-down stimuli come from our desires within. These 
two kinds of stimuli can compete with each other; or they can work together. For example, 
imagine that you are looking for your friend to sit by at church, just as the worship service is 
about to begin. Top-down stimuli (your goals) are directing the information that you are 
attending to—your desire to find your friend. Then, as you are looking for your friend, you hear 
her call your name and you turn to see her sitting in the fourth row. Bottom-up stimuli—hearing 
the sound of your friend’s voice—and top-down stimuli—desiring to sit by your friend—are 
working in harmony. Then competition sets in. As you begin to walk toward your friend, the 
service begins and the worship band begins to play. This bottom-up stimulus—the music—
causes you to pause to look at the stage. The music draws your attention, yet, because your top-
down stimuli—your desire to sit by your friend—is stronger than the bottom-up stimuli you 
choose to ignore the latter and resume walking to your friend. 
What ultimately wins the competition for attention is relevance. We give our attention to 
what we perceive as being the most useful. Kastner and Ungerleider call this “biasing signals.”254 
That is to say, top-down and bottom-up stimuli are categorized by the brain for relevance and 
then selected or discarded. We have a bias toward that which we believe to be relevant to our 
needs. 
Kastner and Ungerleider offer a couple of conclusions on biased competition. Their 
conclusions are based on evidence from functional brain imaging studies in humans and are 
further supported by single-cell studies in monkeys. They write, “First, there is competition 
among multiple stimuli for representation.”255 “Representation” refers to certain stimuli winning 
the competition for attention in the brain. “Second, competition among multiple stimuli can be 
biased by both bottom-up [stimuli] and top-down [stimuli].”256 Desimone and Duncan are in 
agreement: “This competition is biased in part by bottom-up neural mechanisms that separate 
figures from their background (in both space and time) and in part by top-down mechanisms that 
select objects of relevance to current behavior.”257 In summary, attention starts as something a 
																																																						
254 Kastner and Ungerleider, “Mechanisms of Visual Attention,” 315. 
255 Ibid., 332. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Desimone and Duncan, “Neural Mechanisms,” 216. 
	 67 
person does not choose. Top-down and bottom-up stimuli gain the brain’s attention. Then the 
brain chooses to attend to certain stimuli based on bias. Bias is synonymous with relevance. 
Finally, that which is most relevant is then selected by the brain for further processing because it 
wins the competition for attention. 
 
Application of Biased Competition Theory to Visual Mental Imagery 
Now that biased competition has been explained, an important question yet remains: How can 
the competition for attention be biased toward the discourse in a sermon? To answer this 
question, we turn to how biased competition theory applies to this thesis. While the impact of 
goals, beliefs, knowledge, and expectations (top-down stimuli) on attention may be a worthwhile 
homiletical exploration to consider, this chapter is exploring a theoretical basis for language that 
wins attention. Thus, bottom-up stimuli, particularly visual mental imagery created in the brain 
through discourse, is the focus of the remainder of this chapter. 
The following section explains why the use of discourse to create mental images in the 
brain wins the ongoing competition for attention. The reason for this is threefold. First, the brain 
processes imaginative discourse in a way that resembles how it processes sensory data. Second, 
sensory impression is a very strong bias for attention. Third, visual imagery facilitates long-term 
memory; in fact, visual imagery is more easily recalled than other kinds of bottom-up stimuli—
hearing, smelling, and so forth. 
 
Images for Seeing 
Mental images can cause the brain to behave as if it were seeing actual images. This is an 
incredible phenomenon. Theory on attention now proves that the brain processes a mental image 
in a way that is physiologically similar to the way it processes something observed by the naked 
eye. Kastner and Ungerlieder write, “Attentional modulation of activity in the visual cortex can 
occur not only in the presence but also in the absence of visual stimulation.”258 That “absence” 
might occur during a dream, while listening to a radio drama, or—the interests of this thesis—as 
a preacher preaches. Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, and Kosslyn agree. They write: 
 
Brain imaging work has demonstrated that neural representations of mental and 
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perceptual images resemble one another as early as the primary visual cortex 
(V1). Activity patterns in V1 encode mental images and perceptual images via a 
common set of low-level depictive visual features.259 
 
In other words, imaginatively seeing and visually seeing are processed in the same part of the 
brain, as if they are the same kind of sensory experience. According to this finding, one could 
hypothesize that if a discourse causes a listener to imaginatively stand on a dock and see the 
sun’s rays refracting off of the water, that image will be processed in the same area of the brain 
as if the listener were actually being blinded by the sun. Furthermore, this hypothesis suggests 
that autonomic physical reactions such as an alteration in the listener’s pupils will also occur. 
Pearson and Kosslyn confirm that this is more than mere hypothesis when they write, 
“Researchers showed that magnetic pulses delivered to the medial occipital lobe, compared with 
another location, impaired both visual mental imagery and visual perception, and did so to a 
comparable extent.”260 Findings like this signify a strong connection between visual mental 
imagery and visual perception. They produce results that are physiologically similar. Going 
further, they write, “There is now strong evidence that when one visualizes (i.e., forms a mental 
image of) how something looks in darkness or with eyes closed, there is activity in area V1. 
Because area V1 is depictive, these findings alone suggest that visual mental images involve 
depictive representations.”261 Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, and Kosslyn are in agreement. Writing 
about recent findings linking mental imagery and mental perception, they conclude, “This 
finding again supports the hypothesis of a shared representational format in imagery and 
perception.”262 That is to say, things imagined to be seen (imagery) and things actually seen 
(perception), are represented as similar experiences, perhaps even identical experiences, in the 
brain. 
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Images for Seeing Evoke a Strong Bias for Attention 
Thus far, theory on attention makes clear that imaginative seeing and visual seeing function 
similarly in the brain. However, the question, “How can the competition for attention be biased 
toward the discourse in a sermon?” remains. Does “seeing,” both imaginatively and visually, 
increase the chances of winning the ongoing competition for attention in the brain? Theory on 
attention offers a resounding “Yes.” 
The brain is biased toward seeing, whether that seeing is imaginative—created in the 
brain by discourse—or visual—seeing through the eyes—because both forms of depictive 
representations are fundamental to the way the brain processes information. In Pearson and 
Kosslyn’s article, “The Heterogeneity of Mental Representation: Ending the Imagery Debate,” 
they explain why the brain has a bias toward depictive stimuli as opposed to other kinds of 
stimuli. They offer three explanations for such bias. 
The first explanation for the brain’s bias toward seeing is that depictive maps minimize 
the length of connections between neurons.263 A depictive map is an image-based representation 
that contains multiple points of information, which minimizes the distance that information must 
travel between neurons. In other words, the brain prefers to collate information visually because 
using that sense, compared to using other senses, requires the least amount of effort. According 
to this information, a grocery list containing three words: celery, carrots, and radishes requires 
more work from the brain than celery, carrots, and radishes imagined in the mind’s eyes. 
Furthermore, “seeing” the vegetables is easier to remember than remembering the list. Since 
image-based representations require less neurological work for the brain, the brain is biased 
toward depictive stimuli. 
A second explanation for the brain’s bias toward depictive representations is that the 
brain prioritizes depictions in memory recall.264 For example, when people are asked, “What 
shape are a cat’s ears?” they most often visualize a cat’s ears in order to answer.”265 Since the 
brain is inclined to recall implicit and explicit information pictorially, the brain has a bias toward 
depictive stimuli. 
A final explanation for the brain’s bias toward depictive representations is that, because 
of the previous two explanations, the brain often bridges or associates propositional information 
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into depictive information.266 Pearson and Kosslyn write, “Depictive mental representations . . . 
functionally bridge propositional information to depictive perception.”267 Returning to the 
example used in the first explanation, even if a person reads a grocery list containing the words 
“celery, carrots, and radishes,” it is possible, and maybe even probable, that the brain will create 
its own visual images of the words on the list. 
For these reasons—less neurological effort, ease in memory recall, and the brain’s 
tendency to transform propositions into images—the brain is biased toward paying attention to 
stimuli grounded in images, whether those images are visually seen or simply imagined. Thus, a 
sermon that presents information pictorially, either imaginatively or visually, increases the 
chance of winning the ongoing competition for attention in the brain. 
 
Seeing Enhances Memory 
Not only do images for seeing evoke a strong bias for attention, but they are also more easily 
retained than other kinds of stimuli, because they are stored in long-term memory. The ancient 
rhetoricians discovered this and developed mnemonic techniques based on what they called a 
“memory palace.” This name derives from a story in the fifth century BCE in which Simonides 
of Ceos attended a banquet. An earthquake caused the entire banquet hall to crumble and kill 
everyone except Simonides. The bodies were so disfigured that rescue workers could not tell 
who had been at the banquet. Yet, when asked who had attended, Simonides was able to recall 
each person by visualizing them sitting around the table. This unconscious memory surprised 
Simonides and inspired him to invent a technique—now referred to as “a memory palace”—that 
is employed to this day to help people perform remarkable feats of memory.268 
What Simonides accidentally happened upon—that seeing something produces a long-
lasting image in the brain—is scientifically proven today. Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, and 
Kosslyn explain: “Brain imaging work has demonstrated overlap in the neural representation of 
visual working memory and mental imagery.”269 In other words, that which is visually seen with 
the eye, and that which is only imagined in the mind, are both stored in the visual memory part 
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of the brain. According to Pearson and Kosslyn, visual memory, is in fact, long-term memory.270 
According to Posner and Peterson, another benefit associated with long-term memory is that 
visual memory is easily inspected. They write, “It is possible to instruct human subjects to take 
information from their long-term memories and construct a visual representation (image) that 
they might then inspect.”271 This is what was happening in Simonides’ mind. He recalled the 
image of the banquet that had been stored in his memory. His brain discarded many pieces of 
visual data such as the oil lamps, musicians, and food, in order to select only the guests for recall. 
Thus, not only is the brain biased toward paying attention to information grounded in images, but 
it more easily remembers and analyzes information contained in images. Kastner and 
Ungerleider agree. They write, “Finally, the stimulus that wins the competition for representation 
in the visual cortex will gain further access to memory systems for mnemonic encoding and 
retrieval and to motor systems for guiding action and behavior.”272 
In conclusion, neuroscience findings on attention supports the efficacy of employing 
discourse to evoke imaginative “seeing” because it increases the chance of winning attention in 
the brain. This is possible because imaginative seeing through discourse causes the brain to 
behave as if it were seeing actual images. The brain is biased toward paying attention to and 
remembering those images. Allow me to offer an actual visual image to aid the reader’s 
comprehension and recall of the abstract theory on attention. The following figure, originally 
constructed by Kastner and Ungerlieder, displays the theory discussed in the first two sections of 
this chapter:273 
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Figure 5. Stimuli Competition 
 
Connections with Enargeia, Summary, and Conclusions 
Aristotle was the first to advise orators to use language which shows things “as being done.” He 
meant that discourse works best when it is vivid, concrete, and describes action. In essence, he 
advised orators to bring the actors on stage and let them perform in the imaginations of the 
audience so that the action occurred before the “eyes” of the audience.274 Longinus called the 
technique enargeia and the Romans called it evidentia. But the ancient rhetoricians simply 
described the phenomenon and suggested how to use it. Not until Campbell in the eighteenth-
century did the theory receive a theoretical grounding. Campbell used the term “vivacity” and 
drew from Hume’s theory of the mind. 
Campbell’s eighteenth-century explanation of enargeia/evidentia is supported by 
neuroscience’s theory on attention. His genius can be seen in his prescient conclusions that are 
validated today with hard science. Campbell’s primary claims were two-fold. First, he argued 
that impressions from imagination are experienced in the mind as impressions from sensation if 
they have enough vivacity.275 Modern science shows this to be accurate. Verbal images can 
cause the brain to behave as if it were seeing actual images. Using Campbell’s language, words 
can be used to create mental images that cause an impression from sensation in the brain.276 
Second, Campbell argued that impressions are hierarchical in their efficacy.277 He explained that 
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an impression from direct sensation has the greatest impact in the mind while an impression from 
imagination has the weakest impact.278 Although theory on attention does not use the word 
“hierarchy” to explain the brain’s preference for sensory impression, it does validate Campbell’s 
point. As the previous two sections of this chapter explain, images, whether seen or imagined, 
evoke a bias for attention in the brain that is more substantive than other forms of stimuli. 
Furthermore, images, whether they are seen or imagined, are more easily remembered and 
analyzed than other kinds of information that the brain processes. Thus, the brain is biased 
toward depictive stimuli. In summary, theory on attention affirms Campbell’s theory. 
Impressions from imagination are experienced as impressions from sensation and the brain is 
biased toward depictive imagery because depictive representations are fundamental to the way in 
which the brain processes information. 
Following in Campbell’s footsteps, in the twentieth-century, were Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca with their theory of “presence”—“the displaying of certain elements on which 
the speaker wishes to center attention in order that they may occupy the foreground of the 
hearer’s consciousness.”279 The orator highlights in the listeners’ consciousness a figure which 
stands out from the ground just as the friend at church stood out from the music, lights, and 
stage. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the means which orators use to separate the 
figure from the ground is “presence,” just as the Roman rhetoricians taught with their theory of 
evidentia. Theory on attention validates Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s strategy for creating 
presence through the use of concrete objects, carefully presented data, and figures of speech to 
make ideas pictorially visible in the brain. However, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of 
presence goes beyond the findings found in modern theory on attention. 
Neuroscience’s current theory on attention limits Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
theory to pictorial presence. In other words, if their strategies for employing concrete objects, 
carefully presented data, and figures of speech are correctly appropriated, they believed that 
attention-winning presence is achieved. For them, attention-winning presence could result from a 
well-crafted proposition, fact, line of argument, figure of speech, etc. While such a thing is 
certainly possible, such a claim is beyond the scope of theory on attention substantiated by this 
chapter. According to this chapter, the stimuli that holds the greatest potential for winning the 
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ongoing competition for attention in the brain are particularly pictorial. Therefore, the 
application of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s strategies for presence should result in 
imaginative seeing if they are to have the greatest potential for winning attention in the brain. 
Thus, the objects, data, and figures of speech employed in oration must uniquely function to 
make ideas pictorially present to the mind’s eyes. This finding necessarily limits the kinds of 
objects, data, and figures of speech that are selected for winning attention and it guides their 
appropriation. They must be selected for their ability to make an idea pictorially visible and they 
must be applied with all of the oratorical skill that is possible to imbue an idea with pictorial 
presence. 
The support and constraint that findings in neuroscience provide Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s theory of presence result in a theory that I am calling “cynosure.” According to the 
theory of cynosure, opportunity to win the ongoing competition for the brain’s attention 
increases if language is made to be pictorially present in the mind’s eyes. This theory explains 
why pictorial language is an efficacious means to winning attention. It also grounds strategies 
used for winning attention in sermons. The next two chapters turn to Christian rhetoric—the 
Bible and sermons—to identify and analyze pictorial presence. 
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Chapter 4 
Identifying and Analyzing Strategies for Pictorial Presence 
That Grasp Attention: The Gospel of John 
 
Chapter 1 argued that the field of homiletics is in need of coherent theory for pictorial language 
that results in strategies for attention that are theoretically grounded, which raises the primary 
question this thesis pursues: what theoretical basis explains language that grasps attention? To 
answer this question, chapter 2 traced a rhetorical theory called “enargeia” from Greek and 
Roman rhetoric to the eighteenth and twentieth centuries with Campbell’s “vivacity” and 
Perelman’s “presence,” which are further developments of enargeia. This theory suggests that a 
speaker is able to achieve attention by creating presence, which causes the brain of the listener to 
experience a sensory impression through the use of words. According to this theory, strategies 
such as the use of concrete objects, presentation of data, and figures of speech function to make 
ideas lively and active in the brain, thus capturing attention. 
This theory, which is the basis for this thesis, is then validated and constrained in chapter 
3 by examining neuroscience’s findings on attention. Chapter 3 concluded that creating presence 
through the use of concrete objects, carefully presented data, and figures of speech, does indeed 
help to win the ongoing competition for the brain’s attention insofar as the presence created 
includes mental pictures. Presence therefore must be pictorial. In other words, presence must 
function to create imagery that causes the brain to imaginatively “see” an idea as a sensory 
experience in order to win the ongoing competition for the brain’s attention. 
The current chapter demonstrates the use of pictorial language in Christian rhetoric. It 
supports the theory proposed in chapters 1 to 3 by validating pictorial presence as an important 
means in Christian oration to achieving attention. Furthermore, by identifying and then analyzing 
the use of the rhetorical strategies that achieve pictorial presence, this chapter begins to 
illuminate implications and implementation for achieving attention-winning pictorial presence in 
homiletics. These strategies will then be further identified and analyzed in sermons, in chapter 5, 
and chapter 6 will quantitatively test the theory of cynosure. 
It would be possible to survey the entire Bible in order to identify the creation of pictorial 
presence. For example, such a survey might demonstrate how the story about Jacob’s wrestling 
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with a divine being as the sun begins to rise is a means to exhibit Israel’s wrestling relationship 
with God. Another example is the story about Jeremiah replacing a broken wooden yoke with an 
unbreakable iron yoke upon his shoulders. This is a means to show Israel’s certain exile. A final 
example is David’s use of imagery in Psalm 23 to depict God as a caring Shepherd. Rather than 
attempting the impracticable task of surveying the entire Bible, this chapter is limited in its 
scope. It examines the Gospel of John as a test case to identify and analyze the rhetorical 
strategies that create pictorial presence.280 At first consideration, the Bible may not strike the 
reader as an appropriate form of rhetoric to analyze for this thesis because the Bible is read not 
heard. However, for many generations, the majority of humans experienced the Bible aurally; 
engaging the Bible was an oral event. Thus, it is beneficial to identify and analyze language that, 
according the theory of cynosure, encourages attention on a biblical author’s words. 
The Gospel of John is chosen because it is exemplary in its creation of pictorial presence. 
This occurs in at least three ways. First, some of Jesus’ discourses are carefully presented as 
signs. Second, some of Jesus’ “I am” statements conjure up concrete objects in the mind’s eyes. 
Third, the Word is described as dwelling among us. Whether it be Jesus’ discourses, self-
statements, or the person of Jesus himself, the evangelist imbues each with pictorial presence, 
which according to this thesis, centers attention. This chapter therefore, breaks into four sections. 
The first section identifies and analyzes the evangelist’s use of discourse as carefully presented 
signs. The second section identifies and analyzes the evangelist’s use of “I am” to conjure up 
																																																						
280 The evangelist employs many strategies to persuade his audience to believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of 
God (John 20:30–31). This chapter is interested in one aspect of persuasion, defined broadly, which is the 
evangelist’s use of strategies that function to achieve attention. Debate ensues regarding the New Testament authors’ 
awareness and application of classical rhetorical strategies in New Testament writings. Selby points to George 
Kennedy’s New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism as a work that “represented a welcome shift” 
to a rhetorical reading of scripture. (Gary S. Selby, Not with Wisdom of Words [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016], 3.) 
Since then, an abundance of works on the New Testament as rhetoric have been produced. Some examples are Ben 
Witherington’s New Testament Rhetoric, Burton L. Mack’s Rhetoric and the New Testament, Vernon Robbin’s 
Rhetography: A New Way of Seeing the Familiar Text, Greg Cary’s How to Do Things with (Apocalyptic) Words: 
Rhetorical Dimensions of Apocalyptic Discourse, and Eric Eve’s Writing the Gospels: Composition and Memory 
and Behind the Gospels: Understanding the Oral Tradition. Rather than engaging the conversation about the 
awareness and application of classical rhetorical strategies in the New Testament, this chapter is particularly 
interested in analyzing texts in the Gospel of John that create—with or without awareness of classical rhetorical 
strategies—pictorial presence. Therefore, this chapter seeks to understand how the evangelist created pictorial 
presence to help accomplish his rhetorical goals, rather than attempting to demonstrate that he wrote according to 
the conventions of classical rhetoric. 
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concrete objects in the mind’s eyes. The third section identifies and analyzes the evangelist’s use 
of word as figure.281 The final section offers a conclusion. 
 
Discourse as Carefully Presented Signs: Allusion and Illustration 
Chapter 2 explained that discourse can be imbued with presence through the careful presentation 
of data. Two strategies that were highlighted as a means to achieving presence through the 
careful presentation of data were common cultural heritage and illustration. The following 
section identifies and analyzes the use of these strategies to imbue Jesus’ discourses with 
pictorial presence. More specifically, it identifies and analyzes two signs, carefully presented 
alongside two discourses, to illuminate the efficacy of these strategies that achieve attention 
through the creation of pictorial presence.282 
																																																						
281 One final point must be made prior to beginning the body of this chapter: attention is not an end in itself; it is a 
means to an end, which is persuasion. Therefore, as this chapter identifies and analyzes pictorial presence that 
achieves attention, it will be connected to a particular idea that the evangelist promotes for persuasion. For example, 
his use of “Discourse as Signs” intends to center attention on the meaning of Jesus’ discourses; his use of “‘I Am’ as 
Concrete Objects” intends to center attention on Jesus’ particularities; his use of “Word as Figure” intends to center 
attention on the evangelist’s central figure, Jesus. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the particular point that 
the evangelist is making is subsidiary to identifying and analyzing the creation of pictorial presence that functions to 
achieve attention. 
282 Much could be said about the relationship between the seven signs and seven discourses in the Gospel of John. 
Some commentators, such as Witherington, note that the correlation between sign and discourse is not very clear 
(Ben Witherington, John’s Wisdom: A Commentary on the Fourth Gospel [Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
1995], 42), but others, like Leon Morris, state that there are times when the signs and discourses are intimately 
related (Leon Morris, The Gospel according to John, New International Commentary on the New Testament [Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995], 184). Morris establishes an outline to show how the signs and the discourses relate (ibid., 
viii–ix): 
A. First Sign—Water into Wine (2:1–11) 
B. First Discourse—The New Birth (3:1–36) 
C. Second Discourse—The Water of Life (4:1–42) 
D. Second Sign—Healing the Nobleman’s Son (4:46–54) 
E. Third Sign—The Healing of the Lame Man (5:1–18) 
F. Third Discourse—The Divine Son (5:19–47) 
G. Fourth Sign—Feeding the Multitude (6:1–15) 
H. Fifth Sign—Walking on the Water (6:16–21) 
I. Fourth Discourse—The Bread of Life (6:22–66) 
J. Fifth Discourse—The Life-Giving Spirit (7:1–52) 
K. Sixth Discourse—The Light of the World (8:12–59) 
L. Sixth Sign—Healing the Man Born Blind (9:1–41) 
M. Seventh Discourse—The Good Shepherd (10:1–42) 
N. Seventh Sign—The Raising of Lazarus (11:1–57) 
Morris’ outline confirms what Witherington states—that the connection between signs and discourses is not always 
clear. For example, Morris’ outline shows that signs four and five precede discourses four and five. Thus, a reader or 
hearer of the Gospel of John must work hard to connect the fifth discourse with the fifth sign that comes after the 
fourth discourse. However, most commentators agree that two signs and discourses are intimately related 
(Witherington, John’s Wisdom, 41–43; Rudolph Bultmann, The Gospel of John: A Commentary, trans. G. R. 
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Identifying and Analyzing Common Cultural Heritage as Allusion to Achieve Attention 
The evangelist uses the fourth sign, in John 6:1–15, to create pictorial presence that wins 
attention. In his fourth discourse, in John 6:22–66, the discourse begins with Jesus scolding the 
crowd for chasing after him because he filled their stomachs with food (John 6:26). Jesus’ 
scolding is a reference to the fourth sign, which the evangelist places prior to the discourse. This 
reference to feeding the crowd at the beginning of this discourse intentionally connects the 
forthcoming discourse to the sign that occurs just seven verses prior. After making this 
connection to the sign, the evangelist then records the discourse in which Jesus and the crowd 
discuss Moses and manna in the wilderness. In this discourse, Jesus contrasts the physical nature 
of Moses’ manna in the wilderness with his own feeding of the masses, in order to make the 
theological point that he offers spiritual manna through his body and blood. According to Jesus, 
it is belief in his spiritual food—his body broken and blood shed—that results in eternal life 
(John 6:56–58). Jesus’ disciples however, found this discourse difficult to understand: “This 
teaching is difficult; who can accept it?” (John 6:60) 
To achieve attention on and understanding of Jesus’ difficult discourse, the evangelist 
describes a sign to make his point visually present in the mind.283 A primary way in which the 
evangelist accomplishes this is through the use of “common cultural heritage,” described in 
chapter 2 as a means to creating presence through carefully presented data. According to this 
strategy, collective stories, which are part of common cultural heritage, have an advantage over 
discourse if they create pictorial presence.284 Plato’s Laws affords an illuminating example of 
common cultural heritage being used to create presence. Plato desired to combat the notion that 
the right hand was superior to the left hand. To accomplish this, he referred to Geryon (the one-
headed, three-bodied, four-winged giant) and Briareus (the hundred-armed, fifty-headed 
Hecatoncheires) who had many hands.285 Alluding to these mythological characters, which 
																																																																																																																																																																														
Beasley-Murray, R. W. N. Hoare, and J. K. Riches [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976], 203, 330–50; George 
Beasley-Murray, John, 2nd ed., Word Biblical Commentary [Dallas: Word, 2000], 90–91, 148–49; Raymond 
Brown, The Gospel according to John i–xii, Anchor Bible [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966], 260–94; and 
Morris, Gospel according to John, 300–301, 422–23). Those include the fourth sign and discourse and the sixth sign 
and discourse, which are what this section identifies and analyzes. 
283 Witherington concurs. He writes, “The physical is meant to be seen as an icon of the spiritual, a window on a 
larger truth, a means to a greater end.” (Witherington, John’s Wisdom, 155.) 
284 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, New Rhetoric, 146. 
285 Plato, Laws, trans. Benjamin Jowett (n.p., n.d.), Kindle edition, 6343. 
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Plato’s fellow Greeks would have been well aware of, the audience would have not simply 
“heard” names, they would have “seen” in their mind’s eyes two fantastical and powerful beings 
with no superior hand. A modern equivalent is how we “hear” names such as Batman, Ironman, 
or Superman. In our mind’s eyes, we do more than simply “hear” those names; we actually “see” 
these characters because of their place in our common cultural heritage. By doing this, Plato 
endowed his argument—that the right hand was not superior to the left hand—with pictorial 
presence. Presumably, his audience’s bias toward the right hand was overcome by imagining, 
even seeing, two fantastical and powerful beings with no superior hand. 
This particular use of common cultural heritage is called “allusion.” Cuddon defines 
allusion as “an implicit reference, perhaps to another work of literature or art, to a person or an 
event.”286 Ryken concurs, “An allusion is a reference to past literature or history.”287 More 
important for this thesis, however, is the rhetorical function of allusion. It creates a shared 
experience.288 Although shared experience accomplishes the presence lauded by Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, it falls short of the pictorial presence that chapter 3 insists is necessary for the 
brain experience an idea as a sensory experience that wins the ongoing competition for the 
brain’s attention. Ryken goes further than Cuddon to note another rhetorical benefit to allusion. 
He explains that allusion requires an audience to transfer the qualities of that which is being 
alluded to, onto that which is being said.289 In this way, if the qualities being alluded to are 
pictorial, then that which is being said is infused with pictorial presence. 
To demonstrate how this works, Ryken analyzes Psalm 133’s allusion to the Old 
Testament worship that is mandated in Exodus 30:22–33. In the Exodus passage, the Lord 
commanded Moses to have a perfumer create a sacred anointing oil. The oil was to be a 
particular mix of myrrh, cinnamon, cane, cassia, and olive oil. Then, it was supposed to be 
poured over the Tent of Meeting and everything within it. Furthermore, the priests who worked 
in and around the Tent of Meeting were supposed to be anointed by this sacred anointing oil, and 
Moses was instructed to pour it over Aaron and his sons so that they could serve the Lord as 
priests. According to Ryken, the psalmist’s allusion to this process for making the anointing oil 
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and the anointing of the priests would have been transferred to the group of traveling pilgrims 
joining together in the worship of God.290 In this way, the psalmist’s audience would 
imaginatively “see” the preparation of the anointing oil at the hand of the perfumer; they would 
imaginatively “see” Moses pouring the oil over Aaron and his sons. Thus, through allusion, the 
process for anointing would be seen in the mind’s eyes of pilgrims and transferred to their 
experience of unity. 
The evangelist appears to be doing something similar with the fourth sign and discourse. 
He provides a “sign,” which employs allusion to create pictorial presence that grasps attention. 
Beginning by writing that Jesus crossed the sea of Galilee (John 6:1)—which awakens latent 
memories of Israel passing through the Red Sea—and after writing that Jesus sat down on the 
side of a mountain (John 6:3)—which arouses latent memories of Moses and Israel at Sinai after 
their departure from Egypt291—the evangelist writes that the Jewish Passover Feast was near. 
Passover is a clear allusion to Israel’s common cultural heritage. This statement calls to mind 
Israel’s exodus from Egypt through the slaughtering of a lamb, which was followed by the 
inauguration of a Passover meal that commemorated this eminent moment of liberation in 
Israel’s history.292 Following this prologue to the fourth sign, the evangelist then tells a story 
about Jesus feeding bread to the masses in the wilderness.293 Finally, in case these allusions are 
not clear enough to make the connection to Israel’s exodus from Egypt, the evangelist makes his 
own direct connection at the conclusion of the sign by writing, “When the people saw the sign 
that he had done, they began to say, ‘This is indeed the prophet who is to come into the world’” 
(John 6:14). About this connection, Beasley-Murray writes, “The statement as to the nearness of 
the Passover (v 4), [and] the identification of Jesus as the prophet who should come (cf. Deut. 
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291 Talbert points out that this image of Jesus sitting down portrays, if not Moses, at the very least a Jewish rabbi 
who is ready to teach his disciples. (Charles H. Talbert, Reading John: A Literary and Theological Commentary on 
the Fourth Gospel and the Johannine Epistles [Macon, GA: Smyth & Helwys, 2005], 137.) 
292 Köstenberger offers an interesting insight about Jesus, the Passover Lamb, being imaged in this text as the host of 
the meal: “The feeding of the multitude also conveys the image of Jesus presiding as a host over an abundant meal 
(Andreas J. Köstenberger, Encountering John: The Gospel in Historical, Literary, and Theological Perspective 
[Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1999], 100.) 
293 Talbert notes the intentional pictorial presence that is created through Israel’s common cultural heritage, writing, 
“One memory ingrained in Jewish consciousness is that of the manna from heaven by which the people were fed in 
the wilderness.” (Talbert, Reading John, 138.) 
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18:15), . . . combine to indicate that the feeding miracle is understood as falling within the 
fulfillment of the hope of a second Exodus.”294 
Based on this analysis, when the evangelist begins the fourth discourse, the allusions to 
Israel’s common cultural heritage—Passover, exodus, manna, and Moses—are well established 
in the mind’s eyes of his audience, ready to endow the forthcoming discourse with pictorial 
presence. More so, based on the theoretical grounding of this thesis, the pictorial presence that is 
created through the allusion functions to grasp the attention of the evangelist’s audience as he 
proceeds to the forthcoming discourse that is difficult to understand: exodus (salvation from 
bondage) is possible for those who feast on Jesus, the Passover Lamb. Thus, the evangelist’s 
audience is able to “see” the discourse: Jesus is the Passover Lamb, who hosts a Passover feast, 
and invites participation in the meal, which is his very own body. 
 
Identifying and Analyzing Didactic and Action Peaks as Illustration to Achieve Attention 
The evangelist uses the sixth sign to grasp attention. In the sixth discourse, in John 8:12–59, the 
evangelist begins propositionally with his theological point: Jesus is “The light of the world. 
Whoever follows me will never walk in darkness but will have the light of life” (John 8:12). The 
Pharisees however do not believe this proposition, which leads to multiple conflicts between 
their sect and Jesus. The conflicts culminate in the Pharisees attempting to stone Jesus, but he 
slips away (John 8:59). Immediately following this discourse, the evangelist offers a sign, in 
John 9:1–41: Jesus heals a man who was born blind. About this, the evangelist writes that the 
now-healed blind man believes in Jesus and worships him (John 9:38), but the Pharisees do not, 
and so Jesus calls them blind (John 9:39–41). 
 
Analyzing Peaks as Illustration 
The evangelist’s sixth sign pictorially depicts the ramifications of believing or not believing in 
the theological point of the sixth discourse—Jesus is the light of the world. A primary way in 
which the evangelist accomplishes this is through the use of illustration. Chapter 2 identified 
illustration as a means to creating presence through carefully presented data. According to 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, illustration can be used as a starting point for a line of 
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argument.295 Conversely, it could also be used as an ending point for a line of argument. That is 
what John does, and by doing so, the illustration makes the discourse visually accessible to the 
mind’s eyes. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain, “Because an illustration seeks to increase 
presence by making an abstract rule concrete by means of a particular case, there is a tendency to 
see an illustration as ‘a vivid picture of an abstract matter.’”296 Quintilian offers a helpful 
example. Beginning by stating the central point of his discourse, “A man has been murdered,” he 
asks, “Shall I not bring before my eyes everything that is likely to have happened when the 
murder occurred?” He then goes on to describe in great detail how the murder took place. After 
this, Quintilian explains that this is called “illustration” or “evidentness,” which seems not so 
much to narrate as to exhibit.297 According to the ancient rhetoricians, exhibition or illustration, 
is a way to endow a discourse’s central idea with pictorial presence. 
The evangelist appears to be doing something similar when he intentionally provides his 
sixth sign right after the sixth discourse. By his doing this, the sign functions as an illustration 
that pictorially depicts the ramifications of believing or not believing in the theological point of 
the discourse. In other words, the discourse, which states that Jesus is the light of the world and 
whoever follows him will never walk in darkness but will have the light of life (John 8:12), is 
depicted by the illustration of Jesus healing the blind man who, in turn, believes. The blind man 
who believes, then becomes a “seeing” man who stands in stark contrast to the “blind” Pharisees, 
who do not believe. 
The creation of pictorial presence in the sixth sign occurs through what Booth calls 
“selected peak meanings.”298 “Peak” refers to the climactic end of a literary pericope that is 
uniquely marked by turbulence.299 According to Booth, two kinds of “peaks” exist. The first kind 
is called a “didactic peak.” Booth explains that a didactic peak is “a zone of turbulence in the 
otherwise placid flow of discourse.”300 The second kind is called an “action peak.” An action 
peak is “the excitement of tension in the event-line of a story.”301 Simply put, an action peak is 
the climax of a story. 
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Booth’s theory helps to analyze how the evangelist’s rhetoric centers attention on the 
theological point of the sixth discourse because there clearly is turbulence in both the discourse 
and the sign, which result in what Booth calls “peaks.” The didactic peak builds in turbulence. It 
begins by Jesus stating that he is the light of the world and whoever follows him will never walk 
in darkness but will have the light of life (John 8:12). This point is then followed by a series of 
increasingly turbulent didactic statements. The Pharisees declare that Jesus’ testimony is not 
valid (John 8:13–30); Jesus declares that they are children of the devil (John 8:31–47); the Jews 
declare that Jesus is demon possessed (John 8:48–53); Jesus declares that Abraham rejoiced in 
the thought of seeing him, saw him, and was glad (John 8:54–56); the Jews declare with utter 
exasperation that he could not possibly have seen Abraham (John 8:57). The didactic peak then 
occurs at the end of all of these statements, when Jesus declares, “Very truly, I tell you, before 
Abraham was, I am,” which results in the Jews attempting to stone Jesus to death (John 8:58–
59). 
The action peak also culminates in turbulence. In the inciting incident Jesus heals a man 
who was born blind (John 9:6–7). Then, throughout the rising action, the now-seeing man’s 
neighbors had difficulty believing that Jesus made him see (John 9:8–12); the Pharisees had the 
same difficulty believing that Jesus made him see (John 9:13–17); his parents had the same 
difficulty believing that Jesus made him see (John 9:18–23); the Pharisees had difficulty a 
second time believing that Jesus made him see (John 9:24–34). In the action peak—the climax of 
the story—Jesus finds the now-seeing blind man and asks him if he believes. He responds to 
Jesus’ question by saying, “Lord, I believe.” And he worshiped him (John 9:38). 
With these peaks in mind, Booth explains that didactic peaks and action peaks are 
sometimes combined to visually depict hortatory aim.302 That is the case here. The evangelist’s 
placement of the sixth sign immediately after the sixth discourse visually depicts the hortatory 
aim of the didactic peak. This happens in two ways. The first is through “contrast.” In the 
didactic peak, the Pharisees do not believe that Jesus is the light of the world that precedes and 
supersedes Abraham, and their unbelief results in anger, rage, and desire to kill Jesus. In stark 
contrast, through the action peak, the now-healed blind man believes in Jesus and worships him. 
Thus, the action peak depicts a man born blind who receives his sight from “the light of the 
world,” whereas the didactic peak depicts Pharisees, supposedly enlightened, but actually blind 
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because they do not believe that Jesus is the light of the world. The didactic peak and the action 
peak contrast each other like a bright diamond placed on a black velvet cloth. 
Contrast is a powerful means to creating pictorial presence that grasps attention. By 
contrasting the didactic peak with an action peak, the evangelist’s central idea—Jesus is the light 
of the world for those who believe—becomes pictorially present. Furthermore, this now “visible” 
rhetoric prompts the evangelist’s audience to not doubt like the Pharisees, but to believe like the 
now-healed blind man. Without having to say that the Pharisees’ response is the wrong response, 
the evangelist visually depicts it. The Pharisees are filled with anger, rage, and a desire to 
murder; The blind man now sees and worships. 
A second way that the sixth sign and discourse function to create pictorial presence is by 
“synthesizing” didactic and action peaks. Longacre posits that inserting an action peak into a 
didactic peak, and then returning to the didactic peak, can visually emphasize hortatory aim.303 
That is what happens with the sixth discourse and sign. The evangelist begins with discourse, 
which reaches its didactic peak when Jesus declares, “Very truly, I tell you, before Abraham 
was, I am,” and the Jews attempt to stone Jesus to death (John 8:58–59). Following this, the 
evangelist tells the story of a blind man receiving his sight that culminates in the action peak: the 
now-seeing blind man believes in and worships Jesus (John 9:38). Then, following the action 
peak, the Pharisees—the first characters to challenge Jesus’ discourse when he said that he is the 
light of the world—return. Here the didactic peak and the action peak are synthesized into one 
literary unit (John 8:12—9:41). The Pharisees, who from the beginning did not believe in the 
theological point of Jesus’ discourse, and intended to kill him at its peak, return at the end of the 
sign, still unbelieving. This synthesis of peaks functions to endow both faith and doubt with 
pictorial presence: The blind man now sees by virtue of his faith; the Pharisees are now blind by 
virtue of their doubt. Attention grasped by these two images, the evangelist invites his audience 
to believe like the now-healed blind man. 
Through the contrast and synthesis of didactic and action peaks the evangelist grasps 
attention and centers it on his theological point—that Jesus is the light of the world—by 
endowing his language with pictorial presence. The angry and murderous Pharisees embody 
unbelief while the now-healed and worshipping blind man embodies belief; the angry and 
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murderous Pharisees embody blindness while the now-healed and worshipping blind man 
embodies sight; the angry and murderous Pharisees embody life lived in darkness without Jesus 
while the now-healed and worshipping blind man embodies life lived in light with Jesus. 
 
Summary 
The internal relationships between the evangelist’s fourth and sixth discourses and their 
respective signs function to endow discourse with pictorial presence that wins attention. This 
occurs in different but equally efficacious ways. In the fourth sign and discourse, the sign 
functions to visually depict the discourse through allusion. Through allusion to Israel’s common 
cultural heritage, the evangelist depicts Jesus—the bread of life—as the new Moses, the Passover 
lamb, and manna in the wilderness. In the sixth sign and discourse, the sign functions to visually 
depict the discourse through contrast and synthesis. Through the narrative of the now-healed 
blind man who worships Jesus and the now-blind Pharisees who try to kill him, the evangelist 
urges his readers to believe in Jesus, the light of the world. 
 
“I Am” Conjuring Concrete Objects: Metaphor 
The evangelist employs three kinds of “I am” (ego eimi) statements in the Gospel of John, but 
only the third use is pertinent.304 It is the use of the phrase ego eimi with a predicate nominative. 
For example, Jesus says, “I am the good shepherd” (John 10:11). Using this third formulation, 
Jesus speaks of himself figuratively seven times. Of those seven times, five are of particular 
interest to this section because they uniquely function to create pictorial presence.305 
																																																						
304 I am indebted to Brown’s clear categorizing of scholarship’s numerous categorizations of “I am” in the Gospel of 
John. The first use that is not pertinent to this section is the use of the absolute with no predicate. This means that the 
“I am” statement stands alone. It does not continue, for example, with “I am the way,” or “I am the resurrection and 
the life.” These usages of ego eimi are employed passively in the Fourth Gospel as the Divine name, as it is 
expressed in the Hebrew Scriptures. For example, Jesus says, “You will die in your sins unless you believe that I am 
he [ego eimi]” (John 8:24). The second use that is not pertinent to this section is the use where a predicate may be 
understood even though it is not expressed. For example, Jesus declares to his disciples, “It is I [ego eimi]; do not be 
afraid” (John 6:20). (Brown, Gospel according to John i–xii, 533–34.) 
305 Witherington argues that all seven of these “I am” statements belong in one category (Witherington, John’s 
Wisdom, 157). Brown, however, distinguishes between two of these “I am” statements, and the other five (Brown, 
Gospel according to John i–xii, 534). According to Brown, John 11:25 and 14:6 are primarily usages of 
identification because Jesus is declaring that he is “the resurrection and the life,” and “the way, the truth, and the 
life.” The other five usages (John 6:35; 8:12; 10:7; 10:11; and 15:1), however, are usages of recognition. Brown 
notes that the primary difference between the “identification” usages and the “recognition” usages is that in the 
identification usages Jesus is describing himself, whereas in the recognition usages Jesus is describing who he is in 
relation to humankind: bread to eat, light to walk in, gate to pass through, shepherd to follow, and vine to be 
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Identifying and Analyzing “I Am” to Conjure Up Physical Objects That Achieve Attention 
Chapter 2 explained that discourse can be imbued with presence through objects, which form 
impressions from sensation in the mind. This can happen in one of two ways. The first is through 
the use of actual physical objects. For example, they explain how Marc Antony waved Caesar’s 
bloody tunic in front of the Roman populace. By waving a tunic that had blood on it, a past event 
(the murder) became more present in the populace’s consciousness.306 Similarly, an example that 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca offer is that of a lawyer bringing the children of the accused 
before the bar prior to the judge’s judgment. By doing this, the accused’s children come 
powerfully before the judge’s mind, which ideally, affects the judge’s judgment.307 
It is possible that Jesus spoke his “I am” statements using physical objects to endow them 
with presence through propinquity. That is, when he said “I am the good shepherd” (John 10:11), 
he may have pointed to a near-by shepherd who was tending the flock, and when he said “I am 
the true vine” (John 15:1), he may have been passing through a vineyard. We know that he did so 
at other times. For example, in Matthew 19 he uses children to show what a person must be like 
to enter the kingdom of heaven (Matthew 19:13–15). Similarly, Jesus breaks bread and pours 
wine to show through propinquity his broken body and blood poured out (Matthew 26:26–29). 
Recognizing that this supposition is an argument from silence, some contextual clues do suggest 
that it is at least possible that physical objects accompanied Jesus’ “I am” statements. For 
example, when Jesus declared, “I am the bread of life” (John 6:35), he may have actually been 
holding bread for everyone to see because, a few verses earlier, the evangelist writes about Jesus 
feeding the five thousand (John 6:1–15). Also, when Jesus says, “I am the light of the world” 
(John 8:12), he may have been pointing to temple lamps or to a sunrise, because just a few verses 
earlier the evangelist notes that Jesus appeared at dawn in the temple courts (8:2). It is 
impossible to know for certain that this was indeed the case. Perhaps Jesus stood at a gate with 
sheep and shepherds passing by when he declared, “I am the gate” and “I am the good 
shepherd.” Perhaps he sat in a vineyard and ran his fingers through a vine’s branches when he 
declared, “I am the vine.” The evangelist does not provide this amount of detail. However, if 
																																																																																																																																																																														
connected to (Brown, Gospel According to John i–xii, 535). This section proceeds with Jesus’ five “recognition” 
statements, because they uniquely function to create pictorial presence in the mind’s eyes. 
306 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, New Rhetoric, 118. 
307 Ibid., 117. 
	 87 
Jesus did indeed incorporate physical objects into his self-statements, that would have had the 
rhetorical effect of endowing them with pictorial presence through propinquity that centered 
attention on his self-statements. 
 
Identifying and Analyzing “I Am” to Conjure Up Metaphorical Object That Achieve 
Attention 
The creation of objects in oration however, is not relegated to the use of the physical. According 
to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, a second way that discourse can be imbued with presence is 
through non-physical objects created by language.308 A primary strategy that is lauded for its 
ability to elevate the pertinence of an idea without the benefit of a physical object is the use of 
metaphor. Aristotle explained that metaphor is a means of bringing an idea before the eyes.309 
Rhetorica Ad Herennium concurred, “Metaphor is used for the sake of creating a vivid mental 
picture.”310 
 
Metaphor as Representation 
Metaphor functions to create presence in at least two ways. First, metaphor creates presence by 
associating one thing with another thing. Jakobson called this “a theory of binary opposition.”311 
In other words, metaphor affirms that one thing is another thing. Bullinger calls this 
“representation” and argues that although metaphor is variously defined to mean many things, it 
is always meant to represent.312 He explains, “We have recourse to metaphor when we say of a 
picture, ‘This is my father,’ or ‘This is my mother.’ The verb ‘is’ means in this case represents. 
. . . The verb ‘is’ always has this meaning and no other when used as a metaphor.”313 
The use of ego eimi in John 6:35, 8:12, 10:7, 10:11, and 15:1 reflects Bullinger’s 
explanation of metaphor functioning as a representation of something else through the use of the 
verb “is” because eimi is a state of being verb that translates literally as “be,” “am,” or “is.” 
BDAG places the clause ego eimi within the second definition for eimi, which is defined as “to 
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309 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, trans. Kennedy, 245. 
310 Rhetorica ad Herennium, trans. Caplan, 343. 
311 Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms, s.v. “metaphor.” 
312 E. W. Bullinger, Figures of Speech in the Bible (Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino, 2011), 735. 
313 Ibid. 
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be in close connection (with), is, freq.”314 Thus, when the evangelist writes that Jesus used the 
clause ego eimi in his self-statements, it reflects Bullinger’s explanation that Jesus is represented 
by the metaphors of bread, light, gate, shepherd, and vine. 
A combination of common day experience and association with the Hebrew Scriptures 
would have endowed Jesus’ “I am” statements with pictorial presence.315 To better appreciate 
how representation functions rhetorically to create pictorial presence, the following paragraphs 
briefly explain the combination of everyday experience and association with the Hebrew 
Scriptures. 
The evangelist records Jesus saying, “I am the bread of life” (John 6:35). Bread was a 
common staple in Jesus’ day. It was a part of most meals and many families made it on their 
own.316 Furthermore, bread had a prominent role in Israel’s history. A prominent association 
would have been Exodus 16. In Exodus 16, Israel had just been rescued from bondage in Egypt 
and while on her way to worship the Lord at Mt. Sinai, the people became hungry and grumbled. 
God listened to Israel’s complaint and sustained Israel in the wilderness with manna. Thus, when 
Jesus said, “I am the bread of life.” personal experience and association with the Hebrew 
Scriptures would have functioned to rouse imagery in the mind’s eyes. Jesus’ audience would 
have been able to “see” bread, “feel” bread, and maybe even “smell” bread baking. More so, 
stories about manna in the wilderness would have functioned to depict in the mind’s eyes 
imagery of wilderness, hunger, and the Lord’s provision. 
The evangelist records Jesus saying, “I am the light of the world” (John 8:12). Light, 
spoken about literally, would have quickened attention through pictorial presence in Jesus’ day. 
It would have denoted the radiance of the sun, of a lamp, of a torch, or of a candle. Furthermore, 
this statement would have been associated with the Feast of Tabernacles.317 The feast of 
tabernacles was a time of celebrating that the work of harvest was completed. During postexilic 
observances, this celebration included the lighting of menorahs in the temple courtyard, all-night 
dancing to flutes by torchlight, and dawn processions ending with libations of water and wine at 
the bronze altar.318 Thus, when Jesus said, “I am the light of the world.” personal experience and 
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association with the Hebrew Scriptures would have functioned to create pictorial presence in the 
mind’s eyes. Jesus’ audience would have been able to “see” a lit candle or perhaps “feel” the sun 
on their faces, and the Feast of Tabernacles would have aroused imagery of giant menorahs, 
dancing by torchlight, and sunrise processions in the mind’s eyes. 
The evangelist records Jesus saying, “I am the gate for the sheep” (John 10:7) and “I am 
the gate” (John 10:9). Sheep were abundant during Jesus’ day. Along with goats, sheep were the 
most common domesticated animals during biblical times.319 This means, of course, that sheep 
pens with gates were abundant as well. Thus, when Jesus said, “I am the gate for the sheep” the 
readers would have been able to imagine a gate at a sheep pen. According to Unger, a sheepfold 
was an enclosure especially constructed to give the sheep reprieve from the weather and safety 
from wild animals and robbers.320 Furthermore, Morris explains that Jesus’ reference to a gate at 
a sheep pen represents “secure pasturage,” which promises to meet the needs of those who enter 
into the fold.321Thus, Jesus’ words would most likely encourage his audience to “see” Jesus as a 
gate that promises reprieve, safety, and sufficient provision.  
The evangelist records Jesus saying, “I am the good shepherd” (John 10:11). A prominent 
association to this statement by Jesus is found in Ezekiel 34 in which God states that he is going 
to replace the selfish and unloving shepherds with his own generous and loving self. Thus, when 
Jesus said, “I am the good shepherd,” the readers would have very likely understood this 
statement based on more than just everyday experience with shepherds. Biblical connotations 
from the Hebrew Bible would have also filled their imagination so that they could “see” Jesus as 
a shepherd who is generous and self-giving.  
Finally, the evangelist records Jesus saying, “I am the true vine” (John 15:1). Vineyard 
horticulture was extensive during Jesus’ day.322 Cole explains that clearing stones, hoeing 
ground, planting vine stock, and harvesting were everyday experiences, or at least, 
observances.323 Of course, the Hebrew Scriptures are laden with vine, branch, and vineyard 
imagery. Köstenberger explains that the paradigmatic text for this vine metaphor is Isaiah 5.324 In 
this passage, Israel is depicted as the vineyard that God—the gardener—planted and grew, but 
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the vineyard failed to flourish. Thus, when Jesus said, “I am the true vine,” everyday experience 
and biblical imagery would have pictorially depicted Jesus as the vine through whom God’s 
blessings—the bearing of much fruit—flows. 
In summary, metaphor functions to create presence in at least two ways. The first is 
through metaphor that functions to create presence by associating one thing with another thing. 
Thus, when Jesus makes his “I am” statements, he is saying that bread, light, gate, shepherd, and 
vine are representations of himself. The evangelist’s everyday experience and association with 
the Hebrew Scriptures were in abundant supply to sufficiently endow Jesus’ self-statements with 
pictorial presence, which impacts the brain as a sensory impression that wins attention. Jesus is 
bread, light, gate, shepherd, and vine. 
 
Metaphor as Activity 
A second way that metaphor functions to create presence is by making an idea active. Aristotle 
explained that metaphor brings an idea before the eyes as something that should be “seen” as 
being done.325 He provides several examples for how this occurs. For example, when Pericles 
said that the men killed in the war vanished from the city as though someone took the spring 
from the year.326 Similarly, Aristotle offers, when Leptines speaks about the Lacedaimonians, he 
said that he would not allow the Athenians to stand by while Greece was deprived of one of its 
two eyes.327 While imbuing an idea with action may not be the case for every metaphor, it is 
most certainly the case for the metaphors being discussed in this section. In Jesus’ self-
statements, the evangelist depicts metaphors doing more than simply representing Jesus, he 
depicts these metaphors inviting activity. Jesus’ self-statements are an invitation to eat Bread, to 
walk in Light, to pass through Gate, and to abide in Vine. After declaring, “I am the bread of 
life” (John 6:35a). Jesus goes on to say, “Whoever comes to me will never be hungry, and 
whoever believes in me will never be thirsty” (John 6:35b). After declaring, “I am the light of the 
world” (John 8:12a). Jesus adds action to the metaphor by saying, “Whoever follows me will 
never walk in darkness but will have the light of life” (John 8:12b). After declaring, “I am the 
gate” (John 10:9a). Jesus goes on to say, “Whoever enters by me will be saved, and will come in 
and go out and find pasture” (John 10:9b). Lastly, after declaring, “I am the vine and you are the 
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branches” (John 15:5a). Jesus goes on to say, “Those who abide in me and I in them bear much 
fruit, because apart from me you can do nothing” (John 15:5b). 
More than activity however, is the way that these metaphors function to invite 
relationship. Brown notes that the “recognition” usages of Jesus’ “I am” statements that are 
being discussed in this section, function to describe who Jesus is in relation to humankind.328 
Therefore, the act of eating Bread, walking in Light, passing through Gate, following Shepherd, 
and abiding in Vine are more than mere invitation to activity, they are an invitation to 
relationship that is made pictorially present in the mind’s eyes. Jesus is inviting his hearers into a 
relationship that is visually depicted in the mind’s eyes through images of eating Bread, walking 
in Light, passing through Gate, following shepherd, and abiding in Vine. 
 
Summary 
Discourse can be imbued with presence through objects, which form impressions from sensation 
in the mind. One way to accomplish this is through the use of actual physical objects. It is 
possible that Jesus spoke his “I am” statements using physical objects to endow his self-
statements with presence through propinquity. However, if these representations were not 
physically present in Jesus’ self-statements as concrete objects, then a combination of common 
day experience and association with the Hebrew Scriptures would have endowed Jesus’ “I am” 
statements with pictorial presence, through the use of metaphor. This occurs in at least two ways. 
First, the metaphors of bread, light, gate, shepherd, and vine function in the brain as actual 
representations of who Jesus is. Second, the metaphors function in the brain as active invitation 
to relationship. Both of these functions form impressions from sensation in the mind through 
pictorial presence that centers attention on the person of Jesus. 
 
Word as Figure: Allusion  
At the beginning of John’s gospel, the evangelist is careful to grasp attention that is centered on 
his main character, Jesus. Several strategies are employed to accomplish this aim, and one in 
particular is unique in its ability to create pictorial presence: allusion.  
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Identifying and Analyzing Figure as Allusion to Achieve Attention 
The evangelist employs allusion two times in the prologue to imbue “the Word” with pictorial 
presence. First, the evangelist writes: 
 
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was 
God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came into being through him, 
and without him not one thing came into being. What has come into being in him 
was life, and the life was the light of all people. The light shines in the darkness, 
and the darkness did not overcome it. (John 1:1–5) 
 
In these opening words, the evangelist recalls the creation in Genesis 1, “In the beginning.”329 
Furthermore, the words “light” (John 1:4) and “darkness” (John 1:5) call to mind the first acts of 
God in creation: “Then God said, ‘Let there be light’; and there was light. And God saw that the 
light was good; and God separated the light from the darkness. God called the light Day, and the 
darkness he called Night. And there was evening and there was morning, the first day” (Genesis 
1:3–5). Thus, when the evangelist begins his gospel with “In the beginning was the Word” (John 
1:1a) and “What has come into being in him was life, and the life was the light of all people. The 
light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not overcome it,” (John 1:3b–5) the evangelist 
is alluding to the creation account in Genesis. 
The second instance of allusion occurs when the evangelist writes about the Word, that it 
“lived among us” (John 1:14). About this clause, most commentators note that the Greek, 
e˙skh/nwsen e˙n hJmi √n may be rendered, “Pitched his tent among us,” which is an allusion to the 
presence of the Divine in the tabernacle.330 If the hearer somehow misses this allusion, a second 
clause—“and we have seen his glory”—helps to make it abundantly clear. The word “glory,” 
from the Greek do/xan, brings to mind stories from the Hebrew Scriptures in which the presence 
use of God is displayed.331 Morris suggests that the connection between “pitched his tent” and 
“glory” would have called to mind the imagery of Exodus 40:34 when the cloud covered the tent 
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of meeting and the glory of the LORD filled the tabernacle.332 Thus, when the evangelist 
introduces the Word pitching his tent among us that displays the glory of God, allusions to God’s 
presence above and within the tabernacle are being made. 
Since this chapter has already offered a definition for allusion, along with an explanation 
of its rhetorical function, a brief summary of allusion will suffice. Allusion is a reference to a 
past work of art, person, event, literature, or history.333 The rhetorical function of allusion is that 
it creates a shared experience.334 More importantly for this thesis, however, is that allusion can 
function to help an audience imaginatively “see” an idea in the brain, by requiring an audience to 
transfer the qualities of the thing alluded to onto the idea or object being discussed.335 This 
appears to be what the evangelist is doing in his prologue. 
The first allusion, located in John 1:1–5, refers to the creation story in Genesis 1. The 
earth is formless and void, and the Spirit of God hovers over the face of the waters, waiting to 
fashion chaos into creation. Then, over a six-day period, God speaks the world into existence: 
light, sky, land, vegetation, heavenly bodies, creatures, and humans. This creation story would 
likely have been front and center in the mind’s eyes of the evangelist’s audience when they heard 
the words, “In the beginning.” Therefore, Morris concludes, “John is writing about a new 
beginning, a new creation, and he uses words that recall the first creation.”336 Morris however 
misses the central function of allusion. More than simply introducing a new beginning like 
Genesis 1, the evangelist is depicting the Word as the agency that created the cosmos. Thus 
Beasley-Murray explains, “The divine nature of the Logos is seen337 in his activity in creation 
(1–5).”338 By writing, “In the beginning,” the evangelist makes pictorially present the Word that 
spoke the light, sky, land, vegetation, heavenly bodies, creatures, and humans into existence. The 
evangelist’s use of allusion prompts the hearers to associate Jesus with the Word that God spoke 
the creation into existence in their mind’s eyes. A similar dynamic occurs in the next allusion—
became flesh and lived among us. 
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The second allusion, located in John 1:14a-b, refers to the glory of the Lord filling the 
tabernacle. A primary text for this allusion is found in Exodus 40:34–38: 
 
Then the cloud covered the tent of meeting, and the glory of the LORD filled the 
tabernacle. Moses was not able to enter the tent of meeting because the cloud 
settled upon it, and the glory of the LORD filled the tabernacle. Whenever the 
cloud was taken up from the tabernacle, the Israelites would set out on each stage 
of their journey; but if the cloud was not taken up, then they did not set out until 
the day that it was taken up. For the cloud of the LORD was on the tabernacle by 
day, and fire was in the cloud by night, before the eyes of all the house of Israel at 
each stage of their journey. 
 
About the evangelist’s allusion to the glory of God being “pitched,” Witherington writes, “The 
word translated “tabernacled” or “set up tent” seems to allude more remotely to the tabernacles 
period of Jewish history, when God’s presence was to be found in the tent of meeting. Just as the 
Israelites saw the Shekinah glory, so the believers now have seen an even greater glory, the 
glory, the bright and shining presence of the only begotten son.”339 Thus, according to the 
evangelist’s second allusion, the Word is not just the agency that created the cosmos in Genesis 
1, the Word is also the glory of God abiding with Israel, in the tabernacle. 
If the rhetorical function of the allusion worked, and there is no reason to believe it did 
not work, the evangelist’s audience would have imagined in their mind’s eyes the presence of 
God as a cloud by day and as fire in the cloud by night. They would have then transferred this 
imagery onto the Word that the evangelist is introducing in the prologue. This pictorial presence 
is attention winning. All eyes and ears are now centered on God’s glory pitched among them. 
 
Summary 
The evangelist is careful to center attention on his main character, Jesus, by employing allusion 
in his prologue to endow him with pictorial presence. Allusion is used to draw on stories from 
the Hebrew Scriptures that depict the creation and the glory of God in the tabernacle. These 
images that win attention are then transferred onto the Word, endowing it with pictorial presence.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter supports the theory of cynosure by identifying the creation of pictorial presence as 
an important means to grasping attention in Christian oration. The evangelist employs that which 
Perelman advises in order to create presence: carefully presented signs, concrete objects, and 
figures of speech. Also, by analyzing the use of allusion, illustration, and metaphor, the 
rhetorical strategies employed by the evangelist to create pictorial presence begin to ground 
strategies theoretically. Furthermore, the analysis of these strategies begins to illuminate ways in 
which strategies may be implanted to achieve attention-winning pictorial presence in preaching. 
The next two chapters continue to explore the theory of cynosure. Chapter 5 will look to 
a second form of Christian rhetoric—sermons—to further identify and analyze the creation of 
pictorial presence that grasps attention. Chapter 6 will quantitatively test the theory of cynosure. 
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Chapter 5 
Identifying and Analyzing Strategies for Pictorial Presence 
That Grasp Attention: Case Studies 
 
Chapter 4 demonstrated the practice of pictorial language in the Bible, and more specifically, in 
the gospel of John. Thus, chapter 4 demonstrated the creation of pictorial presence as an 
important means to achieving attention in Christian rhetoric. Furthermore, by analyzing 
attention-winning pictorial presence, strategies for creating it in sermons were illuminated. This 
chapter takes the next step to identify similar strategies in sermons. Using four sermons as case 
studies, this chapter further examines this thesis’ theory. Additionally, by analyzing the creation 
of pictorial presence in sermons, this chapter expands the scope of strategies for attention 
detailed in chapter 4, which may be implanted to achieve attention-winning pictorial presence in 
preaching. 
In this chapter I focus on attention in Jonathan Edwards’ “Sinners in the Hands of an 
Angry God,” Charles Spurgeon’s “Compel Them to Come In,” Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have 
a Dream,” and Fred Craddock’s “Doxology.” The section on Edwards’ sermon is longer than the 
other sections for a few reasons. First, more than the other sermons, Edwards’ sermon is rich 
with pictorial presence from beginning to its end. Second, many of Edwards’ strategies for 
creating pictorial presence are employed by the other preachers, which allows the analysis in the 
following three sermons to refer back to and to build on the analysis that occurs in the section on 
Edwards’ sermon. Finally, Edwards’ sermon is simply much longer than the other sermons, 
which requires more space for adequate analysis.340 
Each of the following sections begins by explaining why the sermon chosen for analysis 
is an exemplar for winning attention. Of course, each sermon has a rhetorical aim more 
substantial than mere attention. For example, Jonathan Edwards’ sermon means to persuade its 
listeners to repent and believe; similarly, Charles Spurgeon’s sermon also aims at conversion; 
Martin Luther King’s sermon means to evoke hope for and participation in racial equality; Fred 
Craddock’s sermon means to encourage gratitude in every circumstance. Attention serves these 
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larger rhetorical aims, and yet, this chapter is particularly interested in understanding how each 
sermon grasps attention by creating pictorial presence. 
This chapter is sensitive to the rhetorical situation of each sermon because attention is 
dependent on the circumstances and perceptions of the audience. This is true in everyday 
circumstances as well as in listening to sermons. For example, a tourist visiting a village in 
France may be interested in visiting a quaint family-owned bakery, but a convict on the run 
visiting that same village might be interested in the best place to hide. According to Bitzer, a 
“rhetorical situation” is any imperfection marked by urgency that rhetoric can modify.341 To be 
clear, not every exigence marks a situation as “rhetorical.” For example, death and winter are 
exigencies, but they cannot be modified by rhetoric.342 But sorrow over death, and the adoption 
of strategies to survive the harsh winter can be modified with rhetoric. As situations marked by 
“urgency,” rhetorical situations tend to rouse attention because the exigency is felt by the 
audience who is in need of a remedy.343 Accordingly, as each section begins by explaining why 
the sermon is an exemplar for winning attention, a description of each sermon’s rhetorical 
situation is provided to contextualize why the sermons achieved attention on the level and scale 
that they did. Then each section proceeds to analyze the strategies that create pictorial presence. 
 
Jonathan Edwards’ “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” 
On July 8, 1741, Jonathan Edwards stood in Enfield, Connecticut, to preach “Sinners in the 
Hands of an Angry God.”344 The rhetorical situation for this sermon came just after the height of 
revival in New England, in 1740.345 This revival, part of the Great Awakening, occurred during a 
time in which morals and religion were languishing. According to Cairns, this was caused by 
frontier living, a dynamic population on the move, and a series of brutal wars.346 This context 
gave rise to a series of spontaneous, unorganized, and congregational awakenings as a result of 
sermons preached by pastors such as Jonathan Edwards.347 
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Into that rhetorical situation stepped one of the Colonies’ most powerful and effective 
preachers whose sermon captured attention in 1741, and continues to garner attention today.348 
We can imagine Jonathan Edwards, the six-foot one-inch, emaciated figure ascending the pulpit. 
With one hand, he holds his sermon notes close to his eyes because of nearsightedness. In his 
other hand, he holds a candle. With a monotone voice he begins with these words, 
“Deuteronomy 32:35, Their foot shall slide in due time.”349 Cady notes that when listening to 
Edwards’ sermon listeners broke down into a storm of distress that caused them to shudder with 
terror.350 It is recorded that as the sermon progressed, many in the audience cried so loudly that it 
could be scarcely heard and that by its conclusion, numerous people converted.351 Of course, 
spiritual conversion is a highly complex phenomenon that includes a confluence of spiritual, 
psychological, and sociological motives resulting in repentance and faith.352 Conversion cannot 
be reduced to the gaining and maintaining of attention, yet conversion is unlikely to occur, 
perhaps is impossible to occur, without attention. 
Although “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” is no longer preached in churches and 
no longer causes modern day audiences to grab pillars, it continues to receive scholarly and 
popular attention. Larsen observes that Edwards is generally recognized as the most powerful 
and effective preacher ever heard in America.353 Crisp limits Larsen’s observation by noting that 
Edwards is the most famous preacher within Puritanism. However, Crisp does confirm Edwards’ 
ability to garner modern-day attention by explaining that when people hear the words “hellfire 
preaching” or “Puritan preaching” that they very often think of Edwards. Furthermore, Crisp 
notes that out of all of his sermons, “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” is Edwards’ most 
famous.354 Thus, the attention that this sermon captured in the past, and in the present, makes it a 
worthwhile case study for attention. 
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Identifying and Analyzing Pictorial Presence in Four Images 
The main idea of Edwards’ sermon is that the sinner is in danger of hell and must repent before it 
is too late. His point was common among Puritan preachers, however, through imaginative 
oration, Edwards makes the fires of hell, the wrath of God, the sinner’s predicament, and the 
sinner’s response pictorially vivid in the mind’s eyes.355 Simply put, Edwards’ lucid language 
riveted attention. The remainder of this section expounds aspects of how that is accomplished. 
	
Images of Hell 
Edwards’ insistence that the sinner will go to hell is made present by imaging hell pictorially. 
This is accomplished through the use of metaphor, simile, and hypotyposis. A metaphor is a 
figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to an object or action to which it is not 
literally applicable. Thus, when Edwards refers to hell as a “pit,” “fire,” “furnace,” “flames,” and 
“mouth,” he employs metaphor, and this heightens attention. As Quintilian observes, “Metaphor 
has been invented for the purpose of exciting the mind, giving a character to things, and setting 
them before the eye.”356 Edwards’ metaphors for hell function accordingly: they imbue the 
concept of hell with everyday (albeit frightening) images that his audience knew and could 
imagine. Through metaphor, hell is no longer simply a word referring to a place where none in 
the audience had gone. Rather, hell becomes visible in the mind’s eyes. The New Englanders of 
the 1700s probably had seen a smelting furnace and felt its heat; they probably had smelled the 
pit where wood was transformed into charcoal. Language that compares something distant and 
abstract to something near and concrete secures attention. 
Another aspect of metaphor that can increase its vividness in the mind is its activity. For 
example, Aristotle explains that metaphor brings an idea before the eyes as something that 
should be seen as being done.357 In other words, metaphors should bring to mind activity and 
action. In this way Edwards proclaims, “The Devil is waiting for them, hell is gaping for them, 
the flames gather and flash about them, and would fain lay hold on them, and swallow them 
up.”358 In this sentence, Edwards moves beyond nouns to describe an active hell through the use 
of verbs. In contrast to a painting that hangs on a wall, Edwards’ language evokes the activity of 
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a play in which the actors writhe, lament, and cry out. Thus, according to Edwards, hell is 
dynamic, energetic, and full of activity, which encourages the listener to “see” that which 
Edwards is warning them about. 
Edwards also uses simile to depict the Devil, who in his previous metaphor, “is waiting 
for [the sinner.]” A simile uses the words “like” or “as” to liken one thing to another. Cuddon 
explains that a rhetorical function of simile is to clarify and enhance an image.359 This is 
certainly how Edwards uses simile when he declares, “The devils watch them; they are ever by 
them, at their right hand; they stand waiting for them, like greedy hungry lions that see their prey, 
and expect to have it, but are for the present kept back.”360 In this simile, devils do more than 
simply “wait” because they are metamorphosed into lions, thereby filling the mind’s eyes with 
the image of a large tawny-colored cat with overpowering strength. Furthermore, in this simile 
the lion is endowed with intense emotion and expectation. It is greedy, hungry, and expects to 
have the sinner. Thus, Edwards’ audience is now encouraged to “see” the Devil as an impatient 
lion, ready to consume its prey. Because the human mind is attracted to movement and activity, 
Edwards’ active figures likely encouraged audience attention. With the audience therefore 
attending to his depictions of the devil and hell, Edwards continues to bear down. 
He does this with a third figure of speech: hypotyposis. Chapter 2 of this thesis explains 
that hypotyposis is a figurative device by which something is represented as if it were present. 
This happens by using words to depict something in all its attendant circumstances. According to 
Quintilian the result of hypotyposis is that it functions “to set things before the eyes.”361 As an 
example, Rhetorica Ad Herennium refers to a story about the murder of Gracchus that is depicted 
in vivid detail. Describing the assassin, the author writes, “In a sweat, with eyes blazing, hair 
bristling, toga awry, he begins to quicken his pace, several other men joining him.”362 The author 
then describes the murder: “But this fellow, frothing crime from his mouth, breathing forth 
cruelty from the depth of his lungs, swings his arm, and, while Gracchus wonders what it means, 
but still does not move from the place where he stood, strikes him on the temple.”363 A depiction 
of the scene following the murder concludes the hypotyposis, “The assassin, bespattered with the 
pitiable blood of the bravest of heroes, looks about him as if he had done a most admirable deed, 
																																																						
359 Cuddon, Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms, s.v. “simile.” 
360 All quotations of this sermon are from the version located in appendix A. 
361 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, trans. Watson, 163–64. 
362 Cicero, Rhetorica ad Herennium, trans. Caplan, 407. 
363 Ibid. 
	 101 
gaily extends his murderous hand to his followers as they congratulate him, and betakes himself 
to the temple of Jupiter.”364 With hypotyposis the event is described in words that cause it to pass 
vividly before an audience’s eyes. That is the rhetorical effect of hypotyposis. 
Although Edwards’ hypotyposis does not make the fate of the doomed as pictorially 
present as Gracchus’ murder, he succeeds in endowing hell with the pictorial presence of a 
celestial courtroom: 
 
You shall be tormented in the presence of the holy angels, and in the presence of 
the Lamb; and when you shall be in this state of suffering, the glorious inhabitants 
of heaven shall go forth and look on the awful spectacle, that they may see what 
the wrath and fierceness of the Almighty is, and when they have seen it, they will 
fall down and adore that great power and majesty. 
 
With hypotyposis, Edwards depicts a future in which his audience is able to “see” what it will be 
like to live in hell. According to Edwards, while sinners are being tormented, holy angels, the 
Lamb, and the glorious inhabitants of heaven will witness the fierceness of God’s wrath 
unleashed on the sinner. Furthermore, Edwards depicts an eternal state in which the sinners’ 
torment is provocation for the saints to worship God. Cady notes that Edwards’ imagery 
sometimes reflects New England juridical imagery.365 That appears to be the case in this 
hypotyposis. Colonial court scenes and punishment were almost always public, for the aim was 
to humiliate the wayward and to teach a lesson to the commonwealth.366 The genius of Edwards’ 
depiction here is its ability to draw on common experience to create a scene in which his 
audience can “see” the tormented sinner observed by heavenly beings who are moved to fall 
down and adore the great power of the Lord who executes justice. 
In conclusion, according to the theory of cynosure, Edwards very likely captures attention 
by making hell pictorially present. He does this by fashioning hell into a visibly concrete reality 
in the mind’s eyes. Using metaphor, hell becomes a pit, fire, furnace, flame, and mouth in which 
the Devil is waiting, hell is gaping, and flames are gathering. Using simile, Edwards makes lucid 
an impatient Devil. Like a hungry and greedy lion, the devil longs to pounce on his prey. Finally, 
using hypotyposis, Edwards draws on juridical imagery to cast hell as a celestial courtroom that 
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illumines eternal torment and provokes humiliation for the wicked and worship for the righteous. 
With hell visible in the mind’s eyes, Edwards then takes up the question, “Why is such 
wretchedness pronounced on sinners?” The answer is “God’s wrath.” However, rather than 
simply state the answer, Edwards chooses to endow God’s wrath with pictorial presence that 
wins attention. 
 
Images of God’s Wrath 
Edwards explains why sinners go to hell—because of the holy wrath of God. However, rather 
than concluding with bland statements such as “God is angry” or “The Lord will eternally punish 
the wicked,” Edwards masterfully imbues his discourse with pictorial presence through simile, 
hypotyposis, personification, and anthropomorphism. 
Five similes picture God’s disgust toward and inclination to destroy the sinner. The first 
two similes are part of the same sentence: “His wrath towards you burns like fire . . . [and] you 
are ten thousand times so abominable in his eyes as the most hateful venomous serpent is in 
ours.” The fire simile was well adapted to New Englanders of that day because the hearth burned 
nearly every day of the year, even in summer. The only means of illumination and the only 
means of heating a house was fire. Thus, fire was an easily imagined yet also poignant image for 
Edwards to draw from. 
The second simile in this sentence likens the wrath of God to a person’s hatred of 
venomous serpents. This is effective rhetorically. As Edwards pictorially depicts the wicked as 
slithering snakes, he draws on his audience’s spite for serpents to declare that that is how God 
feels about the wicked, but ten thousand times more! This simile encourages the audience to 
“see” God’s disgust toward the sinner, by rousing the audience’s own experience with snakes. 
The artistry of this simple simile, brief and unadorned, serves as an available means of creating 
imagery in the mind’s eyes. 
The third and fourth similes visualize God’s wrath being much worse than a king’s wrath: 
“The greatest earthly potentates, in their majesty and strength are but feeble despicable worms of 
the dust, in comparison of the great and almighty Creator and King of heaven and earth.” Then 
Edwards says, “All the kings of the earth before God are as grasshoppers, they are nothing and 
less than nothing.” In these two similes, Edwards draws on the imagery of powerful kings, which 
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reflects the covenant traditions of New England theology and politics.367 Edwards then applies 
these images in two directions—to earthly kings and to the heavenly King. By likening the kings 
of the earth to negligible worms and grasshoppers, Edwards diminishes the power of human 
authority. He then uses the same imagery as a contrast to God, whose kingly wrath is magnified 
in comparison to worms and grasshoppers. 
The fifth simile imagines the wrath of God rising like water: “The wrath of God is like 
great waters that are dammed for the present; they increase more and more, and rise higher and 
higher, till an outlet is given, and the longer the stream is stop’d, the more rapid and mighty is its 
course, when once it is let loose.” New Englanders were familiar with the use of water power at 
the mill. The mill pond was dammed to allow for the collection of water and then opened at 
times. With a powerful rush of water, the heavy wheel creaked and turned. Furthermore, the 
experience of floods, not just the mill pond, made the power of water both familiar and 
threatening.368 Thus, Edwards takes images and experiences already existing in his audience’s 
minds and he applies them to God’s pent-up wrath. The result is an idea, made into a picture, that 
wins attention by touching the audience’s fright in relation to the awesome power of water, 
dams, and floods. 
In addition to the use of simile, a second strategy employed by Edwards is the 
combination of personification and hypotyposis. Hypotyposis was explained earlier in this 
chapter, and here personification is briefly explained. Personification attributes human 
characteristics to something nonhuman. A primary rhetorical function of personification is to 
make an idea pictorially visible. Aristotle lauds the use of personification to speak of inanimate 
things in animate ways, which increases their actuality.369 By “actuality,” Aristotle means that a 
“thing” increases in existence, which according to this thesis means that its presence increases. 
For example, Aristotle quotes a funeral speech by Lysias, “Greece should cut her hair at the tomb 
of those who fell at Salamis, since her freedom was buried along with their valor.”370 Greece is 
transfigured into a woman who mourns the loss of freedom. Similarly, to increase the rhetorical 
presence of God’s wrath, Edwards personifies it as a foot and then through hypotyposis, he 
brings the future judgment of the wicked into the present: 
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If you cry to God to pity you, he will be so far from pitying you in your doleful 
case . . . that he’ll only tread you under foot: And tho’ he will know that you can’t 
bear the weight of omnipotence treading upon you, yet he won’t regard that, but 
he will crush you under his feet without mercy; he’ll crush out your blood, and 
make it fly, and it shall be sprinkled on his garments, so as to stain all his 
raiment. 
 
By combining personification with hypotyposis, the Divine foot becomes active in judgment, 
which crushes the blood of the wicked so violently that the blood flies, sprinkles, and stains. 
Although there was no cinema when Edwards preached his sermon, he creates a cinematic 
moment for his audience. It is likely that they were able to see in the mind’s eyes the wrath of 
God, violently punishing the wicked. 
Edwards combines hypotyposis and personification a second time when he says, “The 
bow of God’s wrath is bent, and the arrow made ready on the string, and Justice bends the arrow 
at your heart, and strains the bow.” Through hypotyposis, Edwards’ audience is able to see a 
Divine archer, holding a taut bow. Through personification, the audience is able to see Justice 
aiming the arrow at their heart. In a climactic finale, Edwards concludes that the arrow will be 
“made drunk with your blood.” Similar to the previous image of the divine foot crushing the 
wicked, this image depicts God piercing their heart. However, this image goes further by 
endowing God’s wrath with the shocking image of satisfaction. God is drunk, not with alcohol, 
but with blood—the justice that results from punishing the wicked. 
In addition to imbuing God’s wrath with pictorial presence, Edwards employs 
anthropomorphism to explain that creation, like God, is sickened by the wicked. 
“Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human characteristics and qualities to animals or other 
non-human beings.”371 Similar to Aristotle’s appreciation for personification, he also lauds 
anthropomorphism’s ability to enter into the mind’s eyes. By referencing Homer, he offers a few 
examples: “Again the ruthless stone rolled down to the plane; the arrow eager to fly; the spears 
were buried in the ground, longing to take their fill of flesh.”372 Here, inanimate non-human 
objects such as stones, arrows, and spears are given human desire, which increases their 
presence. Similarly, according to Edwards, the earth does not want to bear the wicked because 
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they are a burden, and creation groans because it is subject to the corruption of the wicked. 
Furthermore, the sun does not willingly shine on the wicked, nor does the earth willingly yield 
increase for them, nor does the air willingly maintain the life of the wicked. Finally, Edwards 
says that if it were not for the sovereign hand of God, the world would spew out the wicked. The 
result of Edwards’ anthropomorphism is that creation’s disgust and desire are animated: creation 
is terribly sickened by wickedness so it desires to open its mouth and spew them out of the world 
and into hell. This mode of communication is much more graphic than simply saying, “The 
wicked do not deserve to abide in the world,” or “The world is not a place for the wicked to 
live.” Edwards’ anthropomorphism creates mental images that, according to the theory of 
cynosure, grasp attention. 
The previous section of this chapter concluded with the horrors of hell graphically 
depicted for Edwards’ audience, and it raised the question, “Why is such wretchedness 
pronounced on sinners?” The sermon answers that question with images depicting a burning, 
sickened, and raging God, which function to win attention. With God’s wrath established in the 
mind’s eyes, Edwards proceeds to imbue yet another idea pictorially: the sinner’s predicament. 
 
Images of the Sinner’s Predicament 
Up to this point in the sermon, Edwards has implied that the sinner is in danger of hell due to 
God’s wrath, but now he goes further to state plainly and categorically that the sinner is in a 
dangerous predicament. However, rather than making plain statements, he festoons his 
statements with pictorial presence through the use of simile, metaphor, hypotyposis, and 
personification. 
Beginning with simile, Edwards likens the sinner’s predicament to New Englanders’ 
experiences with slipping. The images combine kinesthetic and visual sensations. Any New 
Englander can readily imagine walking to their neighbor’s house on snow that has lasted for so 
many months that it has become ice. Thus, he explains: 
 
As one that stands or walks in slippery places is always exposed to fall; as he that 
walks in slippery places is every moment liable to fall; as he that stands or walks 
on slippery ground, needs nothing but his own weight to throw him down; as he 
that stands in such slippery declining ground on the edge of a pit that he can’t 
stand alone, when he is let go he immediately falls and is lost. 
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By likening the sinner’s predicament to that which was familiar and sensory, Edwards 
heightened the attention-holding power of his discourse. Accordingly, the sinner, like the New 
Englander throughout winter, proceeds slowly through the world, teetering once in a while, and 
falling every now and again. However, rather than merely falling onto the ground, the sinner falls 
into hell. 
Another aspect that gives Edwards’ similes pictorial presence is their activity. In the 
section on “Images of Hell” it is explained that rhetoricians laud active metaphors. The same is 
true for similes. Aristotle believes that active similes achieve brilliance.373 According to 
Aristotle, a simple simile goes no further than comparison. For example, a flute player is like a 
monkey, or a shortsighted man’s eyes are like a lamp flame. In comparison to simple similes, 
Aristotle lauds active similes such as: “a shield is like the drinking bowl of Ares.”374 To ancient 
Greeks hearing this simile, the figure would have prompted the image of the Greek war god and 
son of Zeus and Hera, Ares, who is so large that he could grip a shield filled with wine, bring it 
to his lips, and drink from it as if it were a goblet. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca concur that 
active similes win attention as illustrated from Bossuet’s oration at Conde’s funeral: “In his bold 
leaps and light steps, like to those vigorous, bounding animals, he advances only in lively and 
impetuous spurts, and neither mountains nor precipices can stop him.”375 In Bossuet’s speech, 
the active simile attracts the mind to “see” Conde leaping, stepping, and bounding. Similarly, 
Edwards encourages his audience to “see” the sinner’s predicament by filling it with liveliness: 
“As he that walks in slippery places . . . as he that stands or walks on slippery ground . . . as he 
that stands in such slippery declining ground on the edge of a pit.” With active similes, the 
sinner’s predicament is made dynamic, and this likely prompts attention: in every moment, with 
every step, the sinner risks slipping from transient life in the world, to eternal life in hell. 
Edwards also uses hypotyposis to intensify the sinner’s predicament: “Unconverted men 
walk over the pit of hell on a rotten covering, and there are innumerable places in this covering 
so weak that they won’t bear their weight.” In this hypotyposis, Edwards transports his audience 
from the icy ground of New England that depicts the sinner’s risk of slipping, to a rotten 
covering over hell that is so weak that it is not able to bear their weight. Now, the audience is 
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able to “see” that even if they walk carefully over the icy ground they may still fall, because, as 
Edwards explains pictorially, they walk on a rotten covering over hell. 
With the horrors of hell, God’s wrath, and the sinner’s predicament depicted pictorially, 
Edwards brilliantly moves toward his crescendo with personification. Beginning with a didactic 
statement, Edwards asserts, “There is nothing that keeps wicked men at any one moment, out of 
hell, but the mere pleasure of God.” How does this didactic point take shape in the mind’s eyes? 
Throughout his sermon, Edwards personifies God’s pleasure as a “hand” that actively keeps the 
sinner from hell. He does this twelve times. For the sake of brevity, five are analyzed. 
In the first three examples, God’s pleasure, personified as hands, is worked into succinct 
metaphors. In the first example, Edwards states, “You are thus in the hands of an angry God; 'tis 
nothing but his mere pleasure that keeps you from being this moment swallowed up in 
everlasting destruction.” With this metaphor, God’s hands hold the sinner, which invites the 
audience to “see” the wicked cradled in divine hands. In the second example, “The sword of 
divine Justice is every moment brandished over their heads, and 'tis nothing but the hand of 
arbitrary mercy, and God’s mere will, that holds it back.” Here God’s pleasure is imagined to be 
a hand holding back the sword of Justice which is brandished over the heads of the wicked. In 
this metaphor God’s personified hands are no longer holding the wicked, rather, God’s hands are 
now holding back justice, which is transfigured into a sword. This metaphor encourages the 
audience to “see” justice as a sword swinging over their heads that God’s hand holds back. In the 
third example, Edwards describes, “There are the black clouds of God’s wrath now hanging 
directly over your heads, full of the dreadful storm, and big with thunder; and were it not for the 
restraining hand of God it would immediately burst forth upon you.” God’s pleasure holds back a 
dreadful storm. As New Englanders, Edwards’ audience is no stranger to gale force winds and 
torrential rains. This metaphor prompts the audience to “see” such storms hanging over their 
heads and, yet, God’s restraining hand holds it back. God’s personified hands keep sinners from 
hell. Those hands are busy at work cradling the sinner, holding back the brandishing sword of 
justice, and restraining a dreadful storm that resounds with thunder. 
In addition to the use of metaphor, Edwards employs two hypotyposes to create pictorial 
presence with language so lucid that the sinners’ attention is seized and centered on their 
predicament: 
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O sinner! Consider the fearful danger you are in: 'Tis a great furnace of wrath, a 
wide and bottomless pit, full of the fire of wrath, that you are held over in the 
hand of that God, whose wrath is provoked and incensed as much against you as 
against many of the damned in hell: You hang by a slender thread, with the flames 
of divine wrath flashing about it, and ready every moment to singe it, and burn it 
asunder; and you have no interest in any mediator, and nothing to lay hold of to 
save yourself, nothing to keep off the flames of wrath, nothing of your own, 
nothing that you ever have done, nothing that you can do, to induce God to spare 
you one moment. 
 
And: 
 
The God that holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider, or some 
loathsome insect, over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked; his wrath 
towards you burns like fire; he looks upon you as worthy of nothing else, but to 
be cast into the fire; he is of purer eyes than to bear to have you in his sight. 
 
In the first hypotyposis, sinners are depicted as being held by God’s hand over a great furnace of 
wrath. However, this situation is not a comfort because the wrath being depicted in the 
hypotyposis belongs to God who holds them in his hands. To make matters worse, Edwards’ 
second hypotyposis portrays the wicked as loathsome insects that provoke God to hold sinners 
over the pit of hell much like humans hold insects over fire. This is brilliant rhetoric. Edwards 
draws on the audience’s negative feelings toward insects and applies their loathing to the way 
that God feels about the wicked. Thus, through hypotyposis, attention and emotion are fixed on 
the abominable sinner, precariously held over hell by God’s personified hand—his mere 
pleasure. 
Through simile and metaphor audience members “see” themselves slipping on ice and 
fleeing from storms. Through hypotyposis and personification, they “see” God’s hands holding 
back storm and suspending the sinner above a flaming hell. Imagery established, attention very 
likely grasped, Edwards continues toward his conclusion. 
 
Image of the Sinner’s Response 
The purpose of Edwards’ rhetoric is to incite response: the wicked must repent and believe or 
experience eternal torment in hell. Therefore, near the conclusion of his sermon, Edwards returns 
to his image of the sinner suspended above hell: “Let everyone that is yet out of Christ, and 
hanging over the pit of hell, whether they be old men and women, or middle aged, or young 
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people, or little children, now hearken to the loud calls of God’s word and providence.” Having 
thus depicted the hell to which the wicked will go and their precarious suspension above it, a 
central question for Edwards’ audience was, no doubt, “How are we to be saved?” In Edwards’ 
final words, he does more than tell his audience what to do, he uses allusion to show them: 
 
Therefore let every one that is out of Christ, now awake and fly from the Wrath to 
come. The Wrath of almighty GOD is now undoubtedly hanging over great Part 
of this Congregation: Let every one fly out of Sodom: Haste and escape for your 
Lives, look not behind you, escape to the Mountain, least you be consumed. 
 
In chapter 4, allusion was identified as a figure of speech that alludes to literature or history that 
an audience then transfers to the orator’s point. Here Edwards alludes to the story of Sodom and 
Gomorrah from Genesis chapter 19. In this story, God decides to destroy Sodom, but warns Lot 
through angels, who tell him to take his family and flee. According to the story, when Lot 
hesitated, the angels grasped his hand and the hands of his wife and of his two daughters, and led 
them safely out of the city. Once they were out, one of the angels spoke to them the words which 
Edwards quotes, “Haste and escape for your lives, look not behind you, escape to the mountain, 
least you be consumed.” In the end, God rained down burning sulfur on Sodom and Gomorrah 
destroying all living things. Furthermore, Lot’s wife looked back, which she was not supposed to 
do, and so she became a pillar of salt. 
It is impossible to know with certainty how each listener needed to “awake” and “fly.” 
Perhaps some needed to stop consuming alcohol. Perhaps others needed to begin regularly 
attending church. Perhaps others needed to commit to sexual purity. Perhaps others needed to 
place their faith in Christ for salvation. The brilliance of Edwards’ allusion is that it makes 
“visual” the need for each sinner to flee from God’s wrath, without being prescriptive in what 
action to take. In whatever way a person needs to change, they are able to “see” themselves 
waking up and flying away from the wrath of God. Conversely, if they choose to not wake and 
fly, Edwards’ allusion makes their damnation “visual.” 
 
Summary 
Edwards’ sermon is filled with pictorial presence from beginning to end; it is a visually 
imaginative masterpiece that, according to the theory of cynosure, captures attention. By 
imbuing familiar Puritan concepts such as hell, God’s wrath, the sinner’s predicament, and 
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conversion with pictorial presence, Edwards enlivens his ideas and makes them “visible” to his 
audience. He does through discourse that uses various rhetorical devices to make his language 
pictorial: metaphor, hypotyposis, simile, personification, anthropomorphism, and allusion. In the 
next section, I analyze a sermon by the “Prince of Preachers,” Charles Haddon Spurgeon, for its 
ability to create pictorial presence. 
 
Charles Spurgeon’s “Compel Them to Come In” 
The rhetorical situation for Spurgeon’s sermon helps to explain why “Compel them to Come In” 
grasped the attention of his audience. On December 5, 1858, Charles Haddon Spurgeon stood in 
the Surrey Gardens Music Hall to deliver “Compel Them to Come In.”376 Prior to preaching 
there, Spurgeon had preached in Exeter Hall, and before that he had preached for two years at 
New Park Street Church. However, due to Spurgeon’s preaching, the congregation at New Park 
Street Church grew from less than one hundred weekly attenders to regularly filling the entire 
twelve hundred seat sanctuary.377 Similarly, attendance grew at Exeter Hall, and so he transferred 
to the larger Surrey Gardens Music Hall while the Metropolitan Tabernacle, which would seat 
six thousand people, was being built.378 
At least two factors contributed to the exigencies of Spurgeon’s day and his ability to use 
discourse to positively modify his rhetorical situation is one reason for his widespread fame. One 
exigency during mid-Victorian years was Sabbath days that encouraged church attendance and 
discouraged entertainment.379 Spurgeon was dramatic and humorous, he used witty titles and 
excellent illustrations.380 These aspects of his preaching helped to fill the void of games and 
theater on Sabbath days as a kind of sanctified diversion. A second exigency early in Spurgeon’s 
ministry in London came during a period of economic and social distress throughout Britain. In 
1854 twenty thousand people died with cholera. In that same year, the Crimean war broke out. In 
1857 the mutiny of the Seypoys instigated rage and grief that culminated in a National Day of 
Fasting and Humiliation in which Spurgeon addressed a crowd of more than twenty-four 
thousand. Such events brought suffering and economic ruin to many, which incited the desire for 
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the kind of comfort and hope that Spurgeon articulated in his sermons.381 Spurgeon was uniquely 
adept at communicating solid doctrine with clarity that connected to people’s lives.382 Beyond 
these exigencies into which Spurgeon spoke, a third factor contributed to his fame: his sermons 
were published and distributed beyond London, thus making him nationally and internationally 
known.383 Due to these elements Kruppa’s assessment is widely shared: he was the greatest 
preacher in the nineteenth century.384 Furthermore, Spurgeon continues to be recognized as one 
of the greatest preachers in the Protestant tradition. This point is supported by the fact that today 
more than three hundred million copies of his printed works, mostly his sermons, are in 
circulation.385 
Although a full discussion of Spurgeon’s rhetorical situation is beyond the scope of this 
section, it is from within this situation that Spurgeon preached and it is an important element to 
the attention that his sermons garnered. Another important element of his preaching that this 
section does pursue is his language, which created the pictorial presence that this thesis lauds for 
winning attention. While it would be possible to analyze nearly any sermon from Spurgeon’s 
vast output to better understand his ability to capture attention, I have chosen the sermon about 
which Spurgeon himself declared, “I think I never preached another sermon by which so many 
souls were won to God.”386 This is an astonishing statement from a man who preached the gospel 
to over one million people and personally baptized fifteen thousand who were converted under 
his ministry.387 Of course, as stated earlier in this chapter, spiritual conversion is a highly 
complex phenomenon that cannot be reduced to the gaining and maintaining of attention. Yet, 
conversion is unlikely to occur without attention, and Spurgeon was a master at capturing 
attention by using words to create pictorial presence.388 Thus, I have chosen “Compel Them to 
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Come In” as a case study to better understand how Spurgeon created pictorial presence for 
winning attention. 
 
Pictorial Presence in Three Images 
Unlike Edwards, Spurgeon does not thoroughly lace his discourse with imagery. Instead, he 
didactically develops three points and punctuates those points at key moments with imagery to 
move the audience toward conversion. His first point is that unbelievers live their lives outside of 
Christ. His second point is that Christ died for unbelievers, and his third is that unbelievers 
should become believers. Although “Compel them to Come In” uses less imagery than Edwards’ 
astounding and fulsome “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God,” Spurgeon’s three points are 
punctuated with pictorial presence that helps his audience to “see” his discourse. 
 
“Seeing” the Unbeliever’s Life Outside of Christ 
In order for Spurgeon to compel his audience to “come in,” he needs them to understand what 
life is like for those who are “not in.” He spends the majority of his sermon communicating this 
point didactically. However, he also employs metaphor and hypotyposis to create seven images 
in the mind’s eye that depict a horrifying situation for those who are outside of Christ. 
The first image is of tarrying: “I feel in such a haste to go out and obey this 
commandment this morning, by compelling those to come in who are now tarrying in the 
highways and hedges.” By employing metaphor, Spurgeon encourages his listeners to associate 
themselves with people who dawdle on the road. Part of the power of this metaphor derives from 
the audience’s familiarity with highways and hedges. Highways were scattered throughout the 
countryside, and hedges often lined the highways. Of course, highways are avenues of 
transportation, never the destination itself. Thus, to see a person tarrying while on a highway 
suggests that a person is confused, lost, or possibly lazy. Spurgeon’s metaphor implies this 
conclusion and prompts his audience to “see” themselves tarrying when they should be traveling. 
A second image that Spurgeon creates is the destitution of poverty: “Yes, I see you this 
morning, you that are poor. I am to compel you to come in. You are poor in circumstances, but 
God hath not exempted from his grace the man that shivers in rags, and who is destitute of 
bread.” Although “being poor” is somewhat abstract, it likely would have registered for 
Spurgeon’s audience as a clear image, especially when coupled with the concrete phrases 
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“shivers in rags,” and “destitute of bread.” The poor, who were immortalized in Dickens’ 
writings, graphically described the millions of people who lived in unsanitary London slums 
around the time of Spurgeon’s ministry. Again, through the use of metaphor, Spurgeon draws on 
his listeners’ field of experience to see themselves shivering in rags and destitute of bread like 
the poor that they may have passed on their way to hear Spurgeon preach. Through Spurgeon’s 
rhetoric, those who are “outside of Christ” are miserable like the poor. 
In a third image Spurgeon depicts the maimed: “You are not only poor, but you 
are maimed. . . . The sword of the law has cut off your hands.” Spurgeon’s metaphor is graphic 
but then he increases the horror: “But you are worse off than that . . . you are maimed in the feet 
as well as in the hands.” This depiction implies that unbelievers are incapable of works that will 
fix their predicament. Their situation is dire—they are tarrying and poor; their attempt to rectify 
the problem is futile—they have neither hands nor feet. 
The fourth image builds on the previous one: “What little progress you do make in 
religion is but a limp. You have a little strength, but that is so little that you make but painful 
progress.” This metaphor imagines the maimed as halting and shuffling. Here Spurgeon’s 
metaphors tumble over each other and lack precision because he creates people with no feet who 
are limping, but listeners were probably not troubled by the ideational incongruity. It is not 
unreasonable to think that Spurgeon’s audience would “see” in their mind’s eyes veterans from 
the Crimean war doing their best to walk down the streets of London with wooden pegs attached 
to their maimed bodies. Spurgeon calls such people his “limping brother[s].” This affectionate 
appellation drives home the point that the tarrying, poor, maimed, and limping person is no 
stranger to Spurgeon. He is a caring “sibling,” deeply concerned for every unconverted person 
listening to his sermon. 
The fifth image employs blindness: “And yet I see another class—the blind. Yes, you that 
cannot see yourselves, that think yourselves good when you are full of evil, that put bitter for 
sweet and sweet for bitter, darkness for light and light for darkness; to you am I sent. You, blind 
souls that cannot see your lost estate. . . .” This is intriguing rhetoric. Spurgeon’s use of pictorial 
language carries his listeners outside of themselves so that they can see themselves—in this case, 
they see themselves as blind—as if they are watching a film of themselves. Or, to use an analogy 
contemporary to Spurgeon, they see themselves like Scrooge in Dickens’ A Christmas Carol in 
which the miser is allowed to see his life—past, present, and future—to which he is “blind.” Just 
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so, Spurgeon casts a scene in which his audience is able to “see” that they are blind to their 
predicament. Thus, after employing four metaphors to depict the wretched predicament of the 
unconverted, Spurgeon’s fifth metaphor reveals that they, like Scrooge, are blind to the 
pictorially present reality that the first four metaphors created. 
By creating sensory impressions in the brain through metaphor, Spurgeon captures 
attention. He then utilizes hypotyposis to complete his imagery of life outside of Christ: “I 
cannot help thinking of you. I see you acting the suicide this morning, and I picture myself 
standing at your bedside and hearing your cries, and knowing that you are dying without hope. I 
cannot bear that.” Again, like Scrooge who visits his own grave, Spurgeon’s audience is invited 
into personal experience of their own dying. They imagine their own bodies on their own 
deathbeds. Through Spurgeon’s ears, they hear their own cries. Through Spurgeon’s empathy, 
they feel overwhelmed by their own predicament. Then, suddenly and without warning, 
Spurgeon shifts the hypotyposis from a deathbed to a coffin: “I think I am standing by your 
coffin now, and looking into your clay-cold face, and saying. ‘This man despised Christ and 
neglected the great salvation.’” According to Wilson, the creation of identification is often one of 
the most compelling features of a speech because it gives the listener the ability to identify with 
what is being said.389 Similarly, by inviting the audience to “see,” “hear,” and “feel” his 
judgment, the audience is made capable of identifying with what Spurgeon is saying. The 
rhetorical effect is that the audience “sees,” “hears,” and “feels” their own judgment upon 
themselves. 
Spurgeon’s seventh and final image also utilizes hypotyposis; however, the context is no 
longer a deathbed and coffin. Spurgeon now carries the listeners to a courtroom scene during 
which the Lord makes his eternal judgment: 
 
I picture myself standing at the bar of God. As the Lord liveth, the day of 
judgment is coming. . . . I see you standing in the midst of that throng, and the eye 
of God is fixed on you. It seems to you that he is not looking anywhere else, but 
only upon you, and he summons you before him; and he reads your sins, and he 
cries, "Depart ye cursed into everlasting fire in hell!" My hearer, I cannot bear to 
think of you in that position; it seems as if every hair on my head must stand on 
end to think of any hearer of mine being damned. Will you picture yourselves in 
that position? The word has gone forth, "Depart, ye cursed." Do you see the pit as 
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it opens to swallow you up? Do you listen to the shrieks and the yells of those 
who have preceded you to that eternal lake of torment? 
 
Through hypotyposis the throng stands in a courtroom with God’s eye fixed on “you.” Of course, 
“you” is every person listening to Spurgeon’s sermon. They can easily “see” themselves among a 
large mass of people, perhaps much like the Surrey Gardens in which they were listening to 
Spurgeon’s sermon. Yet, despite the drove, God is eyeing them individually. God then reads 
their sins and declares their damnation. For a brief moment, Spurgeon breaks from the 
hypotyposis in which God is speaking to address the listeners personally. He expresses his own 
bewilderment at their damnation saying, “My hearer, I cannot bear to think of you in that 
position.” Then he returns to the hypotyposis, and continues with God’s judgment: “Do you see 
the pit as it opens to swallow you up? Do you listen to the shrieks and the yells of those who 
have preceded you to that eternal lake of torment?” By stating his hypotyposis in the form of two 
questions, Spurgeon is not willing to simply assume that his audience will “see” the images that 
he is creating with words; he invites his audience to go with him into the picture that he is 
painting with his words. In other words, through these questions, he encourages his audience to 
enter into the picture that he has created with hypotyposis. Those who acquiesce are then 
pastorally guided by Spurgeon himself to “see” the place to which the unbeliever will go and 
spend eternal life. 
As stated above, to compel his audience to “come in,” Spurgeon needed them to 
understand and feel what life is like for those who are “not in.” Through metaphor and 
hypotyposis the Prince of Preachers makes the unbeliever’s place in the world, the unbeliever’s 
death, and the Hell to which the unbeliever will go pictorially present in the mind’s eyes of the 
audience. By depicting life in the world, to death, to damnation and entrance into Hell, Spurgeon 
masterfully illustrates the situation of those who are outside of Christ. According to the theory of 
cynosure, this pictorial presence creates a sensory impression in the brain that results in a better 
chance to win attention than does prosaic language. Thus, attention captured, the audience is 
ready to hear about the work of Christ. 
 
“Seeing” Christ Dying for Unbelievers 
Having helped his audience to “see” their situation outside of Christ, Spurgeon then makes the 
solution—the death of Christ—pictorially present through hypotyposis. This occurs in two 
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movements. In the first movement, Spurgeon invites, “Will you just for a moment glance at this 
picture? . . . You see that man there on his knees in the garden of Gethsemane, sweating drops of 
blood?” In the second movement, Spurgeon asks, “You see this next: you see that miserable 
sufferer tied to a pillar and lashed with terrible scourges, till the shoulder bones are seen like 
white islands in the midst of a sea of blood?” Lastly, in the third movement, Spurgeon explains, 
“Again you see this third picture; it is the same man hanging on the cross with hands extended, 
and with feet nailed fast, dying, groaning, bleeding.” 
This use of vivid language may be the most compelling in the sermon. Rather than 
settling for phrases like, “Jesus died for sinners,” and “Christ suffered on a cross,” Spurgeon 
makes the doctrine of Christ’s substitutionary atonement “present” in their hearts by using 
hypotyposis. With present tense verbs and concrete nouns, Spurgeon transports his listeners from 
the garden of Gethsemane to the scourging post, until finally, they arrive at Golgotha. Spurgeon 
shines the spotlight on the horrors of Christ’s suffering and crucifixion so that what was present 
but dark in the hearts of the listeners, now stands out in bright detail. 
One particular aspect to Spurgeon’s sermon is unique in comparison to Edwards: he often 
asks his audience to “see” and to “listen.” Similar to his invitation in the last section for his 
audience to see the deathbed, pit, and coffin, here again Spurgeon summons his audience to not 
just cognitively listen to his sermon, but to enter into the pictures that he is painting. He asks 
them to “glance at this picture” and to “see the miserable sufferer” whose “shoulder bones are 
seen like white islands in the midst of a sea of blood.” Furthermore, at the end of this 
hypotyposis, Spurgeon invites not only “seeing” but “listening” to the picture that now speaks: 
“Methought the picture spoke and said, ‘It is finished.’” This conclusion functions to draw the 
audience more deeply into the picture of Christ’s death. Not only is Christ savagely executed but 
at the end of his life, just prior to death, his voice is heard, “It is finished.” Attention grasped and 
interest roused, Spurgeon transitions to his final image. 
 
“Seeing” the Knocking on a Door 
At its end, Spurgeon’s sermon invites sinners to convert. But how does one make the internal, 
spiritual, and mysterious process of regeneration vivid with mere words? Spurgeon again 
employs hypotyposis: 
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Did you ever notice in that chapter of the Revelation, where it says, “Behold I 
stand at the door and knock,” a few verses before, the same person is described, as 
he who hath the key of David. So that if knocking will not avail, he has the key 
and can and will come in. Now if the knocking of an earnest minister prevail not 
with you this morning, there remains still that secret opening of the heart by the 
Spirit, so that you shall be compelled. 
 
In this final hypotyposis, the Christ is no longer in agony, no longer bleeding, and no longer 
declaring, “It is finished.” Rather, the Christ is now risen. He is standing at a door and knocking. 
Furthermore, he holds the key of David so that if his knocking does not prevail, he can and will 
use the key to come in. Of course, the Christ does not force himself on any person. A person 
must willingly surrender in order to open the door of the heart to receive the Christ. Thus, the 
audience has a choice. They can remain outside of Christ and continue in the unbeliever’s 
predicament, which as a result of Spurgeon’s sermon is endowed with pictorial presence. Or, 
they can “see” the Christ suffering, “see” the Christ risen and knocking, and “see” their own 
hearts, opening like a door and welcoming in Christ. 
 
Summary 
This section has sought to identify and analyze how the Prince of Preacher’s sermon, “Compel 
Them to Come In,” wins attention. This sermon makes three didactic points to move Spurgeon’s 
audience toward conversion. However, as this section has shown, although the points are 
primarily prosaic, each is endowed with pictorial presence through metaphor and hypotyposis. 
Furthermore, Spurgeon urged his listeners “to glance at,” “to see,” and “to listen to” the pictures 
that he created through oration. This extra step encouraged his audience to more deeply engage 
and enter into the imagery that he made pictorially present. 
We can picture the crowd of twelve thousand sitting shoulder to shoulder in the Surrey 
Gardens Music Hall. Some have come looking for comfort and hope in the midst of their despair 
and uncertainty. Others are looking for Sabbath day entertainment, while others are desiring to 
simply hear the renowned orator, the prince of preachers. But as Spurgeon preached his sermon, 
something much more substantial took place for many. Many of the listeners came to “see” their 
predicament outside of Christ, many came to “see” the Christ who died for them, many came to 
“see” Christ knocking on the door of their hearts, and many came to “see” their hearts open to 
the Christ who enters. 
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Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” 
The rhetorical situation for King’s sermon helps to explain why “I Have a Dream” grasped the 
attention of his audience. On August 28, 1963, Martin Luther King Jr. stood on the steps of the 
Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC, and preached his sermon, “I Have a Dream” to thousands 
of civil rights supporters.390 The rhetorical situation for this sermon arose in the 1960s, during 
which a rising tide of civil rights agitation had been building. Many Americans were feeling 
racial tension and were questioning the nation’s Jim Crow laws and the second-class treatment of 
African Americans.391 Furthermore, a new generation entering adulthood and college was 
impassioned by a host of other social issues such as the anti-war movement and the women’s 
movement.392 Thus, the rhetorical situation King faced was deep social unrest. This was indeed 
an “imperfection marked by urgency,”393 and to do battle, like Gandhi thirty years before him, he 
did not enter the battlefield with sword and spear, but with words of inspiration, hope, and 
power. King’s contemporary, Malcom X, had done battle by ominously warning white people 
that they must either grant the “ballot” or they would receive the “bullet,” but King steadfastly 
refused to resort to physical force and violence. Instead, as was said of Churchill, “He mobilized 
the English language and sent it into battle.”394 
Into this rhetorical situation, in front of a quarter of a million people, arose the figure who 
had garnered international fame with his “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” After seven speakers 
interlaced by four musical performances, during the hottest part of the August day, and to a 
people scattered far away along the reflecting pools on the mall, King took the stage and spoke 
what is considered by many as the best oration of the twentieth century.395 Although King’s 
rhetorical situation cannot be repeated, the following sections analyze aspects of his sermon such 
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as its strong imagery and its eloquent vision to better understand the pictorial presence that this 
thesis lauds for winning attention.396 
 
Identifying and Analyzing Pictorial Presence in Three Images 
Similar to “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” and “Compel Them to Come In,” King’s 
sermon is a masterpiece that creates pictorial presence that wins attention. This is accomplished 
in three ways. First, metaphor functions to transfigure the demonstration from a civil rights 
demonstration at the Lincoln Memorial to a cash checking experience at a bank. Second, 
metaphorical clusters are employed to visually depict contrasting realities. Third, with language 
King transports his audience to a better, and pictorially present, tomorrow. 
 
Image of Cashing a Check 
King commences his sermon by stating that while the Emancipation Proclamation was signed 
nearly one hundred years ago, African Americans are still not free. That point was probably 
widely understood and believed by his audience, but effective persuasion needs more than this. It 
also needed to be made “present” to the listeners gathered on that muggy afternoon. To endow 
his point with pictorial presence, King depicts the African American’s dilemma with the image 
of cashing a check:397 
 
In a sense we’ve come to our nation’s capital to cash a check. When the architects 
of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the 
Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every 
American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men, yes, black men as 
well as white men, would be guaranteed the “unalienable Rights" of "Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness.” It is obvious today that America has defaulted on 
this promissory note, insofar as her citizens of color are concerned. Instead of 
honoring this sacred obligation, America has given the Negro people a bad check, 
a check which has come back marked “insufficient funds.” 
But we refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe 
that there are insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this nation. 
And so, we've come to cash this check, a check that will give us upon demand the 
riches of freedom and the security of justice. 
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The check-metaphor sets the civil rights movement in a context that can be “seen,” and through 
this context, King makes two points pictorially visible. The context is banking, which, when it 
relates to cashing a check, involves two parties. The first party is the African American. In 
King’s metaphor, the African American is represented by the payee who walks into the bank to 
cash his check. The second party is the United States of America. In King’s metaphor, the United 
States is represented by the bank that is responsible to cash the check. Thus, King casts the 
relationship between the United States of America and the rights of the African American in 
imagery that creates pictorial presence. His audience is easily able to “see” a person entering a 
bank with the expectation of cashing a check. 
Setting the civil rights movement within the metaphorical context of cashing a check 
validates the expectation that every American citizen should be granted civil rights. In the 1960s 
African Americans had experienced two hundred years of slavery, segregation, and inequality. 
However, upon hearing King’s metaphor, the African American at the demonstration, or 
listening to the radio, or watching on television is able to “see” their unalienable rights as when 
they entered a bank with reasonable and just expectations that their check be cashed. The 
Declaration of Independence states that citizens of the United States have unalienable rights, 
which include life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. King’s metaphor makes visible these 
unrealized rights in the life of African Americans. They “hold a check in their hand” and the 
“bank” is legally bound to cash it. This is skillful rhetoric. Everyone in King’s audience, black 
and white, agreed with the “rightness” that a check represented funds that the bank did not own, 
but simply stewarded. The listeners supplied meaning and agreement to the image. Thus, when 
the metaphor was transferred the actual point King was making, the black person “owned” the 
unalienable rights expressed in the Declaration of Independence, and the United States had a 
moral obligation to dispense justice. The country could not withhold it based simply on color of 
skin and cultural norms; the check must be cashed. 
Beyond merely affirming the African American’s expectations for equality, the check 
metaphor pictorially depicts government-citizen roles in the United States. King explains that the 
“bank of justice” and the “great vault of opportunity” are not bankrupt. They have faithfully 
“cashed the checks” of white Americans for generations. Therefore, on one hand, the role of the 
“bank” is one of responsible obligation. The United States must cash the African American’s 
check which promises them “the riches of freedom and the security of justice.” On the other 
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hand, the role of the “payee” is one of agitating and demanding. African Americans must take 
their checks, enter the bank, hand them over, leave with their money, and spend it freely. The 
result of African Americans and the United States fulfilling their “banking roles” is a “cashed 
check” that “pays out” the unalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness to every 
citizen. These propositional points are skillfully couched in images so that attention is fixed and 
agreement secured in an amalgamation of bank and payee. 
 
Images of Dichotomies 
Following the extended check cashing metaphor, King uses a cluster of metaphors. Leff explains 
that these metaphors are so diverse and densely packed that when examined in detail they tend to 
bewilder the critic rather than yield insight.398 However, I follow the lead of rhetoricians who 
propose a strategy for understanding the metaphors by looking at clusters.399 In the case of “I 
Have a Dream” the metaphorical concepts are expressed in the following clusters: dark/light, 
bound/free, down/up, and backward/forward. Osborn notes that the binary categories of the 
clusters function to simplify complex situations that facilitate choice.400 For example, when King 
exhorts, “Now is the time to rise from the dark and desolate valley of segregation to the sunlit 
path of racial justice” until “the bright day of justice emerges” he is describing reality in only 
two ways. One can either rise or stay put. The dichotomy leaves the audience with only two 
choices. Simultaneously, King’s dichotomous metaphors facilitate pictorial presence. Rather than 
simply evoking a cognitive decision, the dichotomous choices are pictorial contrasts. The options 
are not just conceptually dichotomous, but they are visually dichotomous. For example, the 
dark/light metaphors depict negative and positive images. Darkness brings to the mind’s eyes 
nighttime, difficulty in seeing, and even blindness, whereas light connotes daytime, sight, even 
the sensation of the sun’s warmth. In “I Have a Dream,” King associates segregation, 
discrimination, and injustice with darkness while likening freedom, equality, and justice to 
images related to light: “This momentous decree came as a great beacon light of hope to millions 
of Negro slaves who had been seared in the flames of withering injustice”; and, “It came as a 
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joyous daybreak to end the long night of their captivity.” Thus, King transfigures the 
“Emancipation Proclamation” from a dusty and abstract document into a beacon of light. With 
these metaphors, King endows his message about darkness and light with pictorial presence that 
wins attention. 
Another instance of dichotomous metaphors is the bound/free cluster depicting struggle. 
King states, “The negro is still sadly crippled by the manacles of segregation and the chains of 
discrimination”; and, “With this faith, we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our 
nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood.” These metaphors are densely packed. 
However, they are packed with imagery that the brain is able to “see” and “hear.” “Manacles,” 
“chains,” and “jangling” give shape in the mind to “segregation,” “discrimination,” and 
“discord.” In contrast to these binding metaphors, King paints the picture of “a beautiful 
symphony of brotherhood.” No longer grasping, clinking, and jangling, African Americans are 
set free to join with white Americans to create a harmonious symphony that performs a united 
composition. 
A final example of dichotomous metaphors is the down/up and backward/forward 
clusters depicting progress. King explains, “Now is the time to lift our nation from the quick 
sands of racial injustice to the solid rock of brotherhood”; and, “This sweltering summer of the 
Negro's legitimate discontent will not pass until there is an invigorating autumn of freedom and 
equality”; and, “With this faith, we will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of 
hope.” Through these metaphors the amorphous concept of “progress” is made pictorial. The 
next metaphor passes from “sweltering summer” to “invigorating autumn.” By associating the 
transition from discontent to equality with the changing of seasons, transition is endowed with 
the pictorial presence of an “invigorating autumn.” More so, the association made between 
equality and autumn functions to evoke a sense of refreshment. Standing at the Lincoln 
Memorial on a sultry summer day in August, the invitation to “see” leaves changing color and to 
“feel” the cool air was likely to have elicited a desire for the increase of civil liberties with the 
refreshment of autumn. In the next metaphor, the “mountain of despair” is hewn into “a stone of 
hope.” The spatial movement in this metaphor is the diminishment of size in which a “mountain” 
associated with “despair” is fashioned into a “stone” associated with “hope.” 
A final observation about these clustered metaphors is that King’s preference for 
contrasting metaphors functions to cast an elevated vision for a better tomorrow. For instance, 
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King’s dichotomous clusters often begin by depicting the present reality in pictorially tragic 
images: the dark and desolate valley of segregation; the quick sands of racial injustice; the 
sweltering summer of the Negro's legitimate discontent; the whirlwinds of revolt; the mountain 
of despair; the jangling discords of our nation. Then, he concludes each dichotomy by depicting 
a future reality in pictorially joyful images: the sunlit path of racial justice; the solid rock of 
brotherhood; an invigorating autumn of freedom and equality; the bright day of justice; a stone 
of hope; a beautiful symphony of brotherhood. Rhetorically, by beginning with the negative and 
ending with the positive, King’s pictorial future overwhelms the present. Thus, he “visually” 
eclipses the darkness with the light that promises to rise. Attention captured and set on a 
pictorially visible tomorrow that is much better than today, King proceeds to transport his 
audience to God’s country. 
 
Images of Transport 
Much of the language that King employs in his sermon functions to transport his audience. A 
rhetoric of transport uses the power of language to take a person out of the place where they are 
standing in order to set them down in a different place.401 This is true for the sections of the 
sermon analyzed above as the orator transports the demonstration from the Lincoln Memorial to 
an imaginative bank. However, the most stirring instance of the “rhetoric of transport” comes in 
the climax of the sermon where King states his famous words, “I have a dream,” eight times. 
Following the refrain, the sermon concludes with a second refrain in which King says “let 
freedom ring” eleven times. Chapter 2 explained that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca believe 
that repetition functions to accentuate an idea because it helps listeners to dwell on it.402 That is 
the case with King’s repetition. With purposeful redundancy and cadence, he insists that his 
listeners dwell on the world he imagines in his oration. 
A rhetoric of transport has antecedents in Greek and Roman rhetoric. In fact, chapter 2 
explained that Zanker believes “ecfrasis,” which appeals to the sense of sight, and “phantasia,” 
which refers to mental visualization, are rhetorical strategies that cause an idea to enter the 
mind’s eyes.403 More than simply bringing an idea before the mind’s eyes however, ecfrasis and 
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phantasia have the unique ability to transport listeners to the place that is vividly depicted.404 For 
example, in King’s dream, his listeners are transported to a “table of brotherhood” and to an 
“oasis of freedom and justice” and to a nation in which children are not “judged by the color of 
their skin but by the content of their character.” In this way ecfrasis and phantasia activate the 
human capacity for visualizing ideas, experiences, and attitudes that are not directly or literally 
within the experience of the audience.405 Thus, by appealing to the sense of sight through mental 
visualization, King imagines a better world and invites his audience to “see” it with him. Such 
utopia, visualized in the midst of the African American’s dystopia, stands out like seeing color 
television after years of watching it in black and white. King’s imagined world bursts forth and 
sparkles with attention-winning pictorial presence. 
Finally, in King’s last words in the sermon, he transports all of humanity to a new reality 
with his “free at last” refrain: “All of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and 
Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old 
Negro spiritual: Free at last! Free at last! Thank God Almighty, we are free at last!” With this 
peroration some in the crowd can be heard to declare “yes,” until, at the conclusion, many stand 
to applaud and to offer declarations of affirmation.406 By describing a future scene that he wants 
his audience to imagine, feel, believe in, and work toward, King concludes. His audience is left 
straddling two worlds: the one in which they physically stand and need to strive for equality, and 
the one which King has created in their mind’s eyes that deserves celebration. 
 
Summary 
According to the theory of cynosure, King’s sermon is likely to win attention because his 
language makes his ideas pictorially present. He does this by employing metaphor to transfigure 
the demonstration at the Lincoln Memorial into a bank at which the demonstrators cash a check 
of justice. By using metaphorical clusters, he imagines a pictorially tragic situation that gives 
way to a future endowed with hope. Finally, throughout his sermon, but especially at its 
conclusion he uses the refrains, “I have a dream,” “Let freedom ring,” and “free at last.” With 
ecfrasis and fantasia he activates the human capacity for visualizing a better tomorrow. The 
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sermon’s strong imagery and eloquent vision create pictorial presence that grasp attention and 
contribute to one of the best orations of the twentieth century. 
 
Fred Craddock’s “Doxology” 
In 1996, Baylor University named Fred Craddock as one of the twelve most effective preachers 
in the English-speaking world.407 The rhetorical situation for Craddock’s preaching helps to 
explain his ability to win attention. In 1971 Craddock published a book titled, As One Without 
Authority, which became foundational to influencing a movement in homiletics called the “New 
Homiletic.”408 This movement has roots in the hermeneutical work of Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst 
Fuchs who alleged that the separation between the theology of the pulpit and the people in the 
pews was a threat to preaching.409 Gibson explains that the New Homiletic has antecedents in the 
work of Bultmann who wrote even before Ebeling and Fuchs. Bultmann asserted that the risen 
Christ comes to listeners in the words of preaching.410 Thus, the New Homiletic is a turn away 
from the kerygmatic preaching of Barth who prioritized transmission, to focus on mediation, 
which is more concerned about preaching as “event” and “encounter.”411 
While Craddock’s work was certainly an attempt to modify these exigencies in the world 
of scholarship, his work was also grounded in pragmatic exigencies. As one who preached and 
who taught preaching, Craddock noticed that the authority of the pulpit was in the midst of a sea 
of change. The authority of the pulpit could no longer be assumed as might have been true in 
middle class America in the 1950s. Therefore, his book title rightly names his concern, “As One 
Without Authority.” The preacher was no longer granted the authority that was common in a past 
era, so he or she must come to the listeners as a storyteller and fellow-explorer on an inductive 
journey of discovery. In the beginning pages, Craddock explains his pragmatic worry: “It is the 
sober opinion of many concerned Christians, some who give the sermon and some who hear it, 
that preaching is an anachronism.”412 
Although a full discussion of the New Homiletic and its rhetorical situation is beyond the 
scope of this section, one of its key concerns accords with this thesis: How can the sermon win 
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the interest and keep the attention of the audience? At the conclusion of his book, Craddock 
offers an answer to this question with a sermon titled, “Doxology,” about which he writes, “In 
this sermon I have sought to implement suggestions in the preceding essays, especially those 
dealing with movement, imagery, concrete life situations, and listener identification and 
participation.”413 Although Craddock does not use the word “attention,” it is inherently 
associated with the New Homiletic. Earlier in his book, Craddock explains that an inductive 
form, embodied in concrete images, results in superior sustained attention.414 He writes, 
“Particular concrete experiences are ingredient to the sermon, not just in the introduction to 
solicit interest as some older theories held but throughout the sermon.”415 Craddock was a master 
at gaining and maintaining attention. The focus of the final case study of this chapter is on 
Craddock’s use of movement, imagery and concrete life situations that create attention-winning 
pictorial presence. 
 
Identifying and Analyzing Pictorial Presence in One Extended Image 
This section begins by summarizing “Doxology.” Unlike the other sermons used as case studies, 
this is necessary because of this sermon’s form, which is an extended first person hypotyposis 
that employs personification. Familiarizing oneself with the sermon in its entirety, therefore, is 
requisite prior to analysis because the whole helps to contextualize how the parts create pictorial 
presence. 
 
A Summary of the Sermon 
Craddock’s sermon, “Doxology,” is grounded in Romans 11:33–36. In this passage Paul breaks 
into doxology in the midst of a larger section filled with dense theology that is difficult to 
understand. Craddock therefore decides to make his homiletical point as follows: doxology 
belongs in the parts of life that are easy to appreciate and understand and in the parts of life that 
are difficult to appreciate and understand. To communicate this homiletical point, Craddock 
personifies Doxology who then accompanies him through the ups and downs of his life. 
The sermon commences with Craddock sitting alone, outside, on the patio in his back 
yard when an idea enters his mind. The idea is uplifting and interesting, so he declares, “I 
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claimed it for myself and exercised an owner’s prerogative by giving it a name. I named it, 
Doxology.” Then, throughout the sermon, Doxology joins Craddock as he goes about his life. 
For example, Doxology is with Craddock at his family supper table; the next day Doxology 
laughs with Craddock as they observe “a child losing a race with an ice cream cone;” Doxology 
participates with Craddock in studying “the face of a homeless man staring in a jewelry store;” 
Doxology engages in Craddock’s conversation with a banker, “standing with thumbs in vest 
before a large plate glass window.” However, at times, Craddock does not involve Doxology in 
his life. For example, when he goes to see Betty at St. Mary’s hospital, he leaves Doxology in the 
car. Then, after returning to the car, Doxology asks, “Should I have been there?” To which 
Craddock replies, “Yes, I’m sorry. I did not understand.” Doxology then joins Craddock in his 
summer vacation, but as he returns to teaching in the fall, he concludes, “We do not need 
Doxology when we are heavily engaged in theology.” But then, in the midst of that theology, 
Craddock is astounded to find Doxology in Paul’s letter to the Romans. However, he quickly 
forgets about Doxology when his class is interrupted with word that his brother has died. 
Stunned and hurting, Craddock drives through the night to see his sister-in-law. When he arrives 
at her house, she meets him outside of his car saying, “I hope you brought Doxology.” Craddock 
responds, “Doxology? No, I had not. I had not even thought of Doxology since the phone call. 
But the truth is now clear: If we ever lose our Doxology, we might as well be dead. For from 
him, and through him, and to him are all things. To him be glory forever. In the Name of the 
Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen.” 
Having summarized the sermon, I now turn to analysis. 
 
“Seeing” Doxology 
To communicate his homiletical point—doxology belongs in the parts of life that are easy to 
appreciate and understand and in the parts of life that are difficult to appreciate and understand—
Craddock implements personification throughout an extended first person hypotyposis. This 
accomplishes attention-winning pictorial presence in at least three ways. First, as previously 
explained, hypotyposis sets things before the eyes. To better appreciate this rhetoric, consider 
how different this sermon would be had Craddock simply said, “I find it easy to take Doxology 
with me into the good parts of my life, but I tend to leave Doxology out of the difficult parts of 
my life.” Even though such a sentence still personifies Doxology, it lacks the vivid portrayal of 
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circumstances that hypotyposis encourages. Certainly, a bland approach would communicate that 
Craddock struggled with his homiletical point, but it lacks the visceral world in which his point 
is experienced. Ryken’s observation about how “concretion” makes language visible is pertinent: 
“We have a strong impression of the physical reality in which the action occurs.”416 According to 
the theory of cynosure, impression that makes reality “physical” in the brain has a better chance 
to win attention than do other kinds of impressions that language can cause the brain. Thus, 
through concretion, Craddock’s scenes are made visible, and those scenes convey the world in 
which Craddock communicates his homiletical point. 
The pictorial presence that the hypotyposis creates is increased through Craddock’s use 
of the first person. This is a second way that he wins and maintains attention. By taking his 
audience on his personal journey with Doxology, he allows his listeners to join in his particular 
experience. They walk with him throughout his day. Furthermore, by presenting himself as a 
person who is learning, his audience is also able to learn vicariously without being the brunt of 
his sermonic point. This is induction at its finest. Wilson explains that a lot of pulpit time is not 
available to develop characters, and yet it is the development of characters that functions to make 
portraits more convincing and real.417 Craddock’s use of first person throughout an extended 
hypotyposis invites the listener to spend time with him, which assists in making his life and 
experience with Doxology more pictorially present because his audience is able to “see,” “hear,” 
and “feel” his journey with Doxology. Thus, the audience is not simply listening to words 
spoken, rather, they are along with Craddock, experiencing his reality, which is now theirs. 
A third way that Craddock wins attention is by bringing doxology to life with 
personification. As explained in the section on Edwards’ sermon, personification attributes 
human characteristics to something nonhuman and a primary rhetorical function of 
personification is to make an idea pictorially visible. Craddock could have chosen to speak about 
doxology literally as a liturgical formula of praise rather than personifying it as a person with 
whom he goes through. In other words, he could have said, “Doxology belongs in every 
circumstance.” This would communicate his homiletical point, but such prosaic language does 
not endow doxology with pictorial presence that wins attention. Thus, by taking the abstract and 
impersonal theological notion of doxology and endowing it with life, Craddock wins attention by 
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inviting his audience to “see” Doxology. As noted in chapter 2, the brain prefers to attend to 
impressions from sensation. Craddock’s use of personification provides that sensation. His 
audience can “see” Doxology sitting at the supper table and attending the errands. They can 
“feel” Doxology’s joy evoked by the child with the ice cream cone. They can “hear” Doxology 
conversing with Craddock at St. Mary’s hospital. By the end, Craddock’s audience may even be 
able to “see” Doxology included, not just in the good parts of their lives, but also at the hospital, 
and the theology class, and at the funeral of a sibling. 
 
Summary 
Craddock’s sermon is an exemplar of the creation of pictorial presence that wins attention. 
Through an extended hypotyposis, Craddock makes the world in which he learns and grows, 
“visible.” Through first person form, Craddock encourages his listeners to not simply identify 
with his experience, but to participate in his experience. Finally, through personification, 
Craddock transfigures the concept of doxology from a liturgical formula into a companion who 
belongs in all of life’s circumstances. 
 
Conclusion 
Through four case studies, this chapter has shown how preachers use pictorial language to gain 
and sustain attention, thus further illuminating the theoretical basis of this thesis. All four 
renowned preachers employ rhetorical devices that create pictorial presence that make sermonic 
ideas visible in the mind’s eyes. Furthermore, these case studies indicate that the creation of 
pictorial presence can be diverse. Pictorial presence can be packaged in a variety of structures 
and approaches. Edwards’ sermon is highly theological and doctrinal, yet imbued on every page 
with hypotyposis, metaphor, simile, anthropomorphism, and personification. Spurgeon is highly 
didactic, yet he uses key images at key moments through the use of hypotyposis, metaphor, and 
simile. King’s sermon, in contrast, does not use images to punctuate his didactic message, but 
rather uses an extended metaphor, followed by a series of metaphorical clusters, to depict civil 
rights “visually.” He then concludes with three refrains that transport his audience to a better 
tomorrow. Craddock’s creation of pictorial presence is unique. He personifies Doxology and 
then implements an extended first person hypotyposis throughout his sermon. 
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Although the approaches are diverse, two rhetorical devices are uniform. All four 
preachers use hypotyposis and metaphor. Not surprisingly, these are two devices lauded by the 
ancient rhetoricians for their ability to make ideas visible. As chapter 2 explained, metaphor and 
hypotyposis are especially potent figures of speech that create enargeia. About these figures 
Quintilian writes, “Metaphor has been invented for the purpose of exciting the mind, giving a 
character to things, and setting them before the eye,”418 and, “[Hypotyposis] sets things before 
the eyes, [so that] a thing is not simply mentioned as having been done, but is mentioned with a 
representation how it was done, not merely in a general way, but in all its attendant 
circumstances.”419 From the evidence of the four case studies, one might conclude that these two 
devices are the best devices for creating pictorial presence, but such a conclusion is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However, it does seem reasonable to conclude that these devices are favored 
by orators and preachers alike for endowing ideas with pictorial presence. Of course, many other 
rhetorical devices are able to create pictorial presence that wins attention. At times, Edwards uses 
anthropomorphism; Edwards and Spurgeon use simile; King uses	ecfrasis and fantasia to 
visualize a better tomorrow; and Craddock uses personification. Chapter 4 identified yet other 
rhetorical devices used in the Gospel of John to create pictorial presence: allusion and the 
interrelationship of didactic and action peaks. Thus, it appears that many rhetorical devices can 
be applied to the creation of pictorial presence, as long as they are purposefully employed to 
makes ideas visible, thereby winning attention. 
The next chapter continues on the path that chapters 4 and 5 paved. It subjects the theory 
laid out in chapters 2 and 3 to a primarily quantitative experiment that further validates this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 6 
Research Design, Methods, and Results 
 
Having laid out in chapters 1 through 3 a rhetorical and neuroscience grounding for the attention 
holding power of pictorial language, and having explored that theory in chapters 4 and 5, this 
chapter tests this thesis’ hypothesis with the Experience Sampling Method.420 The purpose of this 
chapter is to explain that method and why I chose it, describe how I adapted it to test the efficacy 
of pictorial presence to win attention, summarize the results, and provide conclusions based on 
the results.421 
 
The Experience Sampling Method 
To test this thesis’ hypothesis, I chose a research method called the “Experience Sampling 
Method.” The primary objective of this tool is to assess experience systematically by asking 
individuals to provide in-the-moment self-reports.422 These self-reports result in an archival file 
of experience that is then analyzed to discern patterns and themes. 
The Experience Sampling Method includes three components.423 First, a device emits a 
stimulus multiple times that signals the respondent to pause from their activity to report on their 
situation. Second, the respondent fills out an Experience-Sampling Form. The form usually 
includes two kinds of questions. One kind, asks about the subject’s location, social context, and 
activity to understand the respondent’s context. A second kind of question, to understand the 
respondent’s psychological state, includes a number of Likert scales measuring affect, activation, 
cognitive efficiency, and motivation.424 Finally, the data from multiple respondents is assessed to 
discern overall patterns and themes regarding that which is being investigated. 
An example of the Experience Sampling Method could be a researcher who wants to 
gauge what parts of a television show are most interesting to viewers. The participants would 
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watch an episode of the show and a signal would indicate when they are to pause the video. 
During the pause, they would answer a series of questions in a form about their psychological 
state. The goal is to discern the viewers’ moment-by-moment experience of the show. They 
might be highly interested in the first seconds of the show because it starts with a murder, but 
their attention might flag at minute six, because it is dominated by dialogue they find boring. 
After collecting the feedback from all of the participants, the researcher would then analyze it to 
discern patterns and themes to arrive at quantitative conclusions about what parts of a television 
show are most interesting to viewers. 
 
Justifying the Experience Sampling Method 
I chose the Experience Sampling Method for three reasons. First, the method has demonstrated 
reliable results. Ericsson and Simon explain that the data obtained from in-the-moment 
experience offers reliable information about cognitive processes.425 Mischel agrees and explains 
that in-the-moment studies have provided verifiable data.426 Beyond the efficacy of in-the-
moment research methods, the Experience Sampling Method is used by a wide array of scholars 
to study issues as diverse as gender differences, adolescent development, energy consumption 
and leisure, and perspectives on research policy options.427 
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In stating that the Experience Sampling Method is reliable, this is not to say that it is 
without shortcoming. In fact, one limitation of the method’s reliability is its dependence on 
respondents’ self-reports. However, this limitation is significant only when that which is being 
explored involves information that may prove harmful to the respondent. For example, if an 
employer used the Experience Sampling Method to study her employees’ private, sensitive, or 
illegal activities, it is likely that the accuracy of the self-reports would diminish because the 
information gathered could endanger the employees’ jobs. In contrast, when self-reports do not 
deal with studies that can harm the respondent, the Experience Sampling Method has been found 
to be a reliable source of data.428 Thus, in the case of my research, I asked no threatening 
questions. Rather, as I will explain below, I asked about their moment-by-moment experience of 
a sermon, gauging how it held their attention. 
I chose the Experience Sampling Method for a second reason: its unique ability to 
quantitatively test attention. That, of course, is the focus of this thesis and the Experience 
Sampling Method serves my purpose very well, yet studying the internal state of consciousness 
is not easy. Csikszentmihalyi explains the challenge of studying the psychological state of 
humans: 
 
The study of consciousness has lagged behind other fields of psychology. We 
know little about the structure of emotions and less about how other dimensions 
of our psychological state (e.g., concentration, involvement, motivation) ebb and 
flow in daily experience. ESM data allow examination of the magnitude, duration, 
and sequences of states. For example, one can examine whether concentration is 
typically associated with positive affect, how long it lasts, and what factors are 
related to its ending.429 
 
While assessing consciousness is difficult, it is not impossible, and the Experience Sampling 
Method is a useful tool for assessing attention. In fact, Hektner, Schmidt, and Csikszentmihalyi 
observe that a particular benefit of this method is its ability to examine fluctuations in the stream 
of consciousness and the links between external context and contents of the mind.430 I use the 
Experience Sampling Method for this very thing—testing the links between external context and 
contents of the mind. In my case, the “external context” is pictorial language delivered orally in a 
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429 Ibid. 
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the Quality of Everyday Life (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007), 6. 
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sermon, and the “contents of the mind” is attention. The Experience Sampling Method provides a 
tool to further substantiate, or to modify this thesis’ hypothesis that pictorial language wins 
attention. 
A final reason justifies my use of the Experience Sampling Method: its ability to 
investigate attention in-the-moment. This is helpful for a thesis exploring the immediate impact 
that pictorial language has on attention. Research suggests that people are not good at 
reconstructing their experience after the fact.431 For example, viewers watching television are 
often unable to recollect the intensity of their attention after the show is finished. They may 
remember a highlight or two, such as the opening murder scene, but the rest of the show tends to 
blend and blur in the mind. Furthermore, assessing attention after the television show is more 
likely to test memory than attention. Like listening to a sermon, watching a TV show occurs in 
time. It is a stream of experience that flows without pause and once it is over testing attention 
becomes more difficult. Furthermore, studies show that obtaining information about people’s 
experience as it occurs minimizes reliance on memory.432 Therefore, the Experience Sampling 
Method is a helpful tool for testing attention as it relates to pictorial language. 
 
Applying the Experience Sampling Method to This Thesis 
I applied the Experience Sampling Method to assess the attention of individuals as they listened 
to one of my own sermons.433 The sermon was titled “An Ode to Care,” and for the purposes of 
testing, it was broken-up into five parts. Each part employed either pictorial language or prosaic 
language. Part One utilized a highly visual poem, metaphors depicting God, and a reading from 
John 10:11–15, which was analyzed in chapter 4 and affirmed for its ability to win attention 
through the pictorial presence that it creates. Part Two utilized prosaic language to differentiate 
between Jesus and other hired hands. Part Three described images of the silly things that sheep 
do, and it utilized hypotyposis to describe sheep jumping off of a cliff. Part Four didactically 
defined the words “good” and “shepherd.” Part Five utilized a second, highly visual poem, and it 
employed simile and metaphor to depict the love of God. 
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To obtain self-reports from a representative sample of people, I tested fifty 
respondents.434 I obtained these respondents by emailing my church, posting on Facebook, and 
asking many acquaintances to take the test and to invite their acquaintances to take the test. The 
invitation explained that the participation would assist with my research in homiletics by taking a 
test on the internet to help me learn about their sermonic experience. Those who were willing to 
take the test were granted access to a Google Form that I used to create the test. In the Google 
Form, respondents began by providing demographic information.435 Then, the respondents 
listened to a portion of the sermon until it ended, at which time they filled out a Likert scale 
questionnaire and one open-ended question before proceeding to the next portion of the sermon. 
The questionnaire asked the same questions throughout the test.436 After fifty respondents took 
the test, I stopped accepting responses and I analyzed the information, which is found in the 
following section. 
Before continuing to the results, it is possible that my bias as the researcher affected the 
data collected. For example, the sermon that respondents listened to was a sermon that I read. 
Thus, knowing that Parts I, III, and V were to be more vibrant and Parts II and IV less so, my 
voice and sermonic pace could have subconsciously been delivered with more energy throughout 
Parts I, III, and V. To control this former variable, I read the sermon from a manuscript while 
attempting to maintain a similar pace for each part. To control this latter variable, I read the 
sermon early in the morning so that my voice was less dynamic, and I consciously attempted a 
monotone voice throughout. Besides my possible bias as a researcher, the testing includes at least 
two variables potentially operative in this experiment. The first variable is that the respondents 
listened to the sermon in various environments, which could have included, for example, a quiet 
office, a busy kitchen, or a loud coffee shop. Due to this, each respondent may have experienced 
a varying degree of distraction, depending on what else was happening within their sensory 
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range of sight, scent, and sound. The second variable is that, although each respondent was asked 
to take the entire test in one sitting, some respondents may have paused the test only to return to 
it later. Due to this, some respondents may have been in more attentive mindsets during some 
portions of the testing and in less attentive mindsets during other portions of the testing. 
Although these two variables would affect respondents’ results, the variation of distraction and 
the potentially intermittent and diverse breaks of respondents throughout the testing would not 
significantly skew the results. In fact, it is possible that these potential variables could increase 
the validity of this experiment’s results because the Experience Sampling Method is based on 
discernable patterns and themes. Thus, discernable patterns and themes, in the midst of various 
distraction and intermittent and diverse breaks, could in some cases, strengthen results.  
 
Results 
The following information provides the results from the test that I administered to better 
understand how language impacts attention. 
 
Demographics 
The test reveals that the respondents were diverse in gender, age, religious affiliation, and church 
engagement.437 Gender: 24 females and 26 males. Age: Spanning 30–77 years of age; the 
average age of respondents was 49.6. Religious affiliation: Baptist, Catholic, Foursquare, 
Lutheran, Episcopal, Presbyterian, Quaker, non-denominational, and non-religious. Non-
denominational respondents had the most involvement, at 12. Church attendance over the course 
of the last year: 33 respondents attended church weekly, 8 respondents attended church every 
other week, 2 respondents attended church monthly, 1 respondent attended church more than 6 
times a year, 1 respondent attended church less than six times a year, and 5 respondents did not 
attend church over the last year. 
 
Sermonic Experience 
To assist the readers of this thesis in appreciating the impact that language had on listener 
attention, the sermon text that respondents listened to is provided in the same five parts, followed 
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by a graph that depicts results.438 At the conclusion of the sermon, those results are further 
analyzed. 
 
An Ode to Care, Part One 
I’ll begin with a poem. It’s by the great Anne Sexton who had a terribly difficult life, an unhappy 
childhood, with possible abuse, a life-long struggle with depression, a tumultuous marriage. She 
writes about her divorce, in this poem: 
 
I have killed our lives together, 
axed off each head, 
with their poor blue eyes stuck in a beach ball 
rolling separately down the drive. 
 
I have killed all the good things, 
but they are too stubborn for me. 
 
They hang on. 
 
The little words of companionship 
have crawled into their graves, 
the thread of compassion, 
dear as a strawberry, 
the mingling of bodies 
that bore two daughters within us, 
the look of you dressing, 
early, 
all the separate clothes, neat and folded, 
you sitting on the edge of the bed 
polishing your shoes with boot black, 
and I loved you then, so wise from the shower, 
and I loved you many other times 
and I have been for months, 
trying to drown it, 
to push it under, 
to keep its great red tongue 
under like a fish, 
but whenever I look they are on fire, 
the bass, the bluefish, the wall-eyed flounder 
blazing among the kelp and seaweed 
like many suns battering up the waves 
and my love stays bitterly glowing, 
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spasms of it will not sleep, 
and I am helpless and thirsty and need shade 
but there is no one to cover me— 
  not even God. 
 
Sad. So, terribly, sad, isn’t it? It’s filled with a trembling ache brought on by a difficult life. And 
while this poem is specifically about divorce, I think its conclusion: 
 
 I am helpless and thirsty and need shade 
 but there is no one to cover me– 
  not even God, 
 
Is a universal experience. Mental illness. Abuse. A crushed dream. The end of a relationship. 
Sickness. A career path that crumbles to pieces. A wayward child: 
 
 I am helpless and thirsty and need shade 
 but there is no one to cover me– 
  not even God. 
 
To make matters worse, we have these notions about God: Too holy to come near my un-
holiness. Too demanding to be pleased by my messiness. God shrouded in a cloud, on a 
mountain. God behind a curtain, in a tabernacle. God far away, up in heaven. You see we have 
these images of God as rock, as lightning, as thunder, as warrior, as all-consuming fire. Oh, 
 
 I am helpless and thirsty and need shade 
 but there is no one to cover me– 
  not even God. 
 
Of course. How can it be any other way? I mean, the images that we have of God pervasively 
shape our understanding of God. And yet, there are other images. There are other stories and 
poems and metaphors, for divinity. Consider John chapter 10: 
 
I am the good shepherd. The good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep. The 
hired hand, who is not the shepherd and does not own the sheep, sees the wolf 
coming and leaves the sheep and runs away—and the wolf snatches them and 
scatters them. The hired hand runs away because a hired hand does not care for 
the sheep. I am the good shepherd. I know my own and my own know me, just as 
the Father knows me and I know the Father. And I lay down my life for the sheep. 
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Part One Results, Pictorial Language 
Part One utilized a highly visual poem, metaphors depicting God, and a reading from John 
10:11–15. The results: 
 
Figure 6. Complete Likert Scale Result for Sermon, Part 1 
 
An Ode to Care, Part Two 
There are a couple of interesting points being made here, in Jesus’ “I am the good shepherd” 
statement. The first is that he is differentiating between himself, and other people. According to 
Jesus, he is not like the “hired hands” in the world. Now, “hired hands,” in this context, can refer 
to any person who has responsibility to care for another person. So, this could be: A boss, or a 
politician, or a friend, or a spouse, or a therapist, or a physician, or a pastor, or a sibling, or a 
parent, who, even if they are above average in caring for us, also fail us from time to time. And 
of course, we’ve all experienced at one time or another, a person, who is supposed to care for us, 
disappoint us, hurt us deeply, break trust, and cause us pain and anguish and terrible sorrow. And 
this, especially at a young age, can inflict a wound deep in our soul, that teaches us to be strong, 
to not have needs, to not ask for help, to hide our tender places, and to overcompensate with 
strength. 
And Jesus is saying here: Those wounds. Those experiences. Those people who have not 
cared well for you in this life. They do not reflect me. They do not reflect me. This 
differentiation, between the hired hands and Jesus, has antecedents in Ezekiel chapter 34. In 
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Ezekiel 34, God is rebuking those who are supposed to care for others—the kings, the prophets, 
the priests—because, they are being unnecessarily harsh, and brutal. They are taking things that 
don’t belong to them and they are prioritizing themselves at the expense of everybody else. 
You see, Jesus is differentiating between himself, and the hired hands who are supposed 
to care for us, but don’t. Jesus is differentiating between himself, and the hired hands who have 
blown it big time without remorse or concern. Jesus is differentiating between himself, and the 
hired hands who have hurt us deeply, which, I think, at a very deep place inside of us, can make 
us feel afraid. Afraid of those who have power. Afraid of those who are in control. Afraid that 
we are alone and isolate and in danger and surrounded by trouble with no one to care for us, not 
even God. 
 
Part Two Results, Prosaic Language 
Part Two utilized prosaic language to differentiate between Jesus who is a good shepherd and 
other hired hands. The results: 
 
Figure 7. Complete Likert Scale Result for Sermon, Part Two 
 
 
An Ode to Care, Part Three 
And this brings me to my second point about Jesus’ “I am the good shepherd” statement: I love 
that Jesus frames this differentiation between those who fail to care for us, and Jesus who 
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promises to care for us, in terms of Shepherd and Sheep. 
Have you ever paused to think about sheep? They’re not known for being very smart, are 
they? For example: If sheep get knocked onto their backs it’s almost impossible for them to get 
up from that position. Did you know that sheep don’t like to get their feet wet? Because of this, 
sheep who are unable to reach pools of water without getting their feet wet have been known to 
dehydrate and even die. Here’s an interesting fact about sheep: If sheep sense danger, they tend 
to walk backwards and not always in a direction that leads them away from the danger. Sheep 
prefer to climb uphill more than downhill. And sheep have a strong instinct to follow a leader. 
When one sheep decides to go somewhere, the rest of the flock usually follow, even if it isn’t a 
good decision. Like, if the lead sheep jumps off of a cliff, the others are likely to follow. That’s 
true. The Associate Press, July 8, 2005, and I quote: 
 
Istanbul Turkey. First one sheep jumped. Then stunned Turkish shepherds, who 
had left the herd to graze while they had breakfast, watched as nearly 1500 others 
followed, each leaping off the same cliff. In the end 450 dead animals lay on top 
of one another in a billowy white pile. Those who jumped later were saved as the 
pile got higher and the fall more cushioned. 
 
End of quote. See what I mean? Getting knocked over and unable to get back up. Unable to drink 
water when it’s right there in front of them. Taking the difficult uphill path, even when 
unnecessary. Walking into danger. Following the wrong leader. It appears that sheep are: at best, 
unwise, and, at worst, just plain dumb. And yet, did you know that a group of behavioral 
scientists from Cambridge spent a few years studying and testing sheep, and have found them to 
have reasonable intelligence? It’s true. You may be wondering how that is possible. Well, 
explaining the seeming lack of intelligence that sheep have, lead scientist Keith Kendrick states: 
“Sheep are scared of just about everything. Any animal, including humans, once they are scared, 
they don’t tend to show signs of intelligent behavior.” 
This finding is fascinating to me. Because, it illuminates the possibility that, the unwise 
and illogical things that I do in life may have less to do with a lack of intelligence and more to do 
with fear. Like, maybe those moments in my life that “hired hands” have failed to tenderly and 
sacrificially care for me, maybe those moments have quietly, sneakily, and even unnoticeably 
penetrated my deepest parts with suspicion and overwhelming fear. I mean, let’s be honest about 
it. It is very often fear, not a lack of intelligence, that makes us do crazy things. 
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Like, hired hands knock us over enough times, and attempting to get back up begins to 
feel impossible. Like hired hands hurt us enough times, and the water we long for begins to look 
like poison. Like hired hands trick us enough times, and the difficult path becomes our normative 
life experience. Like hired hands wound us enough times, and the differences between the good 
shepherd and the hired hands begin to blur. And so, we sing: 
 
 I am helpless and thirsty and need shade 
 but there is no one to cover me– 
  not even God. 
 
Part Three Results, Pictorial Language 
Part Three described images of the silly things that sheep do, and it utilized hypotyposis to 
describe sheep jumping off of a cliff. The results: 
 
Figure 8. Complete Likert Scale Result for Sermon, Part Three 
 
An Ode to Care, Part Four 
What if God isn’t anything like a hired hand? What if God is better than our projections of those 
who have had power and control, but who have failed to care for us, and who have deeply hurt 
us? What if God is a good shepherd like John chapter 10 declares? Good Shepherd. Good. In 
English, “good” is an adjective that has six definitions: 
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Definition number 1: to be desired or approved of. For example, a good quality of 
life 
Definition number 2: having the qualities required for a particular role. For 
example, the schools here are good. 
Definition number 3: possessing or displaying moral virtue. For example, I’ve 
met many good people who made me feel ashamed of my own shortcomings 
Definition number 4: giving pleasure; enjoyable or satisfying. For example, the 
streets fill up with people looking for a good time. 
Definition number 5: valid. For example, the ticket is good for travel from May to 
September. 
Definition number 6: used in conjunction with the name of God or a related 
expression as an exclamation of extreme surprise or anger. For example, good 
heavens! 
 
In the Greek, the word good is kaloß, which is usually translated as beautiful or good. 
This word, in this particular form, is only used five times in the NT: 1 Timothy 1:8 We know 
that the law is good if one uses it properly; 1 Timothy 4:6 If you point these things out to the 
brothers, you will be a good minister of Christ Jesus, brought up in the truths of the faith; 2 
Timothy 2:3 Endure hardship with us like a good soldier of Christ Jesus. And then of course, it’s 
used in John chapter 10. It’s used in this chapter, twice: John 10:11 I am the good shepherd. 
10:14 I am the good shepherd; I know my sheep and my sheep know me. So that’s the adjective 
“good” that describes the noun, “shepherd.” 
In English, the noun “shepherd” can refer to a person who tends and rears sheep. It can 
refer to a member of the clergy who provides spiritual care and guidance for a congregation. Or, 
it can also be short for German shepherd. Not that that matters, but it’s a little interesting. 
In the Greek, the word “shepherd” is poimhn. This word, in this particular form, is used 
even less than kaloß. It’s used only three times in the New Testament: Once in Matthew chapter 
25:32 when Jesus tells about the sheep and goats, in which the shepherd separates the sheep from 
the goats. And then, it’s used twice in John chapter 10. Verse 11, I am the good shepherd. And 
again, in verse 14, I am the good shepherd; I know my sheep and my sheep know me. 
And so, the Bible tells us that God, revealed in Jesus, is not simply good, nor simply a 
shepherd. Rather, God as revealed in Jesus is a shepherd who is good. God, as revealed in Jesus 
is a good shepherd. 
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Part Four Results, Prosaic Language 
Part Four didactically defined the words “good” and “shepherd.” The results: 
 
Figure 9. Complete Likert Scale Result for Sermon, Part Four 
 
An Ode to Care, Part Five 
But there are other ways, besides delineating words, to try and comprehend a good shepherd. 
Other poems, other songs, other images of divinity’s shepherding care, that give us courage to 
get out of bed, to try again, to trust that it isn’t all bad, to hope for something better, to believe 
that, at the heart of it all, is a compassionate, tender, and ever-present shepherd, who cares. In a 
dazzling poem titled, “Courage,” Anne Sexton writes these words in her first two stanzas: 
 
It is in the small things we see it. 
The child’s first step, 
as awesome as an earthquake. 
The first time you rode a bike, 
wallowing up the sidewalk. 
The first spanking when your heart 
went on a journey all alone. 
When they called you crybaby 
or poor or fatty or crazy 
and made you into an alien, 
you drank their acid 
and concealed it. 
 
Later, 
	 145 
if you faced the death of bombs and bullets 
you did not do it with a banner, 
you did it with only a hat to 
cover your heart. 
You did not fondle the weakness inside you 
though it was there. 
Your courage was a small coal 
that you kept swallowing. 
If your buddy saved you 
and died himself in so doing, 
then his courage was not courage, 
it was love; love as simple as shaving soap. 
 
Love as simple as shaving soap. I love that image so much. You see, sometimes in our anguish, I 
think what we long for is a rock, lightning, thunder, a warrior and consuming fire to come down 
to earth and cleanse the world of every person who has caused us pain. But instead, we are given 
a good shepherd. And who knows, perhaps those hired hands, who have hurt us most deeply, 
have had hired hands who have hurt them in their most tender places. I really don’t know. But 
what if Sexton is right? What if love—for our purposes, let’s call it capital L, Love—what if 
divine love is as simple as shaving soap? Simple and warm and soft and lathered all over our 
faces—present to us, in us, and wonderfully upon us? Not only when the day is bathed in light 
but also, when the day is a valley filled with shadows of death? 
 
Part Five Results, Pictorial Language 
Part Five utilized a second, highly visual poem, and it employed simile and metaphor to depict 
the love of God. The results: 
 
	 146 
 
Figure 10. Complete Likert Scale Result for Sermon, Part Five 
 
Analyzing Results 
Quantitative analysis of the data indicates that pictorial language is better at grasping listener 
attention than prosaic language.439 According to the data, an average of 27 out of the 50 
respondents “strongly agree” that the pictorial sections of the sermon facilitated concentration, 
engagement, attention, and images to “see” in the mind’s eyes. In contrast, only an average of 9 
out of the 50 respondents “strongly agree” that the prosaic sections of the sermon facilitated 
concentration, engagement, attention, and images to “see” in the mind’s eyes. By combining the 
choices “strongly agree” and “agree,” an average of 44 out of the 50 respondents answered that 
the pictorial sections of the sermon facilitated concentration, engagement, attention, and the 
ability to “see” images in the mind’s eyes. In contrast, by combining the choices “strongly agree” 
and “agree,” only an average of 29 out of the 50 respondents answered that the prosaic sections 
of the sermon facilitated concentration, engagement, attention, and images to “see” in the mind’s 
eyes. Considering the data differently, only an average of 6 out of the 50 respondents answered 
“neutral,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree” when asked if the pictorial section facilitated 
concentration, engagement, attention, and images to “see” in the mind’s eyes. In contrast, an 
average of 21 out of the 50 respondents answered “neutral,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree” 
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when asked if the prosaic sections facilitated concentration, engagement, attention, and images to 
“see” in the mind’s eyes. 
Quantitative analysis of the open-ended question indicates a correlation between images 
created by pictorial language and listener concentration, engagement, and attention.440 In the 
pictorial sections of the sermon (Parts I, III, and V), an average of 32 out of the 50 respondents 
“strongly agree” that the language facilitated images that could be seen in the mind’s eyes. In 
turn, in the same pictorial sections of the sermon (Parts I, III, and V), an average of 25 out of the 
50 respondents “strongly agree” that the language facilitated concentration, engagement, and 
attention. In contrast, in the prosaic sections of the sermon (Parts II and IV), only an average of 8 
out of the 50 respondents “strongly agree” that the language facilitated images that could be seen 
in the mind’s eyes. In turn, in the same pictorial sections of the sermon (Parts II and IV), an 
average of 9 out of the 50 respondents “strongly agree” that the language facilitated 
concentration, engagement, and attention. The difference in respondents who “strongly agree” 
that pictorial language evokes imagery is an average of 32 out 50 and respondents who “strongly 
agree” that prosaic language evokes imagery is an average of 8 out of 50. The difference in 
respondents who “strongly agree” that pictorial language facilitated concentration, engagement, 
and attention is an average of 25 out of 50 whereas respondents who “strongly agree” that 
prosaic language facilitated concentration, engagement, and attention is an average of 9 out of 
50.  
Qualitative analysis of the open-ended question indicates a similar correlation between 
images created by pictorial language and listener concentration, engagement, and attention. 
Excluding repeated imagery that multiple respondents listed, the pictorial sections (Parts I, III, 
and V) reflect an abundance of images that stood out to the respondents. In Part I, which referred 
to Anne Sexton’s poem on divorce, thirty-one words or clauses were written down. These words 
and clauses ranged from words as simple as “rock” and “lightning” to clauses such as “dressing 
in the morning” and “blue eyes stuck in a ball rolling down the drive.” Similarly, in Part III, 
which included a story about sheep jumping off of a cliff as the shepherds lazily ate their meal, 
fourteen words or clauses were written down. The active clauses were especially salient to the 
respondents: “walking backwards,” “follow leader off of cliffs,” “sheep jumping,” “the sheep 
																																																						
440 See appendix L for complete open-ended question results; see appendix M for full analysis of the open-ended 
question results. 
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following one another off a cliff,” “sheep lying on its back,” “shepherds having breakfast,” and 
“sheep with their legs in the air.” Finally, in Part V, which referred to Anne Sexton’s poem titled, 
Courage, twenty words or clauses were written down. Similar to Part I, these words and clauses 
ranged from words as simple as “creamy” and “foaming” to clauses such as “love as lather all 
over our faces” and “courage like coal you kept swallowing.” 
In stark contrast to the pictorial sections of the sermon, qualitative analysis of the open-
ended question indicates very little correlation between images created by prosaic language and 
listener concentration, engagement, and attention. Excluding repeated imagery that multiple 
respondents listed, the prosaic sections (Parts II, IV) reflect the absence of images that stood out 
to the respondents. In Part II, which explained the difference between “the good shepherd” and 
“the hired hands,” four respondents listed familial or occupational nouns that could infer 
imagery: sibling, politician, therapist, and teacher. In Part IV, which defined the words “good” 
and “shepherd,” the respondents did not list any images that stood out to them. In both Part II 
and Part IV, that which stood out to the respondents were ideas and feelings. For example, one 
respondent explained, “Jesus differentiating himself from hired hands who don’t care for us well. 
Feeling hurt and all alone.” Another respondent answered, “Jesus as shepherd contrasted with 
those who are poor caregivers.” Another respondent answered, “There are many definitions for 
good. I didn’t catch the whole definition of the word ‘good’ in this biblical phrase, but part of the 
definition was beauty.”  
Combining quantitative and qualitative analysis of the results reveals that prosaic 
language is able to cause feelings and to achieve ideas in the respondents but that it is less 
efficacious than pictorial language at creating images. Furthermore, such prosaic language, 
which fosters feelings and ideas but not images is less able to evoke listener concentration, 
engagement, and attention than pictorial language. 
While my testing did not use equipment such as a fMRI or EEG device to monitor brain 
activity, as was explained earlier in this chapter, the Experience Sampling Method is reliable and 
unique in its ability to quantitatively and qualitatively test attention by procuring in the moment 
responses to language. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the analysis of the experiment’s 
results supports the theory of cynosure. Quantitative and minor qualitative analysis of the data 
indicates that pictorial language is better at grasping listener attention than prosaic language.441 
																																																						
441 See appendix K for a full analysis of the Likert scale results. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis began in chapter 1, which concluded that contemporary homiletics lauds the use of 
pictorial language to grasp attention but lacks theory to explain why such language grasps 
attention. Chapter 2 provided a theoretical grounding from rhetoric, which concluded with the 
theory of presence. The theory of presence explains that words and ideas can cause the brain to 
have a sensory impression thereby winning the brain’s attention. Chapter 3 assessed the theory of 
presence in light of what neuroscience explains about attention and concluded that words can 
cause an impression from sensation in the brain if the words create images in the mind’s eyes. 
This conclusion resulted in the proposal of a theory titled “cynosure,” which is: language that 
generates pictorial presence has a higher probability of winning the ongoing competition for the 
brain’s attention than other kinds of language do because pictorial presence impacts the brain as 
a sensory impression. However, at this point in the thesis the theory of cynosure, though 
grounded in rhetorical and neuroscience theory, was still theoretical. That theory was further 
supported through the identification of pictorial language in the Bible (chapter 4) and in sermons 
(chapter 5). And yet, even at this point in the thesis the theory of cynosure, though further 
supported by Christian rhetoric, was still theoretical. 
 The findings of chapter 6 make the theory of cynosure less theoretical and more actual. 
This is good news for preachers who know the difficulty of holding attention. The findings of 
this chapter also serve as an exhortation to preachers to think and communicate ideas in images, 
not just propositions. In the next and final chapter of this thesis I discuss implications like these 
for the theory of cynosure.   
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
This thesis sought to contribute to the field of homiletics by proposing theoretical grounding that 
explains why pictorial language grasps attention. Chapter One contextualized the issue of 
attention in the fields of rhetoric and homiletics and then narrowed its focus to this thesis’ unique 
interest. Chapter Two explored a rhetorical-theoretical basis for pictorial language by tracing a 
rhetorical theory called “enargeia.” Spanning Greek rhetoric from 400 BCE to modern rhetoric 
in the twentieth century, this chapter identified enargeia as a rhetoric of presence and display, 
and followed it through its evolution and use in oration, which culminates in Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of presence. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, presence is 
the displaying of certain elements on which the speaker wishes to center attention in order that 
they may occupy the foreground of the hearer’s consciousness. Chapter Three explored a 
neuroscience-theoretical basis for pictorial language by assessing Chapter Two’s conclusion in 
light of what neuroscience contributes to theory on attention. This chapter concluded by 
validating and constraining a rhetoric of presence. According to neuroscience’s theory on 
attention, presence is capable of creating a sensory impression in the brain, if the presence is 
pictorial. This conclusion resulted in this thesis’ original contribution, which is the theory of 
cynosure. Cynosure explains: language that generates pictorial presence has a higher probability 
of winning the ongoing competition for the brain’s attention than abstract language because 
pictorial presence impacts the brain as a sensory impression. Chapters Four and Five identified 
and analyzed strategies for pictorial presence in Christian rhetoric. Chapter Four provided a 
literary analysis of pictorial presence in the gospel of John. Chapter Five provided sermonic 
analysis of four sermons affirmed for their ability to win attention. These chapters supported the 
theory of cynosure as an efficacious means to attention, and they also began to illuminate 
possible methodology for achieving attention in homiletics. Chapter Six explained the research 
design and methods used to test the theory of cynosure. Quantitative analysis of the data 
confirmed that language that creates pictorial presence is better at grasping listener attention than 
other kinds of language that do not create pictorial presence. 
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Learning from the Study 
The central issue that I examine in this thesis is: does pictorial language win attention better than 
prosaic language, and if so, why? The examination is aided by three questions: (1) What theories 
explain how language, aurally received, wins attention? (2) How does Christian rhetoric—
biblical and sermonic—coalesce with and contribute to theory on attention? (3) Based on a 
theoretical grounding for pictorial language, what strategies for attention can be elucidated for 
the field of homiletics? 
 
Theory that Explains How Language, Aurally Received, Wins Attention 
The first question that aided this thesis’ examination is: What theories explain how language, 
aurally received, wins attention? The theory of cynosure explains that the opportunity to win the 
ongoing competition for the brain’s attention increases if language is made to be pictorially 
present in the mind’s eyes. Two academic fields contribute to the theory of cynosure and the first 
is rhetoric. Beginning with Aristotle this thesis observed the admonition to bring an idea “before 
the eyes” of the listener. Next, this thesis identified the beginning of a theory of presence and 
display called “enargeia.” Then this thesis followed Roman rhetoricians who developed 
enargeia as evidentia by providing a three-stage process for bringing ideas “before the eyes.” At 
this point in the development of enargeia, it was observed that strategy was strong but theory 
was weak in the field of rhetoric. Thus, this thesis identified George Campbell who contributed 
to enargeia/evidentia by applying Enlightenment theory on the human mind to explain that an 
idea creates a sensory impression in the mind if it is imbued with enough energy, which he called 
“vivacity.” Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca deepened Campbell’s theory of vivacity by 
explaining that “presence,” which is the aim of vivacity, must display language in certain ways 
so that it occupies the foreground of the hearer’s consciousness. This advancement is the 
culmination of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca theory of presence that began as “enargeia.”  
 The second field that contributed to the theory of cynosure is neuroscience. According to 
neuroscience’s theory on attention, stimuli that win the biased competition in the brain achieve 
attention, and pictorial language provides such stimuli. Also, as discovered by neuroscience, the 
brain is biased toward seeing, whether that seeing is imaginative—created in the brain by 
discourse—or actual—seeing through the eyes. Both forms of depictive representations are 
fundamental to the way the brain processes information. This finding necessarily limited the 
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theory of presence proposed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. While they posited, along with 
Campbell, that bright, lively, energetic ideas win attention by causing an impression from 
sensation in the brain, neuroscience constrains that conclusion. According to neuroscience, ideas 
that enter the brain as images can impact the brain as if it is an impression from sensation. This 
conclusion resulted in this thesis’ theory of cynosure. According to the theory of cynosure, 
opportunity to win the ongoing competition for the brain’s attention increases if language is 
made to be pictorially present in the mind’s eyes. This theory explains why pictorial language is 
an efficacious means to win attention. It also provides a grounding for attentional strategies in 
homiletics. I will explore some of those strategies below, but before doing so I address this 
thesis’ findings on the use of pictorial language in Christian rhetoric. 
 
Christian Rhetoric Coalesces with Theory on Attention 
The second question that aided this thesis’ examination is: How does Christian rhetoric––biblical 
and sermonic––coalesce with and contribute to theory on attention? Both the Bible and 
renowned Christian preachers use language to create pictorial presence, which according to the 
theory of cynosure, wins attention. Beginning with the Bible, this thesis identified the evangelist 
in the gospel of John as using language to make some of his ideas pictorially present. He uses 
allusion and illustration to endow two signs with pictorial presence. This imagery helps to grasp 
attention that he then transfers onto two discourses. The evangelist also employs metaphor in 
five of Jesus’ “I am” statements, which increases their presence pictorially. Finally, this thesis 
observed that the evangelist using allusion again, but this time to show the “word” dwelling 
among us, thereby grasping attention and centering it on the forthcoming words and deeds of 
Jesus.  
 Proceeding from the Bible to a second form of Christian rhetoric––sermons––this thesis 
identified and analyzed four sermons given by four renowned preachers. It was observed that all 
four preachers employ rhetoric that creates pictorial presence. Edwards’ sermon is highly 
theological and doctrinal, yet imbued on every page with hypotyposis, metaphor, simile, 
anthropomorphism, and personification. Spurgeon is highly didactic, and his sermon does not 
have the density of imagery that Edwards uses, yet he uses key images at key moments in the 
sermon through the use of hypotyposis, metaphor, and simile. King’s sermon, in contrast, does 
not use images simply to punctuate his didactic message, but instead uses an extended metaphor, 
	 153 
followed by a series of metaphorical clusters, followed by three refrains to transport his audience 
to a more just future. Craddock’s creation of pictorial presence is unique. He personifies 
Doxology and then implements an extended first-person hypotyposis to encourage his audience 
to “see” his journey with and conclusion about Doxology.  
Not only does Christian rhetoric coalesce with the theory of cynosure, but it suggests 
strategies for creating pictorial presence that can be applied to sermons today. That is the focus 
of the next section.  
 
Theoretically Grounded Strategies for the Theory of Cynosure  
The third question that aided this thesis’ examination is: Based on a theoretical grounding for 
pictorial language, what strategies for attention can be elucidated for the field of homiletics? The 
following section briefly explains and then provides examples of strategies that, according to the 
theory of cynosure, can and should be used in sermons to win attention. The examples that I 
chose to explain and demonstrate are not exhaustive. They are however strategies that this thesis 
identified and analyzed in Christian rhetoric for creating the kind of pictorial presence that 
increases the chance of winning attention. 
 
Allusion 
Allusion refers to common cultural heritage as an implicit reference. The implicit reference, for 
example, could be to another work of literature or art, to a person, or an event. Allusion has the 
ability to create a shared experience between speaker and listener. However, simply because an 
experience is shared, it can still fall short of riveting attention with pictorial presence. Thus, 
according to the theory of cynosure, if allusion is to make language pictorially present, it must 
allude to a thing that is particularly “visible,” which the listener can transfer onto that which is 
being said. For example, a preacher speaking to a group of Baby Boomers and desiring to 
express the horror felt by those who witness tragedy could allude to the space shuttle Challenger 
tragedy. According to the theory of cynosure this allusion would endow the horror felt by those 
who witness tragedy with pictorial presence. The audience would be able to “see” the image of a 
winding contrail and fiery orange explosion in their mind’s eyes. 
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Simile 
Simile is capable of creating pictorial presence because it uses the words “like” or “as” to 
compare one thing to another. When simile likens an abstract word or idea to a word or idea that 
can be “seen” in the mind’s eyes, simile endows language with pictorial presence. For example, a 
preacher could say in their sermon on the fruit of the Spirit that “self-control is like a teenage boy 
counting to ten rather than speaking rashly.” To help ensure that the simile becomes an image in 
the mind, the preacher could expand: “He knits his brow, he stands fast with hands clasped at his 
sides as he slowly counts one, two, three in a quavering voice.” 
 
Anthropomorphism 
Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human characteristics and qualities to god, animal, or 
object.442 Thus, when anthropomorphism is used to apply images of human features to non-
human entities, they are enlivened with pictorial presence. For example, a preacher desiring to 
vivify the jar belonging to the widow at Zarephath could describe the jar as “benevolent hands 
that daily distributed food to the hungry.” This brief application of anthropomorphism 
accomplishes pictorial presence, and could easily be expanded for even more potent language by 
endowing the jar with human characteristics, and according to cynosure, this increases attention. 
 
Personification 
Personification, a derivative of the Greek word prosopopoeia, is the result of combining 
prosopon, which means “face” or “person,” and poiein, which means “to make.” Thus, 
personification literally refers to a figure of speech that gives something that is inanimate or non-
human the face of humanity. A preacher who is inclined to increase the presence of a theological 
idea such as wisdom, following the lead that Proverbs provides, could personify wisdom as a 
woman who calls out to the young men exhorting them to abandon their foolishness. 
Furthermore, the preacher might show her exhorting and warning the foolish youths. Such use of 
personification makes the abstract concept of wisdom pictorially present. 
 
 
																																																						
442 Ibid., PEDIAA, Difference Between Personification and Anthropomorphism. Accessed January 2017.	
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Metaphor  
Metaphor is an especially potent figure that makes ideas pictorially present. It does so by 
applying a word, phrase, or idea to an object or action. For example, a preacher disposed to 
enlivening the regular practice of tithing could refer to consistent giving as the sun that faithfully 
rises every morning to disperse the world’s darkness. Through metaphor faithful tithing is 
transfigured into an image, which according to cynosure, increases the possibility of grasping 
attention.  
 
Hypotyposis 
Hypotyposis is lauded by the classical rhetoricians for its ability to create “ocular 
demonstration.” In other words, hypotyposis describes events in lucid detail, which results in 
pictorial presence. Continuing with the example from Proverbs that personifies wisdom as a 
woman, hypotyposis is demonstrated in Proverbs chapter 9. In this chapter wisdom has built her 
house, hewn out seven pillars, prepared meat and mixed wine, and set her table. She then calls 
from the highest point of the city, “Let all who are simple come, eat my food and drink the wine 
I have mixed, leave your simple ways and live.” Through hypotyposis, wisdom becomes 
something so much more than a quality. Wisdom is now living, moving, and calling out in vivid 
details that can be seen in the mind’s eyes. Just as Proverbs chapter 9 uses hypotyposis, so can 
preachers. 
 
Transport 
This thesis observed King employing transport to move his audience from racism in the United 
States of America in 1963 to a better tomorrow in which equality reigns. He accomplished this 
with two refrains––“I have a dream” and “free at last”––that were followed by images of racial 
equality. A strategy of transport is used by many others. For example, Isaiah employs transport at 
the end of his book to help his audience “see” future restoration. John utilizes transport 
throughout his apocalypse to assist his audience in “seeing” that which is going on that cannot be 
realized by the naked eye. In fact, the genre of apocalypse might almost be said to “specialize” in 
the rhetoric of transport. Readers in distress hear a hopeful, vivid word about coming 
deliverance, restoration, vindication, and joy, are swept-up into a different world.  
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The theory of cynosure encourages the use of transport to take people out of the place 
where they are standing in order to set them down in a different place. Consider the use of 
transport in a sermon on Ephesians 4:1-6. The point of the sermon is: every effort must be made 
to reflect our unity in the Lord. After expositing in prosaic language on the text’s movements and 
overall idea, the sermon reaches its conclusion, which intends to transport the audience:443 
  
Imagine a table at which love reigns. The meal is over, but everyone is still sitting at the 
table. Platters emptied, plates stacked, smeared napkins happily rest on laps. The 
contented guests have pushed back from the table with arms stretched wide and legs 
extended outward. There’s a hush in the room. A warm, soft glow dances on the ceiling 
from the well-melted candles.   
 
Four women and two men quietly look at each other with nothing much to say. What is 
left to say? They’ve spent the last forty years together attending each other’s weddings 
and visiting the hospital when babies were born. They’ve gone on trips together and 
raised kids together. They’ve cried together and fought together, sworn to never talk 
again only to make up. They’ve shared in each other’s sicknesses and sorrows. They’ve 
lived their lives, together.  
 
And that’s when Nancy began to giggle. Of course, laughter can be contagious and on 
this night, it was. Nancy first, and then Phillip, and before long, all of them. And I don’t 
think they could tell you what they were laughing at if they tried. It was just free and full 
laughter without rhyme or reason. And that’s a very good kind of laughter to share in 
together.  
 
Together. Life together. Humility together. Gentleness, patience, and love, together. Like 
our triune Lord, like one body and one spirit. Like one hope, which is, all of us around 
this Common Table, reflecting, living, experiencing, and basking in the union that is ours, 
in the Lord. Beloved church, let us live together, cry together, fight and reconcile 
together, and laugh with delight because of life together. 
  
Through the use of transport an audience is moved to “see” a different world and that “seeing” 
can serve to encourage, exhort, rebuke, and fulfill many homiletical functions. The rhetorical 
purposes can be many, but according to the theory of cynosure, the result is similar: transport 
makes another reality pictorially present, thereby encouraging attention. 
 
 
 
																																																						
443 This example is out of proportion to the other examples, but necessarily so. Transport takes time to develop. 
Listeners are not easily lifted out of one world and set into another.  
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Summary 
These brief explanations and examples for the use of rhetorical figures and strategies that 
accomplish attention-winning pictorial presence are only a genesis. This thesis’ primary focus 
has been the establishing of theoretical grounding to explain why pictorial language grasps 
attention. With that grounding in place, the field of homiletics is better prepared to consider, 
critique, and create many strategies for pictorial presence. 
 
Methodological Critique 
The methodology employed in this thesis––the theoretical work of explaining why pictorial 
presence wins attention and the analytical work of identifying and testing the efficacy of pictorial 
presence to win attention––served its purpose. The examination of pictorial presence in Christian 
oration and the quantitative testing of its effectiveness showed that there is a substantial 
connection between pictorial presence and listener attention.  
 Having said that, at least three methodological questions are worth noting. First, would 
the theoretical grounding be more robust had this thesis explored academic fields beyond 
rhetoric, homiletics, and neuroscience? Likely, yes. An in-depth consideration of the 
contributions that philosophy and linguistics provide to theory on attention would probably add 
depth to the theory of cynosure. However, the theoretical exploration of attention, in relation to 
this thesis, must be necessarily limited. Furthermore, the theoretical work provided by Campbell 
and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do draw from philosophers such as Hume and Bacon, and 
this demonstrates a certain amount of alignment among these academic fields regarding the 
effects that language has on attention.  
 A second methodological question is: would empirically testing attention in the brain 
better substantiate the theory of cynosure? Again, my answer is: likely, yes. However, a thesis in 
the hard sciences would demand the use of a fMRI or EEG device, and that was not necessary 
for my research. Additionally, the cost of renting such equipment is exorbitant and the expertise 
needed to safely set up a test, execute the test, and then assess the outcomes is highly specialized. 
Lastly, while empirical testing may scientifically support the theory of cynosure, as Chapter Six 
explained, the Experience Sampling Method is proven to provide reliable results when 
examining external impact on internal stream of consciousness. The Experience Sampling 
Method, therefore, is a reasonable and appropriate approach to test this thesis’ theory.  
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 A third methodological question is, would a larger and more diverse pool of respondents 
augment or contradict the findings of this thesis’ quantitative test? Possibly, but likely not. As 
Chapter Six explained, the range of participants for reliable research done by Yale School of 
Medicine and Csikszentmihalyi is between five and seventy-five. This thesis tested fifty 
respondents who were diverse in age and religious tradition. It is possible that a larger or more 
diverse pool of respondents may augment the results of this testing, but it is unlikely that doing 
so would contradict the results of this testing.  
The testing done for this thesis concluded that an average of 27 out of 50 of the 
respondents “strongly agree” that the pictorial sections of the sermon facilitated concentration, 
engagement, attention, and images to “see” in the mind’s eyes. In contrast, only an average of 9 
out of the 50 respondents “strongly agree” that the prosaic sections of the sermon facilitated 
concentration, engagement, attention, and images to “see” in the mind’s eyes. By combining the 
choices to “strongly agree” and “agree,” the percentage of respondents who answered that the 
pictorial sections of the sermon facilitated focus rose to an average of 44 out of 50. In contrast, 
by combining the choices to “strongly agree” and “agree,” the percentage of respondents who 
answered that the prosaic sections facilitated focus ended up at an average of 29 out of 50. Based 
on these percentages it is reasonable to conclude that while a larger pool of respondents or a 
more diverse pool may augment the results of this testing, doing so would not undermine the 
findings of this testing.  
 
Areas for Further Research 
The theory of cynosure elucidates two areas for further research. First, now that theoretical 
grounding exists to explain why pictorial language is more likely to win the brain’s attention 
than prosaic language, creating theoretically grounded strategies is possible. While this chapter 
begins the important work of articulating methodology for making language pictorially present, 
that work can and should go further. The theory of cynosure can be used to evaluate and explain 
the efficacy of strategies that are currently espoused in the field of homiletics. Also, new 
rhetorical devices and rhetorical strategies can now be considered, created, and evaluated in light 
of cynosure.  
 Second, the field of homiletics proposes many strategies for attention that extend beyond 
pictorial language. For example, humor, shock, touching the feelings, ethos, rhetorical questions, 
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paradox, startling facts, provocative statements, arrangement, delivery, and narrative arc, to 
name a few. The field of homiletics would benefit by further theoretical work that, like the 
theory of cynosure, grounds strategies for attention. Such work would benefit the homiletician 
who attempts to explain attention, which would in turn benefit the preacher who must gain 
attention, which would in turn benefit the listener who deserves to experience sacred scripture 
for what it is: “living and active, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing until it divides soul 
from spirit, joints from marrow, it is able to judge the thoughts and intentions of the heart” 
(Hebrews 4:12). 
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Appendix A 
Jonathan Edward’s Sermon 
“Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God”444 
 
DEUT. XXXII. 35. 
———Their Foot shall slide in due Time——— 
 
In this Verse is threatned the Vengeance of God on the wicked unbelieving Israelites, that were 
God’s visible People, and lived under Means of Grace; and that, notwithstanding all God’s 
wonderful Works that he had wrought towards that People, yet remained, as is expressed, ver. 
28. void of Counsel, having no Understanding in them; and that, under all the Cultivations of 
Heaven, brought forth bitter and poisonous Fruit; as in the two Verses next preceding the Text.445 
 
The Expression that I have chosen for my Text, Their Foot shall slide in due Time; seems 
to imply the following Things, relating to the Punishment and Destruction that these wicked 
Israelites were exposed to. 
 
1. That they were always exposed to Destruction, as one that stands or walks in slippery Places is 
always exposed to fall. This is implied in the Manner of their Destruction’s coming upon them, 
being represented by their Foot’s sliding. The same is express’d, Psal. 73. 18. Surely thou didst 
set them in slippery Places; thou castedst them down into Destruction. 
 
2. It implies that they were always exposed to sudden unexpected Destruction. As he that walks 
in slippery Places is every Moment liable to fall; he can’t foresee one Moment whether he shall 
stand or fall the next; and when he does fall, he falls at once, without Warning. Which is also 
expressed in that, Psal. 73. 18, 19. Surely thou didst set them in slippery Places; thou castedst 
them down into Destruction. How are they brought into Desolation as in a Moment? 
 
3. Another Thing implied is that they are liable to fall of themselves, without being thrown down 
by the Hand of another. As he that stands or walks on slippery Ground, needs nothing but his 
own Weight to throw him down. 
 
4. That the Reason why they are not fallen already, and don’t fall now, is only that God’s 
appointed Time is not come. For it is said, that when that due Time, or appointed Time comes, 
their Foot shall slide. Then they shall be left to fall as they are inclined by their own Weight. 
God won’t hold them up in these slippery Places any longer, but will let them go; and then, at 
that very Instant, they shall fall into Destruction; as he that stands in such slippery declining 
Ground on the Edge of a Pit that he can’t stand alone, when he is let go he immediately falls and 
is lost. 
																																																						
444 Text for this sermon comes from University of Nebraska–Lincoln, DigitalCommons, 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://duckduckgo.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1053&
context=etas, accessed February 2018. 
445 Antiquated spelling, incorrect punctuation, and grammatically incorrect capitalization reflect the text for this 
sermon as it appears at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln, DigitalCommons. 
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The Observation from the Words that I would now insist upon is this, There is nothing 
that keeps wicked Men at any one Moment, out of Hell, but the meer Pleasure of GOD. 
By the meer Pleasure of God, I mean his sovereign Pleasure, his arbitrary Will, restrained 
by no Obligation, hinder’d by no manner of Difficulty, any more than if nothing else but God’s 
meer Will had in the least Degree, or in any Respect whatsoever, any Hand in the Preservation of 
wicked Men one Moment. 
The Truth of this Observation may appear by the following Considerations. 
 
1. There is no Want of Power in God to cast wicked Men into Hell at any Moment. Mens Hands 
can’t be strong when God rises up: The strongest have no Power to resist him, nor can any 
deliver out of his Hands. 
He is not only able to cast wicked Men into Hell, but he can most easily do it. Sometimes 
an earthly Prince meets with a great deal of Difficulty to subdue a Rebel, that has found Means 
to fortify himself, and has made himself strong by the Numbers of his Followers. But it is not so 
with God. There is no Fortress that is any Defence from the Power of God. Tho’ Hand join in 
Hand, and vast Multitudes of God’s Enemies combine and associate themselves, they are easily 
broken in Pieces: They are as great Heaps of light Chaff before the Whirlwind; or large 
Quantities of dry Stubble be- fore devouring Flames. We find it easy to tread on and crush a 
Worm that we see crawling on the Earth; so ‘tis easy for us to cut or singe a slender Thread that 
any Thing hangs by; thus easy is it for God when he pleases to cast his Enemies down to Hell. 
What are we, that we should think to stand before him, at whose Rebuke the Earth trembles, and 
before whom the Rocks are thrown down? 
 
2. They deserve to be cast into Hell; so that divine Justice never stands in the Way, it makes no 
Objection against God’s using his Power at any Moment to destroy them. Yea, on the contrary, 
Justice calls aloud for an infinite Punishment of their Sins. Divine Justice says of the Tree that 
brings forth such Grapes of Sodom, Cut it down, why cumbreth it the Ground, Luk. 13. 7. The 
Sword of divine Justice is every Moment brandished over their Heads, and 'tis nothing but the 
Hand of arbitrary Mercy, and God’s meer Will, that holds it back. 
 
3. They are already under a Sentence of Condemnation to Hell. They don’t only justly deserve to 
be cast down thither; but the Sentence of the Law of God, that eternal and immutable Rule of 
Righteousness that God has fixed between him and Mankind, is gone out against them, and 
stands against them; so that they are bound over already to Hell. Joh. 3. 18. He that believeth not 
is condemned already. So that every unconverted Man properly belongs to Hell; that is his Place; 
from thence he is. Joh. 8. 23. Ye are from beneath. And thither he is bound; ’tis the Place that 
Justice, and God’s Word, and the Sentence of his unchangeable Law assigns to him. 
 
4. They are now the Objects of that very same Anger & Wrath of God that is expressed in the 
Torments of Hell: and the Reason why they don’t go down to Hell at each Moment, is not 
because God, in whose Power they are, is not then very angry with them; as angry as he is with 
many of those miserable Creatures that he is now tormenting in Hell, and do there feel and bear 
the fierceness of his Wrath. Yea God is a great deal more angry with great Numbers that are now 
on Earth, yea doubtless with many that are now in this Congregation, that it may be are at Ease 
and Quiet, than he is with many of those that are now in the Flames of Hell. 
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So that it is not because God is unmindful of their Wickedness, and don’t resent it, that he don’t 
let loose his Hand and cut them off. God is not altogether such an one as themselves, tho’ they 
may imagine him to be so. The Wrath of God burns against them, their Damnation don’t 
slumber, the Pit is prepared, the Fire is made ready, the Furnace is now hot, ready to receive 
them, the Flames do now rage and glow. The glittering Sword is whet, and held over them, and 
the Pit hath opened her Mouth under them. 
 
5. The Devil stands ready to fall upon them and seize them as his own, at what Moment God 
shall permit him. They belong to him; he has their Souls in his Possession, and under his 
Dominion. The Scripture represents them as his Goods, Luk. 11. 21. The Devils watch them; 
they are ever by them, at their right Hand; they stand waiting for them, like greedy hungry Lions 
that see their Prey, and expect to have it, but are for the present kept back; if God should 
withdraw his Hand, by which they are restrained, they would in one Moment fly upon their poor 
Souls. The old Serpent is gaping for them; Hell opens his Mouth wide to receive them; and if 
God should permit it, they would be hastily swallowed up and lost. 
 
6. There are in the Souls of wicked Men those hellish Principles reigning, that would presently 
kindle and flame out into Hell Fire, if it were not for God’s Restraints. There is laid in the very 
Nature of carnal Men a Foundation for the Torments of Hell: There are those corrupt Principles, 
in reigning Power in them, and in full Possession of them, that are Seeds of Hell Fire. These 
Principles are active and powerful, and exceeding violent in their Nature, and if it were not for 
the restraining Hand of God upon them, they would soon break out, they would flame out after 
the same Manner as the same Corruptions, the same Enmity does in the Hearts of damned Souls, 
and would beget the same Torments in 'em as they do in them. The Souls of the Wicked are in 
Scripture compared to the troubled Sea, Isai. 57. 20. For the present God restrains their 
Wickedness by his mighty Power, as he does the raging Waves of the troubled Sea, saying, 
Hitherto shalt thou come, and no further; but if God should withdraw that restraining Power, it 
would soon carry all afore it. Sin is the Ruin and Misery of the Soul; it is destructive in its 
Nature; and if God should leave it without Restraint, there would need nothing else to make the 
Soul perfectly miserable. The Corruption of the Heart of Man is a Thing that is immoderate and 
boundless in its Fury; and while wicked Men live here, it is like Fire pent up by God’s Restraints, 
whereas if it were let loose it would set on Fire the Course of Nature; and as the Heart is now a 
Sink of Sin, so, if Sin was not restrain’d, it would immediately turn the Soul into a fiery Oven, or 
a Furnace of Fire and Brimstone. 
 
7. It is no Security to wicked Men for one Moment, that there are no visible Means of Death at 
Hand. ‘Tis no Security to a natural Man, that he is now in Health, and that he don’t see which 
Way he should now immediately go out of the World by any Accident, and that there is no 
visible Danger in any Respect in his Circumstances. The manifold and continual Experience of 
the World in all Ages, shews that this is no Evidence that a Man is not on the very Brink of 
Eternity, and that the next Step won’t be into another World. The unseen, unthought of Ways and 
Means of Persons going suddenly out of the World are innumerable and inconceivable. 
Unconverted Men walk over the Pit of Hell on a rotten Covering, and there are innumerable 
Places in this Covering so weak that they won’t bear their Weight, and these Places are not seen. 
The Arrows of Death fly unseen at Noon-Day; the sharpest Sight can’t discern them, God has so 
many different unsearchable Ways of taking wicked Men out of the World and sending ‘em to 
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Hell, that there is nothing to make it appear that God had need to be at the Expence of a Miracle, 
or go out of the ordinary Course of his Providence, to destroy any wicked Man, at any Moment. 
All the Means that there are of Sinners going out of the World, are so in God’s Hands, and so 
universally absolutely subject to his Power and Determination, that it don’t depend at all less on 
the meer Will of God, whether Sinners shall at any Moment go to Hell, than if Means were never 
made use of, or at all concerned in the Case. 
 
8. Natural Men’s Prudence and Care to preserve their own Lives, or the Care of others to 
preserve them, don’t secure ‘em a Moment. This divine Providence and universal Experience 
does also bear Testimony to. There is this clear Evidence that Men’s own Wisdom is no Security 
to them from Death; That if it were otherwise we should see some Difference between the wise 
and politick Men of the World, and others, with Regard to their Liableness to early and 
unexpected Death; but how is it in Fact? Eccles. 2. 16. How dieth the wise Man? as the Fool. 
 
9. All wicked Men’s Pains and Contrivance they use to escape Hell, while they continue to reject 
Christ, and so remain wicked Men, don’t secure 'em from Hell one Moment. Almost every 
natural Man that hears of Hell, flatters himself that he shall escape it; he depends upon himself 
for his own Security; he flatters himself in what he has done, in what he is now doing, or what he 
intends to do; every one lays out Matters in his own Mind how he shall avoid Damnation, and 
flatters himself that he contrives well for himself, and that his Schemes won’t fail. They hear 
indeed that there are but few saved, and that the bigger Part of Men that have died heretofore are 
gone to Hell; but each one imagines that he lays out Matters better for his own escape than others 
have done: He don’t intend to come to that Place of Torment; he says within himself, that he 
intends to take Care that shall be effectual, and to order Matters so for himself as not to fail. 
But the foolish Children of Men do miserably delude themselves in their own Schemes, 
and in their Confidence in their own Strength and Wisdom; they trust to nothing but a Shadow. 
The bigger Part of those that heretofore have lived under the same Means of Grace, and are now 
dead, are undoubtedly gone to Hell: and it was not because they were not as wise as those that 
are now alive: it was not because they did not lay out Matters as well for themselves to secure 
their own escape. If it were so, that we could come to speak with them, and could inquire of 
them, one by one, whether they expected when alive, and when they used to hear about Hell, 
ever to be the Subjects of that Misery, we doubtless should hear one and another reply, ‘No, I 
never intended to come here; I had laid out ‘Matters otherwise in my Mind; I thought I should 
‘contrive as well for myself; I thought my Scheme ‘good; I intended to take effectual Care; but it 
came ‘upon me unexpected; I did not look for it at that ‘Time, and in that Manner; it came as a 
Thief; Death ‘outwitted me; God’s Wrath was too quick for me; O ‘my cursed Foolishness! I was 
flattering myself, and ‘pleasing myself with vain Dreams of what I would ‘do hereafter, and 
when I was saying Peace and Safety, ‘then sudden Destruction came upon me. 
 
10. God has laid himself under no Obligation by any Promises to keep any natural Man out of 
Hell one Moment. God certainly has made no Promises either of eternal Life, or of any 
Deliverance or Preservation from eternal Death, but what are contained in the Covenant of 
Grace, the Promises that are given in Christ, in whom all the Promises are Yea and Amen. But 
surely they have no Interest in the Promises of the Covenant of Grace that are not the Children of 
the Covenant, and that don’t believe in any of the Promises of the Covenant, and have no Interest 
in the Mediator of the Covenant. 
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So that whatever some have imagined and pretended about Promises made to natural 
Men’s earnest seeking and knocking, 'tis plain and manifest that whatever Pains a natural Man 
takes in Religion, whatever Prayers he makes, till he believes in Christ, God is under no manner 
of Obligation to keep him a Moment from eternal Destruction. 
So that thus it is, that natural Men are held in the Hand of God over the Pit of Hell; they have 
deserved the fiery Pit, and are already sentenced to it; and God is dreadfully provoked, his Anger 
is as great towards them as to those that are actually suffering the Executions of the fierceness of 
his Wrath in Hell, and they have done nothing in the least to appease or abate that Anger, neither 
is God in the least bound by any Promise to hold 'em up one moment; the Devil is waiting for 
them, Hell is gaping for them, the Flames gather and flash about them, and would fain lay hold 
on them, and swallow them up; the Fire pent up in their own Hearts is struggling to break out; 
and they have no Interest in any Mediator, there are no Means within Reach that can be any 
Security to them. In short, they have no Refuge, nothing to take hold of, all that preserves them 
every Moment is the meer arbitrary Will, and uncovenanted unobliged Forbearance of an 
incensed God. 
 
A P P L I C A T I O N. 
The Use may be of Awakening to unconverted Persons in this Congregation. This that you have 
heard is the Case of every one of you that are out of Christ. That World of Misery, that Lake of 
burning Brimstone is extended abroad under you. There is the dreadful Pit of the glowing Flames 
of the Wrath of God; there is Hell’s wide gaping Mouth open; and you have nothing to stand 
upon, not any Thing to take hold of: there is nothing between you and Hell but the Air; 'tis only 
the Power and meer Pleasure of God that holds you up. 
You probably are not sensible of this; you find you are kept out of Hell, but don’t see the 
Hand of God in it, but look at other Things, as the good State of your bodily Constitution, your 
Care of your own Life, and the Means you use for your own Preservation. But indeed these 
Things are nothing; if God should withdraw his Hand, they would avail no more to keep you 
from falling, than the thin Air to hold up a Person that is suspended in it. 
Your Wickedness makes you as it were heavy as Lead, and to tend downwards with great 
Weight and Pressure towards Hell; and if God should let you go, you would immediately sink 
and swiftly descend & plunge into the bottomless Gulf, and your healthy Constitution, and your 
own Care and Prudence, and best Contrivance, and all your Righteousness, would have no more 
Influence to uphold you and keep you out of Hell, than a Spider’s Web would have to stop a 
falling Rock. Were it not that so is the sovereign Pleasure of God, the Earth would not bear you 
one Moment; for you are a Burden to it; the Creation groans with you; the Creation is made 
Subject to the Bondage of your Corruption, not willingly; the Sun don’t willingly shine upon you 
to give you Light to serve Sin and Satan; the Earth don’t willingly yield her Increase to satisfy 
your Lusts; nor is it willingly a Stage for your Wickedness to be acted upon; the Air don’t 
willing serve you for Breath to maintain the Flame of Life in your Vitals, while you spend your 
Life in the Service of God’s Enemies. God’s Creatures are Good, and were made for Men to 
serve God with, and don’t willingly subserve to any other Purpose, and groan when they are 
abused to Purposes so directly contrary to their Nature and End. And the World would spue you 
out, were it not for the sovereign Hand of him who hath subjected it in Hope. There are the black 
Clouds of God’s Wrath now hanging directly over your Heads, full of the dreadful Storm, and 
big with Thunder; and were it not for the restraining Hand of God it would immediately burst 
forth upon you. The sovereign Pleasure of God for the present stays his rough Wind; otherwise it 
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would come with Fury, and your Destruction would come like a Whirlwind, and you would be 
like the Chaff of the Summer threshing Floor. 
The Wrath of God is like great Waters that are dammed for the present; they increase 
more and more, & rise higher and higher, till an Outlet is given, and the longer the Stream is 
stop’d, the more rapid and mighty is it’s Course, when once it is let loose. 'Tis true, that 
Judgment against your evil Works has not been executed hitherto; the Floods of God’s 
Vengeance have been with-held; but your Guilt in the mean Time is constantly increasing, and 
you are every Day treasuring up more Wrath; the Waters are continually rising an waxing more 
and more mighty; and there is nothing but the meer Pleasure of God that holds the Waters back 
that are unwilling to be stopped, and press hard to go forward; if God should only withdraw his 
Hand from the Flood-Gate, it would immediately fly open, and the fiery Floods of the Fierceness 
and Wrath of God would rush forth with inconceivable Fury, and would come upon you with 
omnipotent Power; and if your Strength were ten thousand Times greater than it is, yea ten 
thousand Times greater than the Strength of the stoutest, sturdiest, Devil in Hell, it would be 
nothing to withstand or endure it. 
The Bow of God’s Wrath is bent, and the Arrow made ready on the String, and Justice 
bends the Arrow at your Heart, and strains the Bow, and it is nothing but the meer Pleasure of 
God, and that of an angry God, without any Promise or Obligation at all, that keeps the Arrow 
one Moment from being made drunk with your Blood. 
Thus are all you that are never passed under the great Change of Heart, by the mighty 
Power of the SPIRIT of GOD upon your Souls; all that were never born again, and made new 
Creatures, and raised from being dead in Sin, to a State of new, and before altogether 
unexperienced Light and Life, (however you may have reformed your Life in many Things, and 
may have had religious Affections, and may keep up a Form of Religion in your Families and 
Closets, and in the House of God, and may be strict in it,) you are thus in the Hands of an angry 
God; 'tis nothing but his meer Pleasure that keeps you from being this Moment swallowed up in 
everlasting Destruction. 
However unconvinced you may now be of the Truth of what you hear, by & by you will 
be fully convinced of it. Those that are gone from being in the like Circumstances with you, see 
that it was so with them; for Destruction came suddenly upon most of them, when they expected 
nothing of it, and while they were saying, Peace and Safety: Now they see, that those Things that 
they depend on for Peace and Safety, were nothing but thin Air and empty Shadows. 
The God that holds you over the Pit of Hell, much as one holds a Spider, or some 
loathsome Insect, over the Fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked; his Wrath towards you 
burns like Fire; he looks upon you as worthy of nothing else, but to be cast into the Fire; he is of 
purer Eyes than to bear to have you in his Sight; you are ten thousand Times so abominable in 
his Eyes as the most hateful venomous Serpent is in ours. You have offended him infinitely more 
than ever a stubborn Rebel did his Prince: and yet ‘tis nothing but his Hand that holds you from 
falling into the Fire every Moment: 'Tis to be ascribed to nothing else, that you did not go to Hell 
the last Night; that you was suffer’d to awake again in this World, after you closed your Eyes to 
sleep: and there is no other Reason to be given why you have not dropped into Hell since you 
arose in the Morning, but that God’s Hand has held you up: There is no other reason to be given 
why you han’t gone to Hell since you have sat here in the House of God, provoking his pure 
Eyes by your sinful wicked Manner of attending his solemn Worship: Yea, there is nothing else 
that is to be given as a Reason why you don’t this very Moment drop down into Hell. 
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O Sinner! Consider the fearful Danger you are in: 'Tis a great Furnace of Wrath, a wide 
and bottomless Pit, full of the Fire of Wrath, that you are held over in the Hand of that God, 
whose Wrath is provoked and incensed as much against you as against many of the Damned in 
Hell: You hang by a slender Thread, with the Flames of divine Wrath flashing about it, and ready 
every Moment to singe it, and burn it asunder; and you have no Interest in any Mediator, and 
nothing to lay hold of to save yourself, nothing to keep off the Flames of Wrath, nothing of your 
own, nothing that you ever have done, nothing that you can do, to induce God to spare you one 
Moment. 
And consider here more particularly several Things concerning that Wrath that you are in 
such Danger of. 
 
1. Whose Wrath it is. It is the Wrath of the infinite GOD. If it were only the Wrath of Man, tho’ it 
were of the most potent Prince, it would be comparatively little to be regarded. The Wrath of 
Kings is very much dreaded, especially of absolute Monarchs, that have the Possessions and 
Lives of their Subjects wholly in their Power, to be disposed of at their meer Will. Prov. 20. 2. 
The Fear of a King is as the Roaring of a Lion: whoso provoketh him to Anger, sinneth against 
his own Soul. The Subject that very much enrages an arbitrary Prince, is liable to suffer the most 
extream Torments, that human Art can invent or human Power can inflict. But the greatest 
earthly Potentates, in their Majesty and Strength, and when cloathed in their greatest Terrors, are 
but feeble despicable Worms of the Dust, in Comparison of the great and almighty Creator and 
King of Heaven and Earth: It is but little that they can do, when most enraged, and when they 
have exerted the utmost of their Fury. All the Kings of the Earth before GOD are as 
Grasshoppers, they are nothing and less than nothing: Both their Love and their Hatred is to be 
despised. The Wrath of the great King of Kings is as much more terrible than their’s, as his 
Majesty is greater. Luke 12. 4,5. And I say unto you my Friends, be not afraid of them that kill 
the Body, and after that have no more that they can do: But I will forewarn you whom ye shall 
fear; fear him, which after he hath killed, hath Power to cast into Hell; yea I say unto you, fear 
him. 
 
2. 'Tis the Fierceness of his Wrath that you are exposed to. We often read of the Fury of God; as 
in Isai. 59. 18. According to their Deeds, accordingly he will repay Fury to his Adversaries. So 
Isai. 66. 15. For behold, the Lord will come with Fire, and with Chariots like a Whirlwind, to 
render his Anger with Fury, and his Rebukes with Flames of Fire. And so in many other Places. 
So we read of God’s Fierceness. Rev. 19. 15. There we read of the Winepress of the Fierceness 
and Wrath of Almighty God. The Words are exceeding terrible: if it had only been said, the 
Wrath of God, the Words would have implied that which is infinitely dreadful: But ‘tis not only 
said so, but the Fierceness and Wrath of God: the Fury of God! the Fierceness of Jehovah! Oh 
how dreadful must that be! Who can utter or conceive what such Expressions carry in them! But 
it is not only said so, but the Fierceness and Wrath of ALMIGHTY GOD. As tho’ there would be 
a very great Manifestation of his almighty Power, in what the fierceness of his Wrath should 
inflict, as tho’ Omnipotence should be as it were enraged, and excited, as Men are wont to exert 
their Strength in the fierceness of their Wrath. Oh! then what will be the Consequence! What will 
become of the poor Worm that shall suffer it! Whose Hands can be strong? and whose Heart 
endure? To what a dreadful, inexpressible, inconceivable Depth of Misery must the poor 
Creature be sunk, who shall be the Subject of this! 
 
	 167 
Consider this, you that are here present, that yet remain in an unregenerate State. That God will 
execute the fierceness of his Anger, implies that he will inflict Wrath without any Pity: when 
God beholds the ineffable Extremity of your Case, and sees your Torment to be so vastly 
disproportion’d to your Strength, and sees how your poor Soul is crushed and sinks down, as it 
were into an infinite Gloom, he will have no Compassion upon you, he will not forbear the 
Executions of his Wrath, or in the least lighten his Hand; there shall be no Moderation or Mercy, 
nor will God then at all stay his rough Wind; he will have no Regard to your Welfare, nor be at 
all careful lest you should suffer too much, in any other Sense than only that you shall not suffer 
beyond what strict Justice requires: nothing shall be withheld, because it’s so hard for you to 
bear. Ezek. 8. 18. Therefore will I also deal in Fury; mine Eye shall not spare, neither will I have 
Pity; and tho’ they cry in mine Ears with a loud Voice, yet I will not bear them. Now God stands 
ready to pity you; this is a Day of Mercy; you may cry now with some Encouragement of 
obtaining Mercy: but when once the Day of Mercy is past, your most lamentable and dolorous 
Cries and Shrieks will be in vain; you will be wholly lost and thrown away of God as to any 
Regard to your Welfare; God will have no other Use to put you to but only to suffer Misery; you 
shall be continued in Being to no other End; for you will be a Vessel of Wrath fitted to 
Destruction; and there will be no other Use of this Vessel but only to be filled full of Wrath: God 
will be so far from pitying you when you cry to him, that 'tis said he will only Laugh and Mock, 
Prov. 1. 25, 26, &c. 
How awful are those Words, Isai. 63. 3. Which are the Words of the great God, I will 
tread them in mine Anger, and will trample them in my Fury, and their Blood shall be sprinkled 
upon my Garments, and I will stain all my Raiment. 'Tis perhaps impossible to conceive of 
Words that carry in them greater Manifestations of these three Things, viz. Contempt, and 
Hatred, and fierceness of Indignation. If you cry to God to pity you, he will be so far from 
pitying you in your doleful Case, or shewing you the least Regard or Favour, that instead of that 
he’ll only tread you under Foot: And tho’ he will know that you can’t bear the Weight of 
Omnipotence treading upon you, yet he won’t regard that, but he will crush you under his Feet 
without Mercy; he’ll crush out your Blood, and make it fly, and it shall be sprinkled on his 
Garments, so as to stain all his Raiment. He will not only hate you, but he will have you in the 
utmost Contempt; no Place shall be thought fit for you, but under his Feet, to be trodden down as 
the Mire of the Streets. 
3. The Misery you are exposed to is that which God will inflict to that End, that he might 
shew what that Wrath of Jehovah is. God hath had it on his Heart to shew to Angels and Men, 
both how excellent his Love is, and also how terrible his Wrath is. Sometimes earthly Kings have 
a Mind to shew how terrible their Wrath is, by the extream Punishments they would execute on 
those that provoke 'em. Nebuchadnezzar, that mighty and haughty Monarch of the Chaldean 
Empire, was willing to shew his Wrath, when enraged with Shadrach, Meshech, and Abednego; 
and accordingly gave Order that the burning fiery Furnace should be hot seven Times hotter than 
it was before; doubtless it was raised to the utmost Degree of Fierceness that humane Art could 
raise it: But the great GOD is also willing to shew his Wrath, and magnify his awful Majesty and 
mighty Power in the extream Sufferings of his Enemies. Rom. 9. 22. What if God willing to shew 
HIS Wrath, and to make his Power known, endured with much Long-suffering the Vessels of 
Wrath fitted to Destruction? And seeing this is his Design, and what he has determined, to shew 
how terrible the unmixed, unrestrained Wrath, the Fury and Fierceness of Jehovah is, he will do 
it to Effect. There will be something accomplished and brought to pass, that will be dreadful with 
a Witness. When the great and angry God hath risen up and executed his awful Vengeance on the 
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poor Sinner; and the Wretch is actually suffering the infinite Weight and Power of his 
Indignation, then will God call upon the whole Universe to behold that awful Majesty, and 
mighty Power that is to be seen in it. Isai. 33. 12, 13, 14. And the People shall be as the burning 
of Lime, as Thorns cut up shall they be burnt in the Fire. Hear ye that are far off what I have 
done; and ye that are near acknowledge my Might. The Sinners in Zion are afraid, fearfulness 
hath surprized the Hypocrites &c. 
 
Thus it will be with you that are in an unconverted State, if you continue in it; the infinite Might, 
and Majesty and Terribleness of the Omnipotent GOD shall be magnified upon you, in the 
ineffable Strength of your Torments: You shall be tormented in the Presence of the holy Angels, 
and in the Presence of the Lamb; and when you shall be in this State of Suffering, the glorious 
In- habitants of Heaven shall go forth and look on the awful Spectacle, that they may see what 
the Wrath and Fierceness of the Almighty is, and when they have seen it, they will fall down and 
adore that great Power and Majesty. Isai. 66. 23, 24. And it shall come to pass, that from one new 
Moon to another, and from one Sabbath to another, shall all Flesh come to Worship before me, 
saith the Lord; and they shall go forth and look upon the Carcasses of the Men that have 
transgressed against me; for their Worm shall not die, neither shall their Fire be quenched, and 
they shall be an abhorring unto all Flesh. 
 
4. 'Tis everlasting Wrath. It would be dreadful to suffer this Fierceness and Wrath of Almighty 
God one Moment; but you must suffer it to all Eternity: there will be no End to this exquisite 
horrible Misery: When you look forward, you shall see a long Forever, a boundless Duration 
before you, which will swallow up your Thoughts, and amaze your Soul; and you will absolutely 
despair of ever having any Deliverance, any End, any Mitigation, any Rest at all; you will know 
certainly that you must wear out long Ages, Millions of Millions of Ages, in wrestling and 
conflicting with this almighty merciless Vengeance; and then when you have so done, when so 
many Ages have actually been spent by you in this Manner, you will know that all is but a Point 
to what remains. So that our Punishment will indeed be infinite. Oh who can express what the 
State of a Soul in such Circumstances is! All that we can possibly say about it, gives but a very 
feeble faint Representation of it; 'tis inexpressible and in- conceivable: for who knows the Power 
of God’s Anger? 
How dreadful is the State of those that are daily and hourly in Danger of this great Wrath, 
and in- finite Misery! But this is the dismal Case of every Soul in this Congregation, that has not 
been born again, however moral and strict, sober and religious they may otherwise be. Oh that 
you would consider it, whether you be Young or Old. There is Reason to think, that there are 
many in this Congregation now hearing this Discourse, that will actually be the Subjects of this 
very Misery to all Eternity. We know not who they are, or in what Seat they sit, or what 
Thoughts they now have: it may be they are now at Ease, and hear all these Things without much 
Disturbance, and are now flattering themselves that they are not the Persons, promising 
themselves that they shall escape. If we knew that there was one Person, and but one, in the 
whole Congregation that was to be the Subject of this Misery, what an awful Thing would it be 
to think of ! If we knew who it was, what an awful Sight would it be to see such a Person! How 
might all the rest of the Congregation lift up a lamentable and bitter Cry over him! But alas! 
instead of one, how many is it likely will remember this Discourse in Hell? And it would be a 
Wonder if some that are now present, should not be in Hell in a very short Time, before this Year 
is out. And it would be no Wonder if some Person that now sits here in some Seat at this 
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Meeting-House in Health, and quiet & secure, should be there before tomorrow Morning. Those 
of you that finally continue in a natural Condition, that shall keep out of Hell longest, will be 
there in a little Time! your Damnation don’t slumber; it will come swiftly, and in all probability 
very suddenly upon many of you. You have Reason to wonder, that you are not already in Hell. 
'Tis doubtless the Case of some that heretofore you have seen and known, that never deserved 
Hell more than you, and that heretofore appeared as likely to have been now alive as you: Their 
Case is past all Hope; they are crying in extream Misery and perfect Despair; but here you are in 
the Land of the Living, and in the House of God, and have an Opportunity to obtain Salvation. 
What would not those poor damned, hopeless Souls give for one Day’s such Opportunity as you 
now enjoy! 
And now you have an extraordinary Opportunity, a Day wherein Christ has flung the 
Door of Mercy wide open, and stands in the Door calling and crying with a loud Voice to poor 
Sinners; a Day wherein many are flocking to him, and pressing into the Kingdom of God; many 
are daily coming from the East, West, North and South; many that were very lately in the same 
miserable Condition that you are in, are in now an happy State, with their Hearts filled with Love 
to Him that has loved them and washed them for their Sins in his own Blood, and rejoycing in 
Hope of the Glory of God. How awful is it to be left behind at such a Day! To see so many 
others feasting, while you are pining and perishing! To see so many rejoycing and singing for 
Joy of Heart, while you have Cause to mourn for Sorrow of Heart, and howl for Vexation of 
Spirit! How can you rest one Moment in such a Condition? Are not your Souls as precious as the 
Souls of the People at *Suffield, where they are flocking from Day to Day to Christ? 
Are there not many here that have lived long in the World, that are not to this Day born 
again, and so are Aliens from the Common-wealth of Israel, and have done nothing ever since 
they have lived, but treasure up Wrath against the Day of Wrath? Oh Sirs, your Case in an 
especial Manner is extreamly dangerous; your Guilt and Hardness of Heart is extreamly great. 
Don’t you see how generally Persons of your Years are pass’d over and left, in the present 
remarkable & wonderful Dispensation of God’s Mercy? You had need to consider your selves, 
and wake throughly out of Sleep; you cannot bear the Fierceness and Wrath of the infinite GOD. 
And you that are young Men, and young Women, will you neglect this precious Season 
that you now enjoy, when so many others of your Age are renouncing all youthful Vanities, and 
flocking to Christ? You especially have now an extraordinary Opportunity; but if you neglect it, 
it will soon be with you as it is with those Persons that spent away all the precious Days of Youth 
in Sin, and are now come to such a dreadful pass in blindness and hardness. 
And you Children that are unconverted, don’t you know that you are going down to Hell, 
to bear the dreadful Wrath of that God that is now angry with you every Day, and every Night? 
Will you be content to be the Children of the Devil, when so many other Children in the Land are 
converted, and are become the holy and happy Children of the King of Kings? 
And let every one that is yet out of Christ, and hanging over the Pit of Hell, whether they 
be old Men and Women, or middle Aged, or young People, or little Children, now hearken to the 
loud Calls of God’s Word and Providence. This acceptable Year of the Lord, that is a Day of 
such great Favour to some, will doubtless be a Day of as remarkable Vengeance to others. Men’s 
Hearts harden, and their Guilt increases apace at such a Day as this, if they neglect their Souls: 
and never was there so great Danger of such Persons being given up to hardness of Heart, and 
blindness of Mind. God seems now to be hastily gathering in his Elect in all Parts of the Land; 
and probably the bigger Part of adult Persons that ever shall be saved, will be brought in now in a 
little Time, and that it will be as it was on that great out-pouring of the Spirit upon the Jews in 
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the Apostles Days, the Election will obtain, and the rest will be blinded. If this should be the 
Case with you, you will eternally curse this Day, and will curse the Day that ever you was born, 
to see such a Season of the pouring out of God’s Spirit; and will wish that you had died and gone 
to Hell before you had seen it. Now undoubtedly it is, as it was in the Days of John the Baptist, 
the Ax is in an extraordinary Manner laid at the Root of the Trees, that every Tree that brings not 
forth good Fruit, may be hewen down, and cast into the Fire. 
Therefore let every one that is out of Christ, now awake and fly from the Wrath to come. 
The Wrath of almighty GOD is now undoubtedly hanging over great Part of this Congregation: 
Let every one fly out of Sodom: Haste and escape for your Lives, look not behind you, escape to 
the Mountain, least you be consumed. 
  
	 171 
Appendix B 
Charles Haddon Spurgeon’s Sermon 
“Compel Them to Come In”446 
 
"Compel them to come in."—Luke 14:23 
I feel in such a haste to go out and obey this commandment this morning, by compelling those to 
come in who are now tarrying in the highways and hedges, that I cannot wait for an introduction, 
but must at once set about my business. 
Hear then, O ye that are strangers to the truth as it is in Jesus—hear then the message that 
I have to bring you. Ye have fallen, fallen in your father Adam; ye have fallen also in yourselves, 
by your daily sin and your constant iniquity; you have provoked the anger of the Most High; and 
as assuredly as you have sinned, so certainly must God punish you if you persevere in your 
iniquity, for the Lord is a God of justice, and will by no means spare the guilty. But have you not 
heard, hath it not long been spoken in your ears, that God, in his infinite mercy, has devised a 
way whereby, without any infringement upon his honour, he can have mercy upon you, the 
guilty and the undeserving? To you I speak; and my voice is unto you, O sons of men; Jesus 
Christ, very God of very God, hath descended from heaven, and was made in the likeness of 
sinful flesh. Begotten of the Holy Ghost, he was born of the Virgin Mary; he lived in this world a 
life of exemplary holiness, and of the deepest suffering, till at last he gave himself up to die for 
our sins, "the just for the unjust, to bring us to God." And now the plan of salvation is simply 
declared unto you—"Whosoever believeth in the Lord Jesus Christ shall be saved." For you who 
have violated all the precepts of God, and have disdained his mercy and dared his vengeance, 
there is yet mercy proclaimed, for "whosoever calleth upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." 
"For this is a faithful saying and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the world 
to save sinners, of whom I am chief;" "whosoever cometh unto him he will in no wise cast out, 
for he is able also to save unto the uttermost them that come unto God by him, seeing he ever 
liveth to make intercession for us." Now all that God asks of you—and this he gives you—is that 
you will simply look at his bleeding dying son, and trust your souls in the hands of him whose 
name alone can save from death and hell. Is it not a marvelous thing, that the proclamation of 
this gospel does not receive the unanimous consent of men? One would think that as soon as ever 
this was preached, "That whosoever believeth shall have eternal life," every one of you, "casting 
away every man his sins and his iniquities," would lay hold on Jesus Christ, and look alone to his 
cross. But alas! such is the desperate evil of our nature, such the pernicious depravity of our 
character, that this message is despised, the invitation to the gospel feast is rejected, and there are 
many of you who are this day enemies of God by wicked works, enemies to the God who 
preaches Christ to you to-day, enemies to him who sent his Son to give his life a ransom for 
many. Strange I say it is that it should be so, yet nevertheless it is the fact, and hence the 
necessity for the command of the text,—"Compel them to come in." 
Children of God, ye who have believed, I shall have little or nothing to say to you this 
morning; I am going straight to my business—I am going after those that will not come—those 
that are in the byways and hedges, and God going with me, it is my duty now to fulfil this 
command, "Compel them to come in." 
																																																						
446 Text for this sermon comes from the Spurgeon Center, https://www.spurgeon.org/resource-
library/sermons/compel-them-to-come-in#flipbook/, accessed February 2018. 
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First, I must, find you out; secondly, I will go to work to compel you to come in. 
 
I. First, I must FIND YOU OUT. If you read the verses that precede the text, you will 
find an amplification of this command: "Go out quickly into the streets and lanes of the city, and 
bring in hither the poor, the maimed, the halt, and the blind;" and then, afterwards, "Go out into 
the highways," bring in the vagrants, the highwaymen, "and into the hedges," bring in those that 
have no resting-place for their heads, and are lying under the hedges to rest, bring them in also, 
and "compel them to come in." Yes, I see you this morning, you that are poor. I am to 
compel you to come in. You are poor in circumstances, but this is no barrier to the kingdom of 
heaven, for God hath not exempted from his grace the man that shivers in rags, and who is 
destitute of bread. In fact, if there be any distinction made, the distinction is on your side, and for 
your benefit—"Unto you is the word of salvation sent"; "For the poor have the gospel preached 
unto them." But especially I must speak to you who are poor, spiritually. You have no faith, you 
have no virtue, you have no good work, you have no grace, and what is poverty worse still, you 
have no hope. Ah, my Master has sent you a gracious invitation. Come and welcome to the 
marriage feast of his love. "Whosoever will, let him come and take of the waters of life freely." 
Come, I must lay hold upon you, though you be defiled with foulest filth, and though you have 
nought but rags upon your back, though your own righteousness has become as filthy clouts, yet 
must I lay hold upon you, and invite you first, and even compel you to come in. 
And now I see you again. You are not only poor, but you are maimed. There was a time 
when you thought you could work out your own salvation without God's help, when you could 
perform good works, attend to ceremonies, and get to heaven by yourselves; but now you are 
maimed, the sword of the law has cut off your hands, and now you can work no longer; you say, 
with bitter sorrow— 
"The best performance of my hands, 
Dares not appear before thy throne." 
 
You have lost all power now to obey the law; you feel that when you would do good, evil 
is present with you. You are maimed; you have given up, as a forlorn hope, all attempt to save 
yourself, because you are maimed and your arms are gone. But you are worse off than that, for if 
you could not work your way to heaven, yet you could walk your way there along the road by 
faith; but you are maimed in the feet as well as in the hands; you feel that you cannot believe, 
that you cannot repent, that you cannot obey the stipulations of the gospel. You feel that you are 
utterly undone, powerless in every respect to do anything that can be pleasing to God. In fact, 
you are crying out— 
"Oh, could I but believe, 
Then all would easy be, 
I would, but cannot, Lord relieve, 
My help must come from thee." 
 
To you am I sent also. Before you am I to lift up the blood-stained banner of the cross, to 
you am I to preach this gospel, "Whoso calleth upon the name of the Lord shall be saved;" and 
unto you am I to cry, "Whosoever will, let him come and take of the water of life freely." 
There is yet another class. You are halt. You are halting between two opinions. You are 
sometimes seriously inclined, and at another time worldly gaiety calls you away. What little 
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progress you do make in religion is but a limp. You have a little strength, but that is so little that 
you make but painful progress. Ah, limping brother, to you also is the word of this salvation sent. 
Though you halt between two opinions, the Master sends me to you with this message: "How 
long halt ye between two opinions? if God be God, serve him; if Baal be God, serve him." 
Consider thy ways; set thine house in order, for thou shalt die and not live. Because I will do this, 
prepare to meet thy God, O Israel! Halt no longer, but decide for God and his truth. 
And yet I see another class, —the blind. Yes, you that cannot see yourselves, that think 
yourselves good when you are full of evil, that put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter, darkness 
for light and light for darkness; to you am I sent. You, blind souls that cannot see your lost estate, 
that do not believe that sin is so exceedingly sinful as it is, and who will not be persuaded to 
think that God is a just and righteous God, to you am I sent. To you too that cannot see the 
Saviour, that see no beauty in him that you should desire him; who see no excellence in virtue, 
no glories in religion, no happiness in serving God, no delight in being his children; to you, also, 
am I sent. Ay, to whom am I not sent if I take my text? For it goes further than this—it not only 
gives a particular description, so that each individual case may be met, but afterwards it makes a 
general sweep, and says, "Go into the highways and hedges." Here we bring in all ranks and 
conditions of men—my lord upon his horse in the highway, and the woman trudging about her 
business, the thief waylaying the traveller—all these are in the highway, and they are all to be 
compelled to come in, and there away in the hedges there lie some poor souls whose refuges of 
lies are swept away, and who are seeking not to find some little shelter for their weary heads, to 
you, also, are we sent this morning. This is the universal command—compel them to come in. 
Now, I pause after having described the character, I pause to look at the herculean labour 
that lies before me. Well did Melanchthon say, "Old Adam was too strong for young 
Melanchthon." As well might a little child seek to compel a Samson, as I seek to lead a sinner to 
the cross of Christ. And yet my Master sends me about the errand. Lo, I see the great mountain 
before me of human depravity and stolid indifference, but by faith I cry, "Who art thou, O great 
mountain? before Zerubbabel thou shalt become a plain." Does my Master say, compel them to 
come in? Then, though the sinner be like Samson and I a child, I shall lead him with a thread. If 
God saith do it, if I attempt it in faith it shall be done; and if with a groaning, struggling, and 
weeping heart, I so seek this day to compel sinners to come to Christ, the sweet compulsions of 
the Holy Spirit shall go with every word, and some indeed shall be compelled to come in. 
 
II. And now to the work—directly to the work. Unconverted, unreconciled, unregenerate 
men and women, I am to COMPEL YOU TO COME IN. Permit me first of all to accost you in 
the highways of sin and tell you over again my errand. The King of heaven this morning sends a 
gracious invitation to you. He says, "As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of 
him that dieth, but had rather that he should turn unto me and live:" "Come now, and let us 
reason together, saith the Lord, though your sins be as scarlet they shall be as wool; though they 
be red like crimson they shall be whiter than snow." Dear brother, it makes my heart rejoice to 
think that I should have such good news to tell you, and yet I confess my soul is heavy because I 
see you do not think it good news, but turn away from it, and do not give it due regard. Permit 
me to tell you what the King has done for you. He knew your guilt, he foresaw that you would 
ruin yourself. He knew that his justice would demand your blood, and in order that this difficulty 
might be escaped, that his justice might have its full due, and that you might yet be saved, Jesus 
Christ hath died. Will you just for a moment glance at this picture. You see that man there on his 
knees in the garden of Gethsemane, sweating drops of blood. You see this next: you see that 
	 174 
miserable sufferer tied to a pillar and lashed with terrible scourges, till the shoulder bones are 
seen like white islands in the midst of a sea of blood. Again you see this third picture; it is the 
same man hanging on the cross with hands extended, and with feet nailed fast, dying, groaning, 
bleeding; methought the picture spoke and said, "It is finished." Now all this hath Jesus Christ of 
Nazareth done, in order that God might consistently with his justice pardon sin; and the message 
to you this morning is this—"Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved." That is 
trust him, renounce thy works, and thy ways, and set thine heart alone on this man, who gave 
himself for sinners. 
Well brother, I have told you the message, what sayest thou unto it? Do you turn away? 
You tell me it is nothing to you; you cannot listen to it; that you will hear me by-and-by; but you 
will go your way this day and attend to your farm and merchandize. Stop brother, I was not told 
merely to tell you and then go about my business. No; I am told to compel you to come in; and 
permit me to observe to you before I further go, that there is one thing I can say—and to which 
God is my witness this morning, that I am in earnest with you in my desire that you should 
comply with this command of God. You may despise your own salvation, but I do not despise it; 
you may go away and forget what you shall hear, but you will please to remember that the things 
I now say cost me many a groan ere I came here to utter them. My inmost soul is speaking out to 
you, my poor brother, when I beseech you by him that liveth and was dead, and is alive for 
evermore, consider my master's message which he bids me now address to you. 
But do you spurn it? Do you still refuse it? Then I must change my tone a minute. I will 
not merely tell you the message, and invite you as I do with all earnestness, and sincere 
affection—I will go further. Sinner, in God's name I command you to repent and believe. Do you 
ask me whence my authority? I am an ambassador of heaven. My credentials, some of them 
secret, and in my own heart; and others of them open before you this day in the seals of my 
ministry, sitting and standing in this hall, where God has given me many souls for my hire. As 
God the everlasting one hath given me a commission to preach his gospel, I command you to 
believe in the Lord Jesus Christ; not on my own authority, but on the authority of him who said, 
"Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature;" and then annexed this solemn 
sanction, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be 
damned." Reject my message, and remember "He that despised Moses's law, died without mercy 
under two or three witnesses: of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought 
worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God." An ambassador is not to stand below the 
man with whom he deals, for we stand higher. If the minister chooses to take his proper rank, 
girded with the omnipotence of God, and anointed with his holy unction, he is to command men, 
and speak with all authority compelling them to come in: "command, exhort, rebuke with all 
long-suffering." 
But do you turn away and say you will not be commanded? Then again will I change my 
note. If that avails not, all other means shall be tried. My brother, I come to you simple of 
speech, and I exhort you to flee to Christ. O my brother, dost thou know what a loving Christ he 
is? Let me tell thee from my own soul what I know of him. I, too, once despised him. He 
knocked at the door of my heart and I refused to open it. He came to me, times without number, 
morning by morning, and night by night; he checked me in my conscience and spoke to me by 
his Spirit, and when, at last, the thunders of the law prevailed in my conscience, I thought that 
Christ was cruel and unkind. O I can never forgive myself that I should have thought so ill of 
him. But what a loving reception did I have when I went to him. I thought he would smite me, 
but his hand was not clenched in anger but opened wide in mercy. I thought full sure that his 
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eyes would dart lightning-flashes of wrath upon me; but, instead thereof, they were full of tears. 
He fell upon my neck and kissed me; he took off my rags and did clothe me with his 
righteousness, and caused my soul to sing aloud for joy; while in the house of my heart and in 
the house of his church there was music and dancing, because his son that he had lost was found, 
and he that was dead was made alive. I exhort you, then, to look to Jesus Christ and to be 
lightened. Sinner, you will never regret, —I will be bondsman for my Master that you will never 
regret it, —you will have no sigh to go back to your state of condemnation; you shall go out of 
Egypt and shall go into the promised land and shall find it flowing with milk and honey. The 
trials of Christian life you shall find heavy, but you will find grace will make them light. And as 
for the joys and delights of being a child of God, if I lie this day you shall charge me with it in 
days to come. If you will taste and see that the Lord is good, I am not afraid but that you shall 
find that he is not only good, but better than human lips ever can describe. 
I know not what arguments to use with you. I appeal to your own self-interests. Oh my 
poor friend, would it not be better for you to be reconciled to the God of heaven, than to be his 
enemy? What are you getting by opposing God? Are you the happier for being his enemy? 
Answer, pleasure-seeker; hast thou found delights in that cup? Answer me, self-righteous man: 
hast thou found rest for the sole of thy foot in all thy works? Oh thou that goest about to establish 
thine own righteousness, I charge thee let conscience speak. Hast thou found it to be a happy 
path? Ah, my friend, "Wherefore dost thou spend thy money for that which is not bread, and thy 
labour for that which satisfieth not; hearken diligently unto me, and eat ye that which is good, 
and let your soul delight itself in fatness." I exhort you by everything that is sacred and solemn, 
everything that is important and eternal, flee for your lives, look not behind you, stay not in all 
the plain, stay not until you have proved, and found an interest in the blood of Jesus Christ, that 
blood which cleanseth us from all sin. Are you still cold and indifferent? Will not the blind man 
permit me to lead him to the feast? Will not my maimed brother put his hand upon my shoulder 
and permit me to assist him to the banquet? Will not the poor man allow me to walk side-by-side 
with him? Must I use some stronger words. Must I use some other compulsion to compel you to 
come in? Sinners, this one thing I am resolved upon this morning, if you be not saved ye shall be 
without excuse. Ye, from the grey-headed down to the tender age of childhood, if ye this day lay 
not hold on Christ, your blood shall be on your own head. If there be power in man to bring his 
fellow, (as there is when man is helped by the Holy Spirit) that power shall be exercised this 
morning, God helping me. Come, I am not to be put off by your rebuffs; if my exhortation fails, I 
must come to something else. My brother, I entreat you, I entreat you stop and consider. Do you 
know what it is you are rejecting this morning? You are rejecting Christ, your only Saviour. 
"Other foundation can no man lay;" "there is none other name given among men whereby we 
must be saved." My brother, I cannot bear that ye should do this, for I remember what you are 
forgetting: the day is coming when you will want a Saviour. It is not long ere weary months shall 
have ended, and your strength begin to decline; your pulse shall fail you, your strength shall 
depart, and you and the grim monster—death, must face each other. What will you do in the 
swellings of Jordan without a Saviour? Death-beds are stony things without the Lord Jesus 
Christ. It is an awful thing to die anyhow; he that hath the best hope, and the most triumphant 
faith, finds that death is not a thing to laugh at. It is a terrible thing to pass from the seen to the 
unseen, from the mortal to the immortal, from time to eternity, and you will find it hard to go 
through the iron gates of death without the sweet wings of angels to conduct you to the portals of 
the skies. It will be a hard thing to die without Christ. I cannot help thinking of you. I see you 
acting the suicide this morning, and I picture myself standing at your bedside and hearing your 
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cries, and knowing that you are dying without hope. I cannot bear that. I think I am standing by 
your coffin now, and looking into your clay-cold face, and saying. "This man despised Christ 
and neglected the great salvation." I think what bitter tears I shall weep then, if I think that I have 
been unfaithful to you, and how those eyes fast closed in death, shall seem to chide me and say, 
"Minister, I attended the music hall, but you were not in earnest with me; you amused me, you 
preached to me, but you did not plead with me. You did not know what Paul meant when he said, 
'As though God did beseech you by us we pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God.'" 
I entreat you let this message enter your heart for another reason. I picture myself 
standing at the bar of God. As the Lord liveth, the day of judgment is coming. You believe that? 
You are not an infidel; your conscience would not permit you to doubt the Scripture. Perhaps 
you may have pretended to do so, but you cannot. You feel there must be a day when God shall 
judge the world in righteousness. I see you standing in the midst of that throng, and the eye of 
God is fixed on you. It seems to you that he is not looking anywhere else, but only upon you, and 
he summons you before him; and he reads your sins, and he cries, "Depart ye cursed into 
everlasting fire in hell!" My hearer, I cannot bear to think of you in that position; it seems as if 
every hair on my head must stand on end to think of any hearer of mine being damned. Will you 
picture yourselves in that position? The word has gone forth, "Depart, ye cursed." Do you see the 
pit as it opens to swallow you up? Do you listen to the shrieks and the yells of those who have 
preceded you to that eternal lake of torment? Instead of picturing the scene, I turn to you with the 
words of the inspired prophet, and I say, "Who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire? 
Who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings?" Oh! my brother, I cannot let you put 
away religion thus; no, I think of what is to come after death. I should be destitute of all 
humanity if I should see a person about to poison himself, and did not dash away the cup; or if I 
saw another about to plunge from London Bridge, if I did not assist in preventing him from 
doing so; and I should be worse than a fiend if I did not now, with all love, and kindness, and 
earnestness, beseech you to "lay hold on eternal life," "to labour not for the meat that perisheth, 
but for the meat that endureth unto everlasting life." 
Some hyper-calvinist would tell me I am wrong in so doing. I cannot help it. I must do it. 
As I must stand before my Judge at last, I feel that I shall not make full proof of my ministry 
unless I entreat with many tears that ye would be saved, that ye would look unto Jesus Christ and 
receive his glorious salvation. But does not this avail? are all our entreaties lost upon you; do you 
turn a deaf ear? Then again I change my note. Sinner, I have pleaded with you as a man pleadeth 
with his friend, and were it for my own life I could not speak more earnestly this morning than I 
do speak concerning yours. I did feel earnest about my own soul, but not a whit more than I do 
about the souls of my congregation this morning; and therefore, if ye put away these entreaties I 
have something else: —I must threaten you. You shall not always have such warnings as these. 
A day is coming, when hushed shall be the voice of every gospel minister, at least for you; for 
your ear shall be cold in death. It shall not be any more threatening; it shall be the fulfillment of 
the threatening. There shall be no promise, no proclamations of pardon and of mercy; no peace-
speaking blood, but you shall be in the land where the Sabbath is all swallowed up in everlasting 
nights of misery, and where the preachings of the gospel are forbidden because they would be 
unavailing. I charge you then, listen to this voice that now addresses your conscience; for if not, 
God shall speak to you in his wrath, and say unto you in his hot displeasure, "I called and ye 
refused; I stretched out my hand and no man regarded; therefore will I mock at your calamity; I 
will laugh when your fear cometh." Sinner, I threaten you again. Remember, it is but a short time 
you may have to hear these warnings. You imagine that your life will be long, but do you know 
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how short it is? Have you ever tried to think how frail you are? Did you ever see a body when it 
has been cut in pieces by the anatomist? Did you ever see such a marvelous thing as the human 
frame? 
"Strange, a harp of a thousand strings, 
Should keep in tune so long." 
 
Let but one of those cords be twisted, let but a mouthful of food go in the wrong 
direction, and you may die. The slightest chance, as we have it, may send you swift to death, 
when God wills it. Strong men have been killed by the smallest and slightest accident, and so 
may you. In the chapel, in the house of God, men have dropped down dead. How often do we 
hear of men falling in our streets—rolling out of time into eternity, by some sudden stroke. And 
are you sure that heart of your's is quite sound? Is the blood circulating with all accuracy? Are 
you quite sure of that? And if it be so, how long shall it be? O, perhaps there are some of you 
here that shall never see Christmas-day; it may be the mandate has gone forth already, "Set thine 
house in order, for thou shalt die and not live." Out of this vast congregation, I might with 
accuracy tell how many will be dead in a year; but certain it is that the whole of us shall never 
meet together again in any one assembly. Some out of this vast crowd, perhaps some two or 
three, shall depart ere the new year shall be ushered in. I remind you, then, my brother, that 
either the gate of salvation may be shut, or else you may be out of the place where the gate of 
mercy stands. Come, then, let the threatening have power with you. I do not threaten because I 
would alarm without cause, but in hopes that a brother's threatening may drive you to the place 
where God hath prepared the feast of the gospel. And now, must I turn hopelessly away? Have I 
exhausted all that I can say? No, I will come to you again. Tell me what it is, my brother, that 
keeps you from Christ. I hear one say, "Oh, sir, it is because I feel myself too guilty." That 
cannot be, my friend, that cannot be. "But, sir, I am the chief of sinners." Friend, you are not. The 
chief of sinners died and went to heaven many years ago; his name was Saul of Tarsus, 
afterwards called Paul the apostle. He was the chief of sinners, I know he spoke the truth. "No," 
but you say still, "I am too vile." You cannot be viler than the chief of sinners. You must, at least, 
be second worst. Even supposing you are the worst now alive, you are second worst, for he was 
chief. But suppose you are the worst, is not that the very reason why you should come to Christ. 
The worse a man is, the more reason he should go to the hospital or physician. The more poor 
you are, the more reason you should accept the charity of another. Now, Christ does not want 
any merits of your's. He gives freely. The worse you are, the more welcome you are. But let me 
ask you a question: Do you think you will ever get better by stopping away from Christ? If so, 
you know very little as yet of the way of salvation at all. No, sir, the longer you stay, the worse 
you will grow; your hope will grow weaker, your despair will become stronger; the nail with 
which Satan has fastened you down will be more firmly clenched, and you will be less hopeful 
than ever. Come, I beseech you, recollect there is nothing to be gained by delay, but by delay 
everything may be lost. "But," cries another, "I feel I cannot believe." No, my friend, and you 
never will believe if you look first at your believing. Remember, I am not come to invite you to 
faith, but am come to invite you to Christ. But you say, "What is the difference?" Why, just this, 
if you first of all say, "I want to believe a thing," you never do it. But your first inquiry must be, 
"What is this thing that I am to believe?" Then will faith come as the consequence of that search. 
Our first business has not to do with faith, but with Christ. Come, I beseech you, on Calvary's 
mount, and see the cross. Behold the Son of God, he who made the heavens and the earth, dying 
for your sins. Look to him, is there not power in him to save? Look at his face so full of pity. Is 
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there not love in his heart to prove him willing to save? Sure sinner, the sight of Christ will help 
thee to believe. Do not believe first, and then go to Christ, or else thy faith will be a worthless 
thing; go to Christ without any faith, and cast thyself upon him, sink or swim. But I hear another 
cry, "Oh sir, you do not know how often I have been invited, how long I have rejected the Lord." 
I do not know, and I do not want to know; all I know is that my Master has sent me, to compel 
you to come in; so come along with you now. You may have rejected a thousand invitations; 
don't make this the thousandth-and-one. You have been up to the house of God, and you have 
only been gospel hardened. But do I not see a tear in your eye; come, my brother, don't be 
hardened by this morning's sermon. O, Spirit of the living God, come and melt this heart for it 
has never been melted, and compel him to come in! I cannot let you go on such idle excuses as 
that; if you have lived so many years slighting Christ, there are so many reasons why now you 
should not slight him. But did I hear you whisper that this was not a convenient time? Then what 
must I say to you? When will that convenient time come? Shall it come when you are in hell? 
Will that time be convenient? Shall it come when you are on your dying bed, and the death 
throttle is in your throat—shall it come then? Or when the burning sweat is scalding your brow; 
and then again, when the cold clammy sweat is there, shall those be convenient times? When 
pains are racking you, and you are on the borders of the tomb? No, sir, this morning is the 
convenient time. May God make it so. Remember, I have no authority to ask you to come to 
Christ to-morrow. The Master has given you no invitation to come to him next Tuesday. The 
invitation is, "To-day if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts as in the provocation," for 
the Spirit saith "to-day." "Come now and let us reason together;" why should you put it off? It 
may be the last warning you shall ever have. Put it off, and you may never weep again in chapel. 
You may never have so earnest a discourse addressed to you. You may not be pleaded with as I 
would plead with you now. You may go away, and God may say, "He is given unto idols, let him 
alone." He shall throw the reins upon your neck; and then, mark—your course is sure, but it is 
sure damnation and swift destruction. 
And now again, is it all in vain? Will you not now come to Christ? Then what more can I 
do? I have but one more resort, and that shall be tried. I can be permitted to weep for you; I can 
be allowed to pray for you. You shall scorn the address if you like; you shall laugh at the 
preacher; you shall call him fanatic if you will; he will not chide you, he will bring no accusation 
against you to the great Judge. Your offence, so far as he is concerned, is forgiven before it is 
committed; but you will remember that the message that you are rejecting this morning is a 
message from one who loves you, and it is given to you also by the lips of one who loves you. 
You will recollect that you may play your soul away with the devil, that you may listlessly think 
it a matter of no importance; but there lives at least one who is in earnest about your soul, and 
one who before he came here wrestled with his God for strength to preach to you, and who when 
he has gone from this place will not forget his hearers of this morning. I say again, when words 
fail us we can give tears—for words and tears are the arms with which gospel ministers compel 
men to come in. You do not know, and I suppose could not believe, how anxious a man whom 
God has called to the ministry feels about his congregation, and especially about some of them. I 
heard but the other day of a young man who attended here a long time, and his father's hope was 
that he would be brought to Christ. He became acquainted, however, with an infidel; and now he 
neglects his business, and lives in a daily course of sin. I saw his father's poor wan face; I did not 
ask him to tell me the story himself, for I felt it was raking up a trouble and opening a sore; I 
fear, sometimes, that good man's grey hairs may be brought with sorrow to the grave. Young 
men, you do not pray for yourselves, but your mothers wrestle for you. You will not think of 
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your own souls, but your fathers anxiety is exercised for you. I have been at prayer meetings, 
when I have heard children of God pray there, and they could not have prayed with more 
earnestness and more intensity of anguish if they had been each of them seeking their own soul's 
salvation. And is it not strange that we should be ready to move heaven and earth for your 
salvation, and that still you should have no thought for yourselves, no regard to eternal things? 
Now I turn for one moment to some here. There are some of you here members of 
Christian churches, who make a profession of religion, but unless I be mistaken in you—and I 
shall be happy if I am—your profession is a lie. You do not live up to it, you dishonour it; you 
can live in the perpetual practice of absenting yourselves from God's house, if not in sins worse 
than that. Now I ask such of you who do not adorn the doctrine of God your Saviour, do you 
imagine that you can call me your pastor, and yet that my soul cannot tremble over you and in 
secret weep for you? Again, I say it may be but little concern to you how you defile the garments 
of your Christianity, but it is a great concern to God's hidden ones, who sigh and cry, and groan 
for the iniquities of the professors of Zion. 
Now does anything else remain to the minister besides weeping and prayer? Yes, there is 
one thing else. God has given to his servants not the power of regeneration, but he has given 
them something akin to it. It is impossible for any man to regenerate his neighbour; and yet how 
are men born to God? Does not the apostle say of such an one that he was begotten by him in his 
bonds. Now the minister has a power given him of God, to be considered both the father and the 
mother of those born to God, for the apostle said he travailed in birth for souls till Christ was 
formed in them. What can we do then? We can now appeal to the Spirit. I know I have preached 
the gospel, that I have preached it earnestly; I challenge my Master to honour his own promise. 
He has said it shall not return unto me void, and it shall not. It is in his hands, not mine. I cannot 
compel you, but thou O Spirit of God who hast the key of the heart, thou canst compel. Did you 
ever notice in that chapter of the Revelation, where it says, "Behold I stand at the door and 
knock," a few verses before, the same person is described, as he who hath the key of David. So 
that if knocking will not avail, he has the key and can and will come in. Now if the knocking of 
an earnest minister prevail not with you this morning, there remains still that secret opening of 
the heart by the Spirit, so that you shall be compelled. 
I thought it my duty to labour with you as though I must do it; now I throw it into my 
Master's hands. It cannot be his will that we should travail in birth, and yet not bring forth 
spiritual children. It is with him; he is master of the heart, and the day shall declare it, that some 
of you constrained by sovereign grace have become the willing captives of the all-conquering 
Jesus, and have bowed your hearts to him through the sermon of this morning. 
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Appendix C 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s Sermon 
“I Have a Dream”447 
 
I am happy to join with you today in what will go down in history as the greatest demonstration 
for freedom in the history of our nation. 
 
Five score years ago, a great American, in whose symbolic shadow we stand today, signed the 
Emancipation Proclamation. This momentous decree came as a great beacon light of hope to 
millions of Negro slaves who had been seared in the flames of withering injustice. It came as a 
joyous daybreak to end the long night of their captivity. 
But one hundred years later, the Negro still is not free. One hundred years later, the life of 
the Negro is still sadly crippled by the manacles of segregation and the chains of discrimination. 
One hundred years later, the Negro lives on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast 
ocean of material prosperity. One hundred years later, the Negro is still languished in the corners 
of American society and finds himself an exile in his own land. And so we've come here today to 
dramatize a shameful condition. 
In a sense we've come to our nation's capital to cash a check. When the architects of our 
republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, 
they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a 
promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the "unalienable 
Rights" of "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." It is obvious today that America has 
defaulted on this promissory note, insofar as her citizens of color are concerned. Instead of 
honoring this sacred obligation, America has given the Negro people a bad check, a check which 
has come back marked "insufficient funds." 
But we refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that 
there are insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this nation. And so, we've come 
to cash this check, a check that will give us upon demand the riches of freedom and the security 
of justice. 
We have also come to this hallowed spot to remind America of the fierce urgency of 
Now. This is no time to engage in the luxury of cooling off or to take the tranquilizing drug of 
gradualism. Now is the time to make real the promises of democracy. Now is the time to rise 
from the dark and desolate valley of segregation to the sunlit path of racial justice. Now is the 
time to lift our nation from the quicksands of racial injustice to the solid rock of brotherhood. 
Now is the time to make justice a reality for all of God's children. 
It would be fatal for the nation to overlook the urgency of the moment. This sweltering 
summer of the Negro's legitimate discontent will not pass until there is an invigorating autumn of 
freedom and equality. Nineteen sixty-three is not an end, but a beginning. And those who hope 
that the Negro needed to blow off steam and will now be content will have a rude awakening if 
the nation returns to business as usual. And there will be neither rest nor tranquility in America 
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until the Negro is granted his citizenship rights. The whirlwinds of revolt will continue to shake 
the foundations of our nation until the bright day of justice emerges. 
But there is something that I must say to my people, who stand on the warm threshold 
which leads into the palace of justice: In the process of gaining our rightful place, we must not be 
guilty of wrongful deeds. Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for freedom by drinking from the 
cup of bitterness and hatred. We must forever conduct our struggle on the high plane of dignity 
and discipline. We must not allow our creative protest to degenerate into physical violence. 
Again and again, we must rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical force with soul force. 
The marvelous new militancy which has engulfed the Negro community must not lead us 
to a distrust of all white people, for many of our white brothers, as evidenced by their presence 
here today, have come to realize that their destiny is tied up with our destiny. And they have 
come to realize that their freedom is inextricably bound to our freedom. 
 
We cannot walk alone. 
And as we walk, we must make the pledge that we shall always march ahead. 
 
We cannot turn back. 
There are those who are asking the devotees of civil rights, "When will you be satisfied?" 
We can never be satisfied as long as the Negro is the victim of the unspeakable horrors of police 
brutality. We can never be satisfied as long as our bodies, heavy with the fatigue of travel, cannot 
gain lodging in the motels of the highways and the hotels of the cities. We cannot be satisfied as 
long as the negro's basic mobility is from a smaller ghetto to a larger one. We can never be 
satisfied as long as our children are stripped of their self-hood and robbed of their dignity by 
signs stating: "For Whites Only." We cannot be satisfied as long as a Negro in Mississippi 
cannot vote and a Negro in New York believes he has nothing for which to vote. No, no, we are 
not satisfied, and we will not be satisfied until "justice rolls down like waters, and righteousness 
like a mighty stream." 
I am not unmindful that some of you have come here out of great trials and tribulations. 
Some of you have come fresh from narrow jail cells. And some of you have come from areas 
where your quest—quest for freedom left you battered by the storms of persecution and 
staggered by the winds of police brutality. You have been the veterans of creative suffering. 
Continue to work with the faith that unearned suffering is redemptive. Go back to Mississippi, go 
back to Alabama, go back to South Carolina, go back to Georgia, go back to Louisiana, go back 
to the slums and ghettos of our northern cities, knowing that somehow this situation can and will 
be changed. 
 
Let us not wallow in the valley of despair, I say to you today, my friends. 
And so even though we face the difficulties of today and tomorrow, I still have a dream. 
It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream. 
I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its 
creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal." 
I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia, the sons of former slaves and the 
sons of former slave owners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood. 
I have a dream that one day even the state of Mississippi, a state sweltering with the heat 
of injustice, sweltering with the heat of oppression, will be transformed into an oasis of freedom 
and justice. 
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I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will 
not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character. 
I have a dream today! 
I have a dream that one day, down in Alabama, with its vicious racists, with its governor 
having his lips dripping with the words of "interposition" and "nullification"—one day right 
there in Alabama little black boys and black girls will be able to join hands with little white boys 
and white girls as sisters and brothers. 
I have a dream today! 
I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, and every hill and mountain 
shall be made low, the rough places will be made plain, and the crooked places will be made 
straight; "and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed and all flesh shall see it together." 
 
This is our hope, and this is the faith that I go back to the South with. 
With this faith, we will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope. 
With this faith, we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful 
symphony of brotherhood. With this faith, we will be able to work together, to pray together, to 
struggle together, to go to jail together, to stand up for freedom together, knowing that we will be 
free one day. 
And this will be the day—this will be the day when all of God's children will be able to 
sing with new meaning: 
 
My country 'tis of thee, sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing. Land where my fathers died, land of 
the Pilgrim's pride, From every mountainside, let freedom ring! 
 
And if America is to be a great nation, this must become true. 
And so let freedom ring from the prodigious hilltops of New Hampshire. 
Let freedom ring from the mighty mountains of New York. 
Let freedom ring from the heightening Alleghenies of Pennsylvania. 
Let freedom ring from the snow-capped Rockies of Colorado. 
Let freedom ring from the curvaceous slopes of California. 
 
But not only that: 
Let freedom ring from Stone Mountain of Georgia. 
Let freedom ring from Lookout Mountain of Tennessee. 
Let freedom ring from every hill and molehill of Mississippi. 
From every mountainside, let freedom ring. 
 
And when this happens, and when we allow freedom ring, when we let it ring from every village 
and every hamlet, from every state and every city, we will be able to speed up that day 
when all of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and 
Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual: 
 
Free at last! Free at last! 
Thank God Almighty, we are free at last! 
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Appendix D 
Fred Craddock’s Sermon 
“Doxology”448 
 
Romans 11:33–36 
 
In the fall of the year, even after days grow short and the air crisp, I still go out on the patio alone 
at the close of the day. It usually takes only a few minutes, but those few minutes are necessary. 
Everyone needs a time and place for such things. 
But this particular evening was different. I sat there remembering, trying to understand 
the painful distance between the day as I planned it and the day as it had been. The growing 
darkness was seeping into mind and heart, and I was as the night. Looking back on it, I know 
now that it was the evening on which The Idea came to me. But frankly, I was in no mood to 
entertain it. 
It was not really a new Idea, but neither was it old. It was just an Idea. And it returned the 
next evening. I was relaxed enough to play with it a little while before it went away. 
The following evening I spent a bit more time playing with the Idea and feeding it. 
Needless to say, I grew attached to the Idea before long, and then I had the fear that it belonged 
to one of the neighbors and that I would not be able to keep it. 
I went to each of the neighbors. “Is this your Idea?” “No, it isn’t our Idea.” 
I claimed it for myself and exercised an owner’s prerogative by giving it a name. I named 
it....Doxology. I took Doxology inside to our family supper table. Supper is family time, and is 
usually reflection upon the day. If all are unusually quiet, I often ask, “What the worst thing that 
happened today?” [My son] John answers, “The school bell rang at 8:30.” “Well, what was the 
best thing that happened today?” “It rang again at 3:30.” Tongues are loosed and all of us—
Laura, John, Nettie, and I—share our day. Supper is a good time and pleasant, and the whole 
family agreed Doxology belonged at our table. 
 
The next day Doxology went with me downtown for some routine errands. But somehow they 
did not seem so routine. We laughed at a child losing a race with an ice cream cone, his busy 
tongue unable to stop the flow down to his elbow. 
We studied the face of a homeless man staring in a jewelry store window and wondered if 
he were remembering better days or hoping for better days. We spoke to the banker, standing 
with thumbs in vest before a large plate glass window, grinning as one who possessed the keys of 
the kingdom. 
But I had to make a stop at St. Mary’s Hospital to see Betty. Betty was dying with cancer, 
and the gravity of my visit prompted me to leave Doxology in the car. Doxology insisted on 
going in and was not at all convinced by my reasons for considering it inappropriate to take it 
into the room of a dying patient. I locked Doxology in the car. 
Betty was awake and glad to see me. I awkwardly skirted the subject of death. “It’s all 
right,” she said. “I know, and I have worked it through. God has blessed me with a wonderful 
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family, good friends, and much happiness. I am grateful. I do not want to die. But I am not 
bitter.” Before I left, it was she who offered the prayer. 
Back at the car, Doxology asked, “Should I have been there?” “Yes,” I answered softly. 
“I’m sorry. I did not understand.” 
Of course, Doxology went with the family on vacation. This summer we went to the 
beach down on the Gulf. What a good time! A swim before breakfast, a snooze in the afternoon 
sun, and a walk on the beach for shells in the evening. 
Doxology enjoyed watching the young people in dune buggies whiz by and spin sand 
over on the old man half-buried beside his wife, who turned herself in the sun like a chicken 
being barbecued. 
It was fun to walk out into the waves. These waves would start toward us, high, angry, 
and threatening. But as they drew near, they began to giggle and fall down. By the time they 
reached us, they had rolled over. We scratched their soft undersides, and they ran laughing back 
out to sea. There is no question: Doxology belongs on a vacation. 
Too soon it is time for school again. I return to seminary classes, explaining all the while 
to Doxology that Doxology is unnecessary, even superfluous, at seminary. After all, do we not 
spend every day talking about God? We do not need Doxology when we are heavily engaged in 
theology. 
I was leading a group of students in a study of Paul’s letter to the Romans. The class soon 
discovered, however, that in this weightiest and most influential of all Paul’s letters, the 
argument was often interrupted by Doxology. 
Early in the letter, in the midst of a discussion of the spiritual state of all those who live 
out their lives without Bible or knowledge of Christ, Paul inserts a burst of praise to the “Creator 
who is blessed forever, Amen.” After a very lengthy treatment of the tragic situation concerning 
the Jews, from whom came the Christ but who had not believed in Him, Paul breaks off his 
argument and suddenly begins to sing: 
 
O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How Unsearchable are his 
judgments and how inscrutable his ways! For Who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has 
been his counselor? Or who has given a gift to him, to receive a gift in return? For from him And 
through him and to him are all things. To him be the glory forever. Amen. (Rom. 11:33–36) 
 
Time and time again Paul breaks the line of thought with a doxological reservation, as though 
suddenly reminding himself of something. Why? Probably because Paul is aware that Doxology 
is most appropriate to his task as a theologian. Theology begins with words not about God but to 
God. People discern first what is sacred, and from there move to what is true and right and 
good. Worship does not interrupt theological study; theology grows out of worship. 
More specifically, Doxology is appropriate for Paul’s own life, for who he is. Who is Paul that he 
should write of the grand themes of creation, the history of salvation, and redemption in Jesus 
Christ? He is himself a creation of the very grace of which he speaks. He offers himself as 
Exhibit A in evidence of the effective love of God. Why not break into song now and then? 
Nothing could be more appropriate for any of us, whoever or wherever or however. Whether we 
spend our time at sticky café tables talking revolution or sit in calm indifference on suburban 
patios, Doxology is never out of place. 
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Once in a while we have a seminarian who gives it up. Not suddenly but slowly. Zeal 
cools, faith weakens, appetite for Christian enterprises disappears. The soul is parched, and you 
can see it in the eyes grown dull. What happened? Did evil storm his citadel and take over? No. 
Did attractive alternatives to ministry turn his head? No. Nothing quite so dramatic. He simply 
made the fatal error of assuming that spending so much time talking about God was an adequate 
substitute for talking with God. He lost his Doxology, and he died. Is there ever a time or place 
when it is inappropriate to say: For from him and through him and to him are all things—to him 
be glory forever? 
It was from the class on Romans that I was called to the phone. My oldest brother had 
just died. Heart attack. When stunned and hurt, get real busy to avoid thought. Call the wife. Get 
the kids out of school. Arrange for a colleague to take my classes. Stop the paper and the mail. 
Arrange to have someone feed the dog. “I think I packed the clothes we need,” my wife said as 
we threw luggage and our bodies into the car. 
All night we drove, across two states, eyes pasted open against the windshield. 
Conversation was spasmodic, consisting of taking turns asking the same questions over and over. 
No one pretended to have answers. 
When we drew near the town and the house, I searched my mind for a word, a first word 
to the widow. He was my brother, but he was her husband. I was still searching when we pulled 
into the driveway. 
She came out to meet us, and as I opened the car door, still without that word, she broke 
the silence: “I hope you brought Doxology.” Doxology? No, I had not. I had not even thought of 
Doxology since the phone call. But the truth is now clear: If we ever lose our Doxology, we 
might as well be dead. For from him, and through him, and to him are all things. To him be glory 
forever. In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. 
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Appendix E 
Explanatory Page 
 
	
London School of Theology (LST) Research Ethics Policy and Code of Practice requests that an 
Ethics form should be completed for approval before the start of research involving human 
participants. However, the approval of the LST Research Ethics Committee was not sought prior 
to my submission of the thesis although I engaged in research involving human participants. I 
sought permission immediately after submission.  
 
In order to address this issue, the Academic Dean, Professor Twelftree, and the Program Leader 
of Theology and Counselling, Nikolaos Souvlakis, met with the Academic Secretary to discuss 
how best to respond to this oversight. They agreed that I should add an explanatory page that 
addresses the specific points below and that this page should be inserted in the thesis before 
sending it to the examiners. 
 
1. Explain the absence of the Research Ethics Committee approval. 
 
When I began as a student in 2012, there was not a requirement to pursue approval for human 
testing. Over the years LST guidelines regarding human testing have become more detailed and 
during this time I have had multiple Directors of Studies. When it was finally decided that I 
would test my hypothesis, neither I, nor my Director of Studies, nor my First Supervisor was 
paying sufficient attention to the regulations, perhaps because the research seemed innocuous, as 
will be explained below. In any case, the day before I submitted my thesis, Dr. Arthurs (my First 
Supervisor) realized that my testing may have required approval from the Research Ethics 
Committee and he informed me of this potential oversight. I immediately contacted Sandra 
Khalil to explain the situation and to ask for guidance.  
 
2. Methodology used in the Research 
 
Chapter 6 explains the methodology used in the research. In summary, fifty volunteers listened to 
a sermon and filled out a questionnaire that tested their attention to bland, prosaic language 
compared to their attention to vivid, pictorial language. Prior to participation, each volunteer read 
a cover letter explaining the research procedures to ensure that they were fully informed and 
comfortable with participating in the research. All participants willingly volunteered and they 
had the ability to opt out at any time during the test. 
 
3. How the data has and will be handled. 
 
The data consists of the respondents’ first names, gender, religious affiliation, and church 
engagement, along with their responses to a questionnaire that tested their attention to different 
kinds of language throughout a sermon. The data is analyzed and explained solely for the 
purposes of this thesis.  
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4. The protections in place to support the Research Participants. 
 
The respondents’ feedback remains anonymous and will not be passed along or used for any 
purpose other than informing this particular research. All participants have my contact 
information and can contact me with any questions or concerns. Upon successful defense of my 
thesis, I will destroy the data. 
 
 
5. A statement as to how the student will engage with the Research Participants  
in the future. 
 
I will not further engage any of the respondents regarding this thesis’ research. 
 
6. The explanatory page should explicitly state that from this point forward, until the 
conclusion of the Viva, the Research Methodology is the responsibility of the Supervisor 
but that after the Viva this will become the responsibility of the student. 
 
Until the conclusion of the viva, the research methodology is the responsibility of Michael 
Roth’s supervisors, Dr. Heimerdinger and Dr. Arthurs, but after the viva this will become the 
responsibility of Michael Roth. 
 
 
Date: October 25, 2018 
 
Signature: Michael H. Roth 
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Appendix F 
An Ode to Care 
 
 
Part I 
I’ll begin with a poem. It’s by the great Anne Sexton who had a terribly difficult life, an unhappy 
childhood, with possible abuse, a life-long struggle with depression, a tumultuous marriage. She 
writes about her divorce, in this poem: 
 
I have killed our lives together, 
axed off each head, 
with their poor blue eyes stuck in a beach ball 
rolling separately down the drive. 
 
I have killed all the good things, 
but they are too stubborn for me. 
 
They hang on. 
 
The little words of companionship 
have crawled into their graves, 
the thread of compassion, 
dear as a strawberry, 
the mingling of bodies 
that bore two daughters within us, 
the look of you dressing, 
early, 
all the separate clothes, neat and folded, 
you sitting on the edge of the bed 
polishing your shoes with boot black, 
and I loved you then, so wise from the shower, 
and I loved you many other times 
and I have been for months, 
trying to drown it, 
to push it under, 
to keep its great red tongue 
under like a fish, 
but whenever I look they are on fire, 
the bass, the bluefish, the wall-eyed flounder 
blazing among the kelp and seaweed 
like many suns battering up the waves 
and my love stays bitterly glowing, 
spasms of it will not sleep, 
and I am helpless and thirsty and need shade 
but there is no one to cover me— 
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  not even God. 
 
Sad. So, terribly, sad, isn’t it? It’s filled with a trembling ache brought on by a difficult life. And 
while this poem is specifically about divorce, I think its conclusion: 
 
 I am helpless and thirsty and need shade 
 but there is no one to cover me– 
  not even God, 
 
Is a universal experience. Mental illness. Abuse. A crushed dream. The end of a relationship. 
Sickness. A career path that crumbles to pieces. A wayward child: 
 
 I am helpless and thirsty and need shade 
 but there is no one to cover me– 
  not even God. 
 
To make matters worse, we have these notions about God: Too holy to come near my un-
holiness. Too demanding to be pleased by my messiness. God shrouded in a cloud, on a 
mountain. God behind a curtain, in a tabernacle. God far away, up in heaven. You see we have 
these images of God as rock, as lightning, as thunder, as warrior, as all-consuming fire. Oh, 
 
 I am helpless and thirsty and need shade 
 but there is no one to cover me– 
  not even God. 
 
Of course. How can it be any other way? I mean, the images that we have of God pervasively 
shape our understanding of God. And yet, there are other images. There are other stories and 
poems and metaphors, for divinity. Consider John chapter 10: 
 
I am the good shepherd. The good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep. The hired 
hand, who is not the shepherd and does not own the sheep, sees the wolf coming and 
leaves the sheep and runs away—and the wolf snatches them and scatters them. The hired 
hand runs away because a hired hand does not care for the sheep. I am the good shepherd. 
I know my own and my own know me, just as the Father knows me and I know the 
Father. And I lay down my life for the sheep. 
 
Part II 
There are a couple interesting points being made here, in Jesus’ “I am the good shepherd” 
statement. The first is that he is differentiating between himself, and other people. According to 
Jesus, he is not like the “hired hands” in the world. Now, “hired hands,” in this context, can refer 
to any person who has responsibility to care for another person. So, this could be: A boss, or a 
politician, or a friend, or a spouse, or a therapist, or a physician, or a pastor, or a sibling, or a 
parent, who, even if they are above average in caring for us, also fail us from time to time. And 
of course, we’ve all experienced at one time or another, a person, who is supposed to care for us, 
disappoint us, hurt us deeply, break trust, and cause us pain and anguish and terrible sorrow. And 
this, especially at a young age, can inflict a wound deep in our soul, that teaches us to be strong, 
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to not have needs, to not ask for help, to hide our tender places, and to overcompensate with 
strength. 
 
And Jesus is saying here: Those wounds. Those experiences. Those people who have not cared 
well for you in this life. They do not reflect me. They do not reflect me. This differentiation, 
between the hired hands and Jesus, has antecedents in Ezekiel chapter 34. In Ezekiel 34, God is 
rebuking those who are supposed to care for others—the kings, the prophets, the priests—
because, they are being unnecessarily harsh, and brutal. They are taking things that don’t belong 
to them and they are prioritizing themselves at the expense of everybody else. 
 
You see, Jesus is differentiating between himself, and the hired hands who are supposed to care 
for us, but don’t. Jesus is differentiating between himself, and the hired hands who have blown it 
big time without remorse or concern. Jesus is differentiating between himself, and the hired 
hands who have hurt us deeply, which, I think, at a very deep place inside of us, can make us feel 
afraid. Afraid of those who have power. Afraid of those who are in control. Afraid that we are 
alone and isolate and in danger and surrounded by trouble with no one to care for us, not even 
God. 
 
Part III 
And this brings me to my second point about Jesus’ “I am the good shepherd” statement: I love 
that Jesus frames this differentiation between those who fail to care for us, and Jesus who 
promises to care for us, in terms of Shepherd and Sheep. 
 
Have you ever paused to think about sheep? They’re not known for being very smart, are they? 
For example: If sheep get knocked onto their backs it’s almost impossible for them to get up 
from that position. Did you know that sheep don’t like to get their feet wet? Because of this, 
sheep who are unable to reach pools of water without getting their feet wet have been known to 
dehydrate and even die. Here’s an interesting fact about sheep: If sheep sense danger, they tend 
to walk backwards and not always in a direction that leads them away from the danger. Sheep 
prefer to climb uphill more than downhill. And sheep have a strong instinct to follow a leader. 
When one sheep decides to go somewhere, the rest of the flock usually follow, even if it isn’t a 
good decision. Like, if the lead sheep jumps off of a cliff, the others are likely to follow. That’s 
true. The Associate Press, July 8th, 2005, and I quote: 
 
Istanbul Turkey. First one sheep jumped. Then stunned Turkish shepherds, who had left 
the herd to graze while they had breakfast, watched as nearly 1500 others followed, each 
leaping off the same cliff. In the end 450 dead animals lay on top of one another in a 
billowy white pile. Those who jumped later were saved as the pile got higher and the fall 
more cushioned. 
 
End of quote. See what I mean? Getting knocked over and unable to get back up. Unable to drink 
water when it’s right there in front of them. Taking the difficult uphill path, even when 
unnecessary. Walking into danger. Following the wrong leader. It appears that sheep are: at best, 
unwise, and, at worst, just plain dumb. And yet, did you know that a group of behavioral 
scientists from Cambridge spent a few years studying and testing sheep, and have found them to 
have reasonable intelligence? It’s true. You may be wondering how that is possible. Well, 
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explaining the seeming lack of intelligence that sheep have, lead scientist Keith Kendrick states: 
“Sheep are scared of just about everything. Any animal, including humans, once they are scared, 
they don’t tend to show signs of intelligent behavior.” 
 
This finding is fascinating to me. Because, it illuminates the possibility that, the unwise and 
illogical things that I do in life may have less to do with a lack of intelligence and more to do 
with fear. Like, maybe those moments in my life that “hired hands” have failed to tenderly and 
sacrificially care for me, maybe those moments have quietly, sneakily, and even unnoticeably 
penetrated my deepest parts with suspicion and overwhelming fear. I mean, let’s be honest about 
it. It is very often fear, not a lack of intelligence, that makes us do crazy things. 
 
Like, hired hands knock us over enough times, and attempting to get back up begins to feel 
impossible. Like hired hands hurt us enough times, and the water we long for begins to look like 
poison. Like hired hands trick us enough times, and the difficult path becomes our normative life 
experience. Like hired hands wound us enough times, and the differences between the good 
shepherd and the hired hands begin to blur. And so, we sing: 
 
 I am helpless and thirsty and need shade 
 but there is no one to cover me– 
  not even God. 
 
Part IV 
What if God isn’t anything like a hired hand? What if God is better than our projections of those 
who have had power and control, but who have failed to care for us, and who have deeply hurt 
us? What if God is a good shepherd like John chapter 10 declares? 
 
Good Shepherd. Good. In English, “good” is an adjective that has six definitions: 
 
Definition number 1: to be desired or approved of. For example, a good quality of life 
Definition number 2: having the qualities required for a particular role. For example, the 
schools here are good. 
Definition number 3: possessing or displaying moral virtue. For example, I've met many 
good people who made me feel ashamed of my own shortcomings 
Definition number 4: giving pleasure; enjoyable or satisfying. For example, the streets fill 
up with people looking for a good time. 
Definition number 5: valid. For example, the ticket is good for travel from May to 
September. 
Definition number 6: used in conjunction with the name of God or a related expression as 
an exclamation of extreme surprise or anger. For example, good heavens! 
 
In the Greek, the word good is kalos, which is usually translated as beautiful or good. This 
word, in this particular form, is only used five times in the NT: 1 Timothy 1:8 We know that the 
law is good if one uses it properly; 1 Timothy 4:6 If you point these things out to the brothers, 
you will be a good minister of Christ Jesus, brought up in the truths of the faith; 2 Timothy 2:3 
Endure hardship with us like a good soldier of Christ Jesus. And then of course, it’s used in John 
chapter 10. It’s used in this chapter, twice: John 10:11 I am the good shepherd. 10:14 I am the 
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good shepherd; I know my sheep and my sheep know me. So that’s the adjective “good” that 
describes the noun, “shepherd.” 
 
In English, the noun “shepherd” can refer to a person who tends and rears sheep. It can refer to a 
member of the clergy who provides spiritual care and guidance for a congregation. Or, it can also 
be short for German shepherd. Not that that matters, but it’s a little interesting. 
 
In the Greek, the word shepherd is poimein. This word, in this particular form, is used even less 
than kalos. It’s used only three times in the New Testament: Once in Matthew chapter 25:32 
when Jesus tells about the sheep and goats, in which the shepherd separates the sheep from the 
goats. And then, it’s used twice in John chapter 10. Verse 11, I am the good shepherd. And 
again, in verse 14, I am the good shepherd; I know my sheep and my sheep know me. 
 
And so, the Bible tells us that God, revealed in Jesus, is not simply good, nor simply a shepherd. 
Rather, God as revealed in Jesus is a shepherd who is good. God, as revealed in Jesus is a good 
shepherd. 
 
Part V 
But there are other ways, besides delineating words, to try and comprehend a good shepherd. 
Other poems, other songs, other images of divinity’s shepherding care, that give us courage to 
get out of bed, to try again, to trust that it isn’t all bad, to hope for something better, to believe 
that, at the heart of it all, is a compassionate, tender, and ever-present shepherd, who cares. 
 
In a dazzling poem titled “Courage,” Anne Sexton writes these words in her first two stanzas: 
 
It is in the small things we see it. 
The child's first step, 
as awesome as an earthquake. 
The first time you rode a bike, 
wallowing up the sidewalk. 
The first spanking when your heart 
went on a journey all alone. 
When they called you crybaby 
or poor or fatty or crazy 
and made you into an alien, 
you drank their acid 
and concealed it. 
 
Later, 
if you faced the death of bombs and bullets 
you did not do it with a banner, 
you did it with only a hat to 
cover your heart. 
You did not fondle the weakness inside you 
though it was there. 
Your courage was a small coal 
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that you kept swallowing. 
If your buddy saved you 
and died himself in so doing, 
then his courage was not courage, 
it was love; love as simple as shaving soap. 
 
Love as simple as shaving soap. I love that image so much. You see, sometimes in our anguish, I 
think what we long for is a rock, lightning, thunder, a warrior and consuming fire to come down 
to earth and cleanse the world of every person who has caused us pain. But instead, we are given 
a good shepherd. And who knows, perhaps those hired hands, who have hurt us most deeply, 
have had hired hands who have hurt them in their most tender places. I really don’t know. But 
what if Sexton is right? What if love—for our purposes, let’s call it capital L, Love—what if 
divine love is as simple as shaving soap? Simple and warm and soft and lathered all over our 
faces—present to us, in us, and wonderfully upon us? Not only when the day is bathed in light 
but also, when the day is a valley filled with shadows of death? 
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Appendix G 
Demographic Form 
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Appendix H 
Questionnaire Form 
 
	
	
  
	 196 
 
Appendix I 
Demographic Results 
 
Gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age 
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Religious Affiliation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Church Engagement 
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Church Engagement, Continued 
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Appendix J 
Complete Likert Scale Results 
 
Part One Results 
Part One utilized a highly visual poem, metaphors depicting God, and a reading from John 
10:11–15. The results: 
 
 
Part Two Results 
Part Two utilized prosaic language to differentiate between Jesus who is a good shepherd and 
other hired hands. The results: 
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Part Three Results 
Part Three described images of the silly things that sheep do, and it utilized hypotyposis to 
describe sheep jumping off of a cliff. The results: 
 
 
 
Part Four Results 
Part Four didactically defined the words “good” and “shepherd.” The results: 
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Part Five Results 
Part Five utilized a second, highly visual poem, and it employed simile and metaphor to depict 
the love of God. The results: 
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Appendix K 
Full Analysis of the Likert Scale Results 
 
Total Averages for Each Sermon Part 
 
Pictorial Section, Part I, Total Averages 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
200 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
20 20 27 32 99 49.5% 
Agree 22 26 19 12 79 39.5% 
Neutral 4 2 2 2 10 5% 
Disagree 3 1 1 3 8 4% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 1 1 1 4 2% 
Total 50 50 50 50 200 100% 
 
 
Prosaic Section, Part II, Total Averages 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
200 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
13 17 13 11 54 27% 
Agree 28 24 23 21 96 48% 
Neutral 4 7 9 9 29 14.5% 
Disagree 4 2 4 5 15 7.5% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 0 1 4 6 3% 
Total 50 50 50 50 200 100% 
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Pictorial Section, Part III, Total Averages 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured 
my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
200 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
29 30 31 36 126 63% 
Agree 18 18 16 12 64 32% 
Neutral 2 2 3 2 9 4.5% 
Disagree 1 0 0 0 1 .5% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Total 50 50 50 50 200 100% 
 
 
Prosaic Section, Part IV, Total Averages 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured 
my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
200 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
3 6 3 5 17 8.5% 
Agree 18 15 18 13 64 32% 
Neutral 14 18 18 13 63 31.5% 
Disagree 11 8 7 13 39 19.5% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
4 3 4 6 17 8.5% 
Total 50 50 50 50 200 100% 
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Pictorial Section, Part V, Total Averages 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured 
my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
200 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
20 21 26 28 95 47.5% 
Agree 21 20 15 14 70 35% 
Neutral 7 9 9 6 31 15.5% 
Disagree 2 0 0 2 4 2% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Total 50 50 50 50 200 100% 
 
 
Pictorial Sections, Part I, III, and V Combined Averages 
 
Pictorial Sections I, III, and V, “Strongly Agree” Combined Average 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured 
my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
600 
% 
Strongly 
Agree Part I 
20 20 27 32 99  
Strongly 
Agree, Part 
III 
29 30 31 36 126  
Strongly 
Agree, Part 
V 
20 21 26 28 95  
Total     320 53.34% 
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Pictorial Sections I, III, and V, “Agree” Combined Average 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured 
my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
600 
% 
Agree Part I 22 26 19 12 79  
Agree, Part 
III 
18 18 16 12 64  
Agree, Part 
V 
21 20 15 14 70  
Total     213 35.5% 
 
 
Pictorial Sections I, III, and V, “Neutral” Combined Average 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured 
my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
600 
% 
Neutral Part 
I 
4 2 2 2 10  
Neutral, 
Part III 
2 2 3 2 9  
Neutral, 
Part V 
7 9 9 6 31  
Total     50 8.34% 
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Pictorial Sections I, III, and V, “Disagree” Combined Average 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured 
my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
600 
% 
Disagree, 
Part I 
3 1 1 3 8  
Disagree, 
Part III 
1 0 0 0 1  
Disagree, 
Part V 
2 0 0 2 4  
Total     13 2.16% 
 
 
Pictorial Sections I, III, and V, “Strongly Disagree” Combined Average 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured 
my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
600 
% 
Strongly 
Disagree, 
Part I 
1 1 1 1 4  
Strongly 
Disagree, 
Part III 
0 0 0 0 0  
Strongly 
Disagree, 
Part V 
0 0 0 0 0  
Total     4 .66% 
 
 
Total Results for Pictorial Sections I, III, and V, Combined Average 
Out of 600 points 
Strongly agree: 320 = 53.34% 
Agree: 213 = 35.5% 
Neutral: 50 = 8.34% 
Disagree: 13 = 2.16 
Strongly disagree: 4 = .66% 
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Prosaic Sections, Part II and IV Combined Averages 
 
Prosaic Sections, Part II and IV, “Strongly Agree” Combined Average 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured 
my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
400 
% 
Strongly 
Agree Part 
II 
13 17 13 11 54  
Strongly 
Agree, Part 
IV 
3 6 3 5 17  
Total     71 17.75% 
 
 
Prosaic Sections, Part II and IV, “Agree” Combined Average 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured 
my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
400 
% 
Agree Part 
II 
28 24 23 21 96  
Agree, Part 
IV 
18 15 18 13 64  
Total     160 40% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 208 
Prosaic Sections, Part II and IV, “Neutral” Combined Average 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured 
my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
400 
% 
Neutral Part 
II 
4 7 9 9 29  
Neutral, 
Part IV 
14 18 18 13 63  
Total     92 23% 
 
 
Prosaic Sections, Part II and IV, “Disagree” Combined Average 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured 
my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
400 
% 
Disagree, 
Part II 
4 2 4 5 15  
Disagree, 
Part IV 
11 8 7 13 39  
Total     54 13.5% 
 
 
Prosaic Sections, Part II and IV, “Strongly Disagree” Combined Average 
 I found it 
easy to 
concentrate 
I was 
engaged 
The words 
captured 
my 
attention 
The 
language 
created 
images that 
I could 
“see” in my 
mind’s eyes 
Total 
Points = 
400  
% 
Strongly 
Disagree, 
Part II 
1 0 1 4 6  
Strongly 
Disagree, 
Part IV 
4 3 4 6 17  
Total     23 5.75% 
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Total Results for Prosaic Sections II and IV, Combined Average 
Out of 400 points 
Strongly agree: 71 = 17.75% 
Agree: 160 = 40% 
Neutral: 92 = 23% 
Disagree: 54 = 13.5% 
Strongly disagree: 23 = 5.75% 
 
 
Comparison of Total Results for Pictorial Sections I, III, V and Prosaic 
Sections II and IV 
 
 Pictorial Sections, 
Parts I, III, and V 
Prosaic Sections, 
Parts II and IV 
Total Points 600 400 
Strongly Agree 320 = 53.34% 71 = 17.75% 
Agree 213 = 35.5% 160 = 40% 
Neutral 50 = 8.34% 92 = 23% 
Disagree 13 = 2.16 54 = 13.5% 
Strongly Disagree 4 = .66% 23 = 5.75% 
Strongly Agree & 
Agree 
533 = 88.84% 231 = 57.75% 
Neutral, Disagree, 
and Strongly 
Disagree 
67 = 11.16% 169 = 42.25% 
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Appendix L 
Complete Open-Ended Question Results 
 
 
Part One Results 
Part One utilized a highly visual poem, metaphors depicting God, and a reading from John 
10:11–15. The results: 
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Part Two Results 
Part Two utilized prosaic language to differentiate between Jesus who is a good shepherd and 
other hired hands. The results: 
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Part Three Results 
Part Three described images of the silly things that sheep do, and it utilized hypotyposis to 
describe sheep jumping off of a cliff. The results: 
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Part Four Results 
Part Four didactically defined the words “good” and “shepherd.” The results: 
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Part Five Results 
Part Five utilized a second, highly visual poem, and it employed simile and metaphor to depict 
the love of God. The results: 
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Appendix M 
Full Analysis of the Open-Ended Question Results 
 
Imagery for Each Sermon Part 
 
Pictorial Section, Part I. Total Images (repeated imagery excluded and not counting the 
words “good,” “shepherd,” or “good shepherd”) 
 
Rock, lightning, scattering sheep, shepherd lying down with sheep, an old bearded white man 
sitting on a cloud, chopping off the heads, man getting out of the shower, polishing shoes, red 
tongue, heads rolling like beach balls, fish in the water, walking out of shower, God as warrior 
and fire, beach ball, shepherd watching for the sheep, dressing in the morning, strawberry, water, 
God as rock, warrior against image of shepherd, axed off heads, blue eyes in a beach ball, fish on 
fire, dressing early, boot black, rock, consuming fire, axed off head, blue eyes stuck in a ball 
rolling down the drive, wise from the shower, red tongued fish. 
 
Prosaic Section, Part II. Total Images (repeated imagery excluded and not counting the 
words “good,” “shepherd,” or “good shepherd”) 
 
The words politician, sibling, therapist, teacher caused four respondents to list these words, 
which resulted in one respondent to write, “… made me picture these personal examples [when 
“hired hands like politicians, siblings, etc.] in my life.” 
 
Pictorial Section, Part III. Total Images (repeated imagery excluded and not counting the 
words “good,” “shepherd,” or “good shepherd”) 
 
Feet wet, walking backwards, feet in water, walk backwards even if it’s into danger, follow 
leader off of cliffs, a pile of sheep, sheep jumping, the sheep following one another off a cliff, a 
fluffy 1500 sheep pile, fluffy white cloud, sheep lying on its back, shepherds having breakfast, 
fluffy mounds of sheep, sheep with their legs in the air. 
 
Prosaic Section, Part IV. Total Images (repeated imagery excluded and not counting the 
words “good,” “shepherd,” or “good shepherd”) 
 
None. 
 
Pictorial Section, Part V. Total Images (repeated imagery excluded and not counting the 
words “good,” “shepherd,” or “good shepherd”) 
 
Get out of bed, shaving soap upon us, love as simple as soap, shaving soap, drank their acid, I 
could see white, creamy, lathering soap, swallowing acid, foaming, drinking their poison, love as 
lather all over our faces, spanking, bike wallowing in the driveway, baby first steps like 
earthquakes, rocks, lightning, courage like coal you kept swallowing, light and shadows of death, 
shaving soap spilling out in abundance. 
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Graphs Depicting “Strongly Agree” for Each Sermon Part, Per Respondent 
 
Part I       Part II 
 
 
 
 
Part III      Part IV 
       
 
Part V 
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Tables Depicting “Strongly Agree” for Each Sermon Part in Images and 
Combined Concertation, Engagement, and Attention, in Percentages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part One: 
Pictorial 
Images 
 
 
Combined: 
Concentration, 
Engagement, 
and Attention 
“Strongly 
Agree” in % 
64% 44.66% 
Part Two: 
Prosaic 
Images 
 
 
Combined: 
Concentration, 
Engagement, 
and Attention 
“Strongly 
Agree” in % 
22% 28.6% 
Part Three: 
Pictorial 
Images 
 
 
Combined: 
Concentration, 
Engagement, 
and Attention 
“Strongly 
Agree” in % 
72% 60% 
Part Four: 
Prosaic 
Images 
 
 
Combined: 
Concentration, 
Engagement, 
and Attention 
“Strongly 
Agree” in % 
10% 8% 
Part Five: 
Pictorial 
Images 
 
 
Combined: 
Concentration, 
Engagement, 
and Attention 
“Strongly 
Agree” in % 
56% 44.66% 
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Tables Depicting “Strongly Agree” for Combined Sermon Parts in Images 
and Combined Concertation, Engagement, and Attention, in Percentages 
 
  
Parts One, 
Three, and 
Five: 
Pictorial 
Images 
 
 
Combined: 
Concentration, 
Engagement, 
and Attention 
“Strongly 
Agree” in % 
64% 49.77% 
Parts Two, 
and Four: 
Prosaic  
Images 
 
 
Combined: 
Concentration, 
Engagement, 
and Attention 
“Strongly 
Agree” in % 
16% 18.33% 
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